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There is no widely accepted contextual framework for planning, designing, and 
evaluating systems of protocols and equipment for detecting, intercepting, and 
deterring transport of high consequence radiological and nuclear threats.  A 
candidate framework is posited for assessment of the design and application of a 
security system for detection and interdiction of these threats at an international 
border crossing.  Results from an examination of the efficacy of this framework 
indicate that the use of rarely considered criteria provide a promising framework 
for a broad community of stakeholders to use in planning, design and application 
of security system upgrades for high consequence threats in the flow of 
commerce at a border crossing.  These results also indicate that discovery of 
these criteria can be informed by a model of the geopolitical structure in which 
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION  
 
Many nations and regions are facing decisions about how to improve their 
abilities to deal with man-made and natural disasters like hurricanes, tornadoes, 
floods, levee failures, earthquakes, fires and epidemics.  They establish 
organizations that concentrate on understanding how to predict or respond to 
these types of events.  In addition to natural and man-made disasters, 
governments try to protect their citizens from criminal behavior, like burglary, 
violence and harassment.  At the same time, these governments have other 
missions that are extant at international border crossings associated with 
immigration control, highway safety, environmental protection, customs and tariff 
collection.  
 
Frequently, these additional capabilities and/or protocols must work in the same 
spaces as the normal security, law enforcement and compliance services already 
extant.  In many areas of the world, limited financial resources and/or uncertain 
political relationships make the problem more difficult.  
 
An architecture exists in some form to support these standing missions.  Police 
departments, fire departments, and emergency management organizations work 
in some of the same spaces and share some of the same information in many 
regions.  There may be memoranda of agreement between organizations in 
contiguous areas within a metropolitan area that facilitate information sharing and 
interoperability.  This construct may allow and define the roles and 
responsibilities of these organizations when they need to support each other.  
Staffing and budget levels will be affected by these agreements.  An organization 
can save money if they know they can rely on a neighboring organization to 
provide some type of support to them when needed (like fire departments and 
bomb squads).  These relationships and understandings underpin the overall 
enterprise of security in a region. 
 
In addition to improving abilities to deal with disasters, many national, regional 
and local organizations would like to provide improved security for their citizens.  
Considerable attention at the moment focuses on low probability but very high 
consequence events, like the detonation of an improvised nuclear device or of a 
radiological dispersal device.  As technology is developed to detect these types 
of threats, and as methodologies are developed for dealing with the 
consequences of these events, discussions arise around how to deploy these 
technologies and methodologies.  In some cases, the organizations that will be 
responsible for the utilization of the technologies are those that already have 
other missions that occupy their attention, like local police officers, customs 




When a nation or region adds the mission of protection from (or response to and 
recovery from) terrorism, the architecture already extant in the region may have 
to support the new mission.  In some cases, the government may expect the 
same policeman who walks a beat looking for criminal behavior also to detect 
weapons of mass destruction.  A fireman may have to deal with radioactive 
materials or new chemical agents in smoke.  A highway patrolman may have to 
screen vehicles for abnormal radiation as well as looking for normal criminal 
behavior.  
 
The government might assume that if they provide new equipment, protocols and 
training, then the responsible organizations will make a long term commitment to 
support the additional missions, which generally involve low probability, high 
consequence events.  With limited financial resources and uncertain political 
relationships, there may be cases where organizations struggle to budget for and 
commit to this additional mission space for the long term.  Without a long term 
commitment by all parties involved, it seems unlikely that the overall enterprise 
will succeed. 
 
In this dissertation, three obstacles in the way of planning for and analyzing the 
security of a region are discussed.  These obstacles are: 
1) A general lack of consensus about what is meant by security; 
2) A lack of consensus around metrics important to ensuring enduring 
mission success 
3) A general lack of frameworks to support the planning and assessment of 
security.(McGill & Ayyub, 2009) 
 
This planning is especially difficult for cases where: a) the threats are hard to 
detect; b) the occurrence of the threat is likely to be extremely rare; c) the 
security plan requires cooperation and coordination of multi-organizational 
resources (especially for the case of borders between regional constructs); d) the 
security system is complex; and e) the security system involves human 
perception and human response.  This dissertation addresses this type of 
problem, the introduction of a mission to interdict the illicit transport of 
radiological and nuclear materials at an international border crossing,  
 
There is no widely accepted contextual framework for planning, designing, 
evaluating systems of protocols and equipment for detecting, intercepting, and 
deterring infrequent transport of high consequence threats across international 
borders.  A framework proposed in this dissertation can inform discussions and 
considerations around how this interdiction might be implemented.  The 
framework will include a consideration of the relationships between organizations 
with missions associated with the border crossing before the radiological and 
nuclear threat screening mission is added, a model of the physical structure of 
the border crossing, and a dynamic model of the traffic flows through the border 
crossing station.  An examination of how the addition of a RadNuc screening 
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mission might change the organizational relationships, the physical structure of 
the border crossing station and the dynamic flow of traffic through (and within) 
the station is conducted.  To more fully characterize these effects, a set of 
metrics is developed that relate to high level objectives associated with long term 
efficacy of the endeavor.  
 
A description of a hypothetical border crossing provides a focus point for the 
study.  For this hypothetical border crossing, the study postulates missions of the 
types of organizations likely to apply there and the study discusses a likely 
associated concept of operations.  Later in the study, what may happen when 
another mission (for detection and interdiction of radiological and nuclear threats) 
is added to the system is discussed.  The model of the border crossing is useful 
in examining the operational effects of this radiological and nuclear (RadNuc) 
mission addition.  Then a discussion of the hypothetical geopolitical structure is 
used to examine the effects of the RadNuc mission addition to the broader group 
of stakeholders.  An examination of criteria and metrics for assessment of the 










ADDITION OF RADNUC SCREENING MISSION AT BORDER 
CROSSINGS 
 
Problem Statement and Research Questions 
 
Types of border crossings 
There are many different types of border crossings, ranging from very simple to 
very complex.  There are some border crossings which are unmanned, some 
which are operational only for certain periods of time, some which are at 
locations where only vehicle and foot traffic are allowed, some which are at 
locations that include sea ports as well as vehicle and foot traffic, and some 
locations which act like border crossings because they serve as ports of entry 
inland (like international airports). 
 
The type of border crossings considered within this dissertation will be 
considered a location where a checkpoint is installed to monitor and control the 
flow of vehicles and people from one national geopolitical construct to another. 
For this dissertation, we will examine an international land border crossing with 
significant vehicular flow.  An example of such a border crossing is shown in 
Figure 1. 
 
The flow of people and goods from one country into another facilitates commerce 
and legitimate travel.  Predominately, this flow is entirely legal, and is monitored 
and controlled at border crossings and other ports of entry to ensure that regional 
policies and regulations are met.  Since delays in commerce have been shown to 
relate to economics of a value chain, then the monitoring and controlling of traffic 
flow can become problematic.  For United Kingdom border crossings, the cost of 
procedures and border crossings were estimated to be from 2% to 15% of the 
value of the goods crossing the border.(UK KM Revenue and Customs, 2009) A 
photograph showing traffic backup at the U.S. San Ysidro (California) border 
crossing is shown in Figure 2.   
 
Generally, there are many national policies applicable to border crossings. 
Several federal, state and local agencies will have missions to support the 
policies.  These agencies will have developed regulations to support these 
missions.  These agencies then will have developed concepts of operations to 
support these regulations throughout the nation.  At locations like a land border 
crossing, these regulations and the associated concepts of operations will be 
applied at the same location.  This confluence of policies, missions, regulations 
and operational constructs at the same location can be problematic.  This 










Figure 2. San Ysidro border crossing traffic back-up (List of Mexico–United 
States border crossings, Wikipedia) 
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the border crossing and the operational construct there. 
 
Critical issues at border crossings – growth in volume, increase in security 
measures, limited funding and other resources 
How these layers of federal, state, county, metropolitan area, city and township 
missions and organizations interact varies from location to location.  In some 
cases, there is an overall regional integrating organization that helps articulate 
common goals, encourages policy and operational alignment where possible and 
promotes overall communication and information sharing.  Occasionally, the 
organizations may act as rigid and totally separate entities.  In any case, there 
are certainly opportunities for development of different and possibly competing 
perspectives about importance of missions, training, equipment purchases, 
information sharing and budgets and other resources to advance initiatives.  This 
disparity in perspectives may change radically in the face of perceived danger 
from immediate threats, or the need to respond to disasters or attacks. 
 
The volume of goods and services crossing international borders has been 
growing significantly, and is expected to continue growing.  The 2008 U.S. and 
global economic downturn caused some setbacks, but freight exports continue to 
show a long-term upward trend.  According to the U.S. Department of 
Transportation, world merchandise freight exports nearly tripled in value from 
$5.4 trillion to $16 trillion from 1998 to 2008, while U.S. freight exports doubled 
from $682 billion to $1.3 trillion during the same period.  Their report concludes 
that a strong interconnectedness among countries and the increased 
globalization of economic activities continue to generate increasing freight 
movements.(U.S. Department of Transportation, 2010)  
 
At many of these borders, there have been complaints about the backup of the 
flow of commerce and people – at a significant economic cost.  For example, in a 
study of the U.S. El Paso region, a study predicts that total freight flows through 
the area will grow by more than 76 per cent by 2035 and that if something is not 
done to relieve the projected congestion at the border crossings, wait times will 
result in a contraction of the regional economy by $54 billion (21.8 
percent).(Cambridge Systematics, 2011) 
 
At the same time, there has been significant growth in the number of security 
related initiatives applicable to border crossings.  These security related 
initiatives add to the burden of the border operations staff, to the law enforcement 
organizations that have to deal with the violations of the regulations and the 
judicial systems that have to handle the cases arising from the arrests made 
associated with the border crossings.  Several nations are struggling with the 
question about how best to assess the efficacy of the operational constructs to 




The problem statement for this dissertation is to develop a useful framework for 
assessing the efficacy of the addition of a radiological and nuclear detection and 
interdiction system when it is laid onto an existing set of mission spaces and 
concepts of operations at a land border crossing. 
 
Research questions 
An approach for addressing this problem statement is presented.  The first step 
in this approach is the development a set of strategic questions that will help 
ensure that a broad integrated perspective will be developed and examined.  To 
develop these strategic questions, the second step was building a set of models 
of a hypothetical border crossing.  Then an accompanying set of hypothetical 
stakeholders and missions associated with the border crossing was postulated.  
A concept of operations to support these missions at the hypothetical border 
crossing was developed and examined.  Then these models and concepts of 
operations were modified to support consideration of what would happen when a 
radiological and nuclear materials detection and interdiction mission would be 
laid onto the border crossing operational construct.  This examination addresses 
the following strategic questions: 
 
1. What is a useful approach for eliciting strategic questions to be 
considered? 
2. What are some strategic questions coming from the work? 
3. What are some tactical questions arising from the strategic questions? 
4. What are useful metrics related to these questions? 
5. What is a useful methodology for evaluating these metrics? 
 
Literature Review and Personal Experience 
 
A literature review supported the need for a framework for assessing the efficacy 
of systems for detection and interdiction of radiological and nuclear threats at 
land border crossings.  This finding  aligns well with previous conclusions drawn 
from numerous occasions to observe and examine operations at border 
crossings and at ports of entry within the U.S.(White, 2011)  A discussion of the 
literature and observations of the author is organized here as: 
1. Description of border crossings 
2. General missions and stakeholders for border crossings 
3. Addition of security missions at border crossings 
4. Need for consensus in definitions of security 
5. The RadNuc mission 
6. Need for consensus in metrics that relate to enduring success of this 
additional RadNuc mission 
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7. Methodologies for assessing efficacy of new missions. 
 
Description of border crossings 
An excellent summary of border crossing descriptions, international regulations 
associated with border crossings, and typical roles and responsibilities of 
government agencies at border crossings is given in the Handbook of Best 
Practices at Border Crossings – a Trade and Transport Facilitation Perspective 
published by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in 
conjunction with the United Nations Economic Commission for 
Europe.(Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 2012)  The 
handbook gives an overview of the existing legal framework related to 
international trade and border management.  The handbook points out that there 
is an international increase in cross-border transactions supporting the growing 
global trade.  To facilitate that trade, governments are trying to find more efficient 
border crossing processes.   
 
Conway, in his “Land Port of Entry”, in the Whole Building Design Guide 
sponsored by the U.S. National Institute of Building Sciences, describes the 
functions occurring at a border crossing station.(Conway, 2010)  These activities 
generally take place to meet the missions of several federal agencies.  According 
to Conway and the previously mentioned OSCE Handbook, the types of activities 
include: 
1. Compliance checks to ensure that activities involving the crossing of the 
border meet the requirements of national legislation; 
2. Control of entry into or departure from the country for persons and 
materials arriving as commercial, non-commercial, or pedestrian traffic; 
3. Collection of revenues;  
4. Prevention of illegal aliens from entering the country; 
5. Prevention of injurious plant, animal pests, human and animal diseases 
from entering the country; 
6. Examination of export documents; and 
7. Registration of valuable articles being temporarily taken out of the country. 
 
Persons are essentially checked from the perspective of immigration, with the 
added objective of detecting and arresting criminals. These checks are carried 
out by immigration authorities, border police or, in some cases, by border guards 
or troops. 
 
Goods are usually checked by Customs authorities.  However, goods can also be 
examined by border police when drugs, weapons or, occasionally, undeclared or 
prohibited goods are suspected. Goods are sometimes also searched by animal 
health/agriculture officials, or by standards and consumer protection agencies.  




Commercial vehicles are controlled by road administrations such as ministries of 
transport, or sometimes by border police.  Immigration authorities may also 
choose to inspect commercial vehicles to detect illegal immigrants.  Private 
vehicles are inspected by Customs authorities or, sometimes, by border police. 
 
Generally, border police are in charge of controlling persons, while customs 
officials are in charge of controlling goods.  This can lead to an important 
question.  Can customs officers inspect traveler and identity documents or 
passports because, in theory, that is the responsibility of the border police or 
immigration authorities?  We can see that some sort of agreement, supported by 
law, might need to be put in place.  
 
According to the OSCE Handbook, border police frequently are not authorized to 
search vehicles or goods.  But the identity of drivers may be an essential part of 
risk management for customs and, conversely, border police may have good 
reasons to inspect rail, road or vessel transport cargo.  
 
Similarly, different administrations may carry out identical verifications for 
different purposes, such as weighing the vehicle.  The traditional demarcation of 
the tasks undertaken by various staff members at border crossings brings with it 
the risk of duplication of effort, waste of resources, and lack of commitment to the 
areas where missions overlap. 
 
A land border station generally includes a facility that is owned or leased by a 
federal agency.  A border station is typically open year-round. However, 
there may be locations which operate seasonally due to local climate conditions, 
and some facilities which are not open twenty-four hours each day.(Conway, 
2010) 
 
In practice, a border is a busy area where many government organizations have 
a presence.  Some have a physical presence, while others delegate their 
activities to border crossing operations staff (usually employed by a customs type 
organization).  For instance, in its study of the UK security environment, SITPRO 
Ltd. (now part of the UK Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS)) 
has identified a series of government stakeholders and divided them into two 
groups: those with executive authority directly responsible for controlling the 
cross-border environment, and others with a policy development role.  Among 
these organizations, some have a presence at the border, such as Customs, 
while others are only represented at the central government level, such as the 
department of trade.  Some are represented at both levels. 
 
General missions and stakeholders for border crossings 
According to the General Services Administration, a U.S. border station may 




General Services Administration (GSA), Public Buildings Service: The GSA is 
responsible for the providing the land, design and construction of land ports of 
entry.  GSA also provides general management, maintenance and repair. 
 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP): CBP facilitates legitimate trade and 
travel.  Generally, CBP inspects goods and people seeking entry into the U.S. at 
land ports of entry.  Depending on the need a secondary inspection may be 
conducted by the CBP, Veterinary Services (VS), or the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA).  The U.S. Border Patrol is part of CBP, but does not 
participate in inspections at the land ports of entry.  
 
The Department of Transportation’s Federal Highway Administration (FHWA): 
The FHWA works with its state, federal, and international partners to ensure the 
safe and efficient movement of people and goods across borders.  
 
U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA): FDA conducts inspections to control 
the import of foods, drugs, cosmetics, medical devices, biological products, 
animal feeds and drugs, and radiation-emitting instruments.  CBP officers are 
trained and certified to detect and intercept shipments. 
 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (F&WS): The F&WS regulates the importation of 
birds protected by the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species 
(CITES) and the Wild Bird Conservation Act of 1992 (WBCA).  
 
Department of Justice’s Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS): The DOJ, 
whose law enforcement branches (the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Drug 
Enforcement Agency) coordinate with CBP and Bureau of Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents when their investigations involve immigration 
violations. 
 
Center for Disease Control (CDC): The CDC develops and implements strategies 
to monitor for diseases on people, animals, cargo, and conveyances arriving at 
the U.S.’s ports of entry.  The CDC reviews operations for programs used to 
monitor the importation of quarantinable and other specified diseases.  
 
Bureau of Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE): ICE’s mission is to 
detect and prevent terrorist and criminal acts by targeting the people, money, and 
materials that support terrorist and criminal networks.  ICE is also responsible for 
the collection, analysis and dissemination of strategic and tactical intelligence 
data pertaining to homeland security, infrastructure protection, and the illegal 




The Transportation Security Administration (TSA): The TSA is charged with 
protecting the United States’ air, land, and rail transportation systems to ensure 
freedom of movement for people and commerce. 
 
U.S. Border Patrol (USBP): The USBP enforces U.S. immigration law and other 
federal laws between official ports of entry along the border and in the interior of 
the United States.  As currently comprised, the USBP is the uniformed law 
enforcement arm of the Department of Homeland Security.  Its primary mission is 
to detect and prevent the entry of terrorists, weapons of mass destruction, and 
unauthorized aliens into the country, and to interdict drug smugglers and other 
criminals. 
 
Department of Agriculture (USDA): The USDA establishes the agricultural 
policies that CBP Inspectors execute.  Among other things, the USDA 
implements stray animal control policies, provides inspection services when 
imported animals are re-assembled after importation, and assists with notification 
of livestock movement to receiving states.  USDA also works with Homeland 
Security border inspectors to train inspectors and set policy for plants, animals, 
and commodities entering the United States.  USDA employs new Import 
Surveillance Liaison Inspectors, who are stationed around the nation at Import 
Houses and ports of entry to enhance surveillance of imported products.   
 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA): The CIA informs INS officers of potential 
terrorists, including possible operatives trying to enter the United States.(U.S. 
General Services Administration, 2013)   
 
These mission spaces and the agencies responsible for them are summarized in 
Table 1.  A similar set of mission spaces and the federal, state and local 
agencies supporting them for our hypothetical border crossing later will be 
developed and discussed later in this report.   
 
All of these organizations operating at borders have different strategic objectives, 
requirements, documentation, processes and information technology systems. 
This potentially creates a mass of paperwork and duplication. Because these 
organizations have their own means of vertical reporting, they tend to work 
independently, thus opening up the risk of overlapping activities and operational 
gaps. Lack of co-ordination can also result in conflicting instructions and 
requirements. 
 
Addition of security missions to border crossings 
Recent years have seen a dramatic increase in security regulations. Regulatory 
control in trade concerns revenue collection, safety and security, environment 
and health, consumer protection and trade policy.  In recent years, the addition of 
new security initiatives has added many regulatory burdens to businesses. 
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Table 1. Federal missions and organizations for U.S. border crossing 
Mission Objective U.S. Agency 
Provide and maintain structures, utility interfaces General Services 
Administration 
Sets federal policies to facilitate cross border 
travel; inspects goods and people 
Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP) 
Facilitate safe and efficient movement of people 




Control the import of foods, drugs, cosmetics, 
medical devices, biological products, animal 
feeds and drugs, and radiation-emitting 
instruments 
Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) 
Regulate the importing of birds and wildlife 
protected by international convention 
Fish and Wildlife Service 
(FWS) 
Federal law enforcement, criminal and terrorist 
threat response 
Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) 
Federal law enforcement related to drugs, 
smuggling 
Drug Enforcement Agency 
(DEA) 
Develop and implement strategies to monitor for 
diseases in people, animals, cargo, and 
conveyances  
Center for Disease Control 
(CDC) 
Detect and prevent criminal acts by targeting the 
people, money, and materials that support 
criminal networks 
Bureau of Immigrations and 
Customs Enforcement (ICE) 
Protecting national air, land, and rail 
transportation systems to ensure freedom of 
movement for people and commerce 
Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA) 
Detect and prevent the entry of weapons of mass 
destruction, unauthorized aliens, and drug 
smugglers and other criminals 
Border Patrol (BP) 
Implements animal control policies, provides 
inspection  





Although there are many security initiatives affecting border-crossing stations, 
not all are specifically relevant to Customs authorities.  Other agencies also 
operate at borders: for example, the police, agencies for the interior or counter-
terrorism agencies, and administrative bodies responsible for food, drugs, and 
veterinary or safety matters. 
 
Furthermore, Customs authorities may also find themselves being required to 
implement security measures on behalf of other such agencies.  SITPRO, for 
example, examined UK sea borders and supply chains and discovered that in 
recent years no less than 37 new and existing security-related procedures and 
controls had been put in place.(SITPRO, 2008)  A listing of recent security 
initiative is given here is given here for the UK: 
 
1.   Authorized Economic Operator (AEO) 
2.   Container Security Initiative (CSI) 
3.   Secure operator 
4.   Known Shipper (air freight) 
5.   ISPS Code and SOLAS Convention (maritime) 
6.   ISO 28000 
7.   U.S. Customs and Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) 
8.   Transport Asset Protection Association Freight Security Requirements 
(TAPA-FSR) 
9.   Multi Agency Threat and Risk Assessment (MATRA) 
10. Export controls (precursor drugs) 
11. Import licenses (carcinogenic substances) 
12. Rough diamond certificate 
13. Export controls (end use and destination) 
14. Export controls (technology, dual-use and military) 
15. Medical equipment licensing 
16. Medicines and drugs licensing 
17. Animal health controls and licensing 
18. Plant health controls and certificates 
19. Food and hygiene controls 
20. Bio-terrorism controls for USA 
21. Secure freight initiative: 100% freight screening 
22. Customs pre-notifications: security 
23. Using additional scanning equipment such as X-ray scanners scanning for 
radioactive materials and explosives and chemicals 
24. Immigration passenger controls 
25. Immigration vehicle operator controls 
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26. Financial crime and financing of terrorism; restrictions and controls 
27. Pre-ship notification 
28. Road operator licensing 
29. Immigration outward proposed under eBorders 
30. Dangerous goods declarations: air 
31. Dangerous goods declarations: rail 
32. Dangerous goods declarations: sea 
33. Dangerous goods declarations: road 
34. Compliance with specified health and safety procedures for handling goods 
35. Formal co-operation agreements between businesses and executive 
agencies including MoUs 
36. Due diligence activities such as contracts, guarantees, letters of credit, 
reference requests, credit checking and other 
37. Commercial insurance. 
 
Need for consensus in definitions of security 
The literature indicates a lack of consensus with respect to certain terms, 
concepts, metrics and assessment methodologies that limits the quality of 
discussions around what should be done (and how much) to improve security.  
Clearly, the perspective of the planner/assessor produces a lens through which 
he perceives the quality of security in a region.   
 
There probably will be many perspectives that need to be integrated into any 
enduring changes in the security posture of a region.  A businessman, a police 
officer, and a district attorney may define security in terms of threats they deal 
with every day.  An official within the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the 
Environmental Protection Agency, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission or the 
Department of Defense may define security in terms that also include low 
probability but very high consequence events.  The public at large may define 
security in absolute terms, wanting the government to provide total protection 
from any threat.  Security professionals might define security in relative terms, 
knowing that security can never be absolute. 
 
Furthermore, the funding available to the planner may be applicable only to a 
particular type of security problem.  A federal organization established to support 
a nuclear threat mission would have funding available primarily for detection and 
interdicting radiological and nuclear threats, but not for recovery from a 
detonation of such a threat.  Nor does it have funds available for dealing with 
chemical or biological threats or natural disasters.  A federal emergency 
management agency might not have funding for detection and interdiction, but 
would have funds applicable to preparedness and response/recovery from 
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almost any kind of disaster.  An environmental protection agency, a nuclear 
regulatory commission, a transportation security administration, a department of 
agriculture, a department of defense, and a department of justice all will have 
different missions that give their planners different perspectives around the 
definition of security.   
 
At a regional or state level, there are still more differences in perspective.  Fire 
departments, police departments, hospitals, bomb squads, customs officials, and 
judges probably all see the term security differently.   
 
This tends to lead to a compartmentalization around the matter of security, 
allowing planners and analysts to deal with a smaller scope of mission space. 
But this compartmentalization also may crystallize perspectives, making 
consideration of other perspectives problematic.  In many cases, these security 
specialists have to compete for limited resources.  For example, this competitive 
posture might make the specialist in bomb prevention less interested in flood 
relief. 
 
There is a need for a common framework (even at the highest level) to support 
dialogue among organizations that are compartmentalized around specific threat 
types (or regions).  This framework should support a dialogue around how the 
organizations involved view security.  An important part of this discussion would 
be how the increases in mission could be woven into the existing mission spaces 
of the organizations that would be touched by it.   
 
A model frequently adds value to this type of discussion.  If the mission increase 
were to be applied at only one bridge or tunnel, or if it included adding only a little 
more information to be shared, then what might have been a serious debate 
might instead be a quick agreement.  If there are major changes in missions, 
then definitions of scope and specifics of implementation become very important.  
A model frequently can support the exploration and illumination of what is meant 
by otherwise vague terms. 
 
The RadNuc mission 
An additional security mission we are considering in this dissertation is screening 
and interdicting radiological and nuclear threats.  At many border crossings 
throughout the world, there are radiation detection instruments used for detecting 
whether people or cargo have radioactive materials in excess of what is allowed.  
This generally is done for safety purposes.  Significant quantities of radioactive 
material in transport generally require some sort of transportation containers 
approved by the federal government (and international organizations like the 
International Air Transport Association, or IATA, and the International Maritime 
Organization, or IMO), as well as placarding to alert border crossing officials and 
law enforcement officials that there are varying levels of radioactive material in 
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transit.  At high enough levels, some states require official escort of vehicles 
carrying radioactive materials throughout their boundaries.  One function of some 
border crossings is to detect and monitor these shipments of radioactive 
materials. 
 
A high level of concern is associated with the possibility of a terrorist attack using 
radioactive materials in a radiological dispersal device or RDD.  Generally, an 
RDD involves a large amount of radioactive material and a method of dispersal.  
In most cases, the method of dispersal involves the use of explosives that would 
detonate and spread the radioactive material broadly to contaminate a targeted 
area.  Other possible methods of dispersal might involve placing the radioactive 
material in a water supply, spreading it from airborne platforms or in some cases 
just opening a container near an air intake system of a building and letting the 
radioactive material evaporate into the intake.  For this study, we will consider 
only RDD threats that involve large quantities of radioactive material, emanating 
significant levels of radiation (which may or may not be shielded). 
 
A nuclear threat, as considered in this dissertation, will involve special nuclear 
material (SNM) and will, for the purposes of this report, include a quantity of SNM 
sufficient that it could become weaponized in a fashion to cause a nuclear 
explosion.  This possibility is also considered a very significant security concern.  
In this report, the term RadNuc will represent the threats presented by either the 
RDD threat or the nuclear device threat. 
 
The shipment without authorization by the responsible authorities of radioactive 
materials of significant quantities and of types that could become a RadNuc 
threat generally is regarded as illicit.  For this dissertation, the general problem of 
detecting and interdicting the illicit transport of RadNuc materials at border 
crossings is considered.   
 
Kouzes (Kouzes et al., 2003) discusses a problem that arises from naturally 
occurring radioactive materials and medical isotopes at border crossings when 
one tries to screen for the RadNuc threat in cargo. He points out that the 
materials of concern for cargo are plutonium (239Pu), enriched uranium (235U) and 
233U and other special nuclear materials and any radioactive source that could be 
used for an RDD.  All of these materials produce a gamma radiation signature. 
 
In addition to detecting and measuring the gamma radiation coming from a 
person or cargo, many border crossing locations also monitor for neutron 
radiation, because plutonium emits neutrons as well as gamma radiation.  There 
are not many legitimate sources of neutrons, so a detection of significant neutron 
flux would raise a concern.  Some legitimate neutron sources include californium 
(252Cf), americium-beryllium (AmBe), polonium-beryllium (PoBe), plutonium-
beryllium (PuBe), and radium-beryllium (RaBe).  These neutron sources are 
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commercially used for well-logging, and soil and concrete density measurements.  
Some neutron sources also are used for scientific research purposes. 
 
In his paper, Kouzes discusses what he calls nuisance sources. These generally 
include naturally occurring radioactive material (NORM) and man-made sources 
like medical isotopes and commercial products containing radioactive material. 
Examples of man-made sources are americium (241Am), barium (133Ba), cesium 
(137Cs), cobalt (57CO and 60Co), iridium (192Ir), radium (226Ra) and depleted 
uranium (DU).  Both NORM and man-made sources can have enough radiation 
to trigger alarms at border crossings. 
 
Many radioactive materials are frequently in cargo, especially the naturally-
occurring ones.  Commodities that contain them include fruits, vegetables, 
fertilizer, ceramic glazed materials, polishing compounds, fluorescent lamp 
starters, welding rods, propone tanks, kitty litter, road salt, ore and rock, smoke 
detectors, oil field pipe, and hot water heaters.  
 
Some drivers or passengers in vehicles crossing a border will have had recent 
medical procedures in which radioisotopes will have been injected into their 
bodies.  The level of gamma radiation emanating from a person injected with 
technetium (99mTc), for example, can be easily detected for several days after the 
injection.  Other medical radioisotopes injected into people for diagnosis and 
treatments include radioactive isotopes of iodine, thallium, gallium and indium. 
People released from a hospital with gamma radiation measuring several 
thousand microR/hr can set off monitors from 100 feet away.(Ludlum Model 
3500-1000 Radiation Detector System, 2010)  Kouzes points out that about one 
in 2600 Americans carries a significant radioactive burden at any one time. 
However, this number is a gross average.  If the border crossing is near a major 
hospital, then the number could be significantly higher.  He calculated that for a 
typical radiation portal monitor (RPM), alarms might be generated from most 
medical isotopes for a period of 3 to 115 days after the medical procedure, 
depending upon the isotope half-life.(Kouzes et al., 2003) 
 
The literature shows that many countries are deploying radiation detection 
equipment at border crossings (and at other locations not discussed in this 
dissertation).  This equipment frequently involves the use of RPMs in the form of 
large polyvinyl toluene (PVT) panels sensitive to gamma radiation.  When a 
vehicle is in the field of view of the RPM, the level of radiation coming from the 
vehicle can be monitored.  If the level is high enough, then the vehicle may or 
may not be denied approval to cross the border, sent to a secondary screening 
station at the border crossing, detained at the primary screening station for in situ 
examination, or just passed on through.  How the vehicle will be handled 





One would understand that there might be considerations suggesting that the 
sensitivity of the detection equipment might be adjusted to manage the flow of 
traffic to an acceptable level.  Included here is a quote from the OSCE Handbook 
of Best Practices at Border Crossings – a Trade and Transport Facilitation 
Perspective “Many countries have invested large amounts of money in radiation 
detection equipment and training.  In the U.S., for example, virtually 100 percent 
of arriving sea containers are scanned by radiation portal monitors.  Also each 
Customs and Border Protection officer is required to wear a personal radiation 
pager.  However, such equipment is not always used effectively.  At Long Beach, 
California, the busiest container port in the U.S., there are about 450 Customs 
inspectors.  One third of these monitor and mitigate radioactivity alerts.  The 
average traffic is 32,000 containers per day, generating about 600 alerts.  In 
many countries where Customs have radiation control responsibilities, false 
alerts occur all the time.  As a result, Customs officers often “tune down” the 
sensitivity of their equipment.  Customs managers (or whoever has radiation 
control responsibilities) must make adjustments in their staffing, and assignment 
processes to accommodate the changes in work caused by the acquisition of 
new equipment.  Rotterdam seaport traffic amounts to about 20,000 containers 
per day, with 200 alerts.  However, the Customs in Rotterdam do not take action 
in every case.  They have a list of commodities that give off high levels of 
radiation, such as floor tiles or cat litter.  If a manifest states that such 
commodities are in a container, Customs lets it enter.  To avert the risk of such 
commodities being used for smuggling – for example, surrounding a nuclear 
device with floor tiles – background risk management is carried out.  This, 
however, negates the entire rationale behind having radiation 
detectors.”(Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 2012) 
 
If we consider that 600 alerts are generated for 32,000 containers on the average 
at Long Beach, then we might conclude that 1.9% of the containers will have 
radiation levels high enough to trigger alarms.  In the Ludlum manual referred to 
previously, they say that about 1% of the cargo will set off alarms due to NORM.  
Of course, this depends upon the discriminator settings used for the RPMs and 
the incidence of radioactive materials of all types in the stream of commerce at 
that point.  As lower discriminator levels would be used, we would expect the 
number of nuisance alarms would increase, but the sensitivity to the RadNuc 
threat might increase. 
 
The problem of having less than optimal detection capability if the RPM 
discriminator point is set high enough to limit the number of nuisance alarms is 
well known.  There are a number of approaches being taken around the world.  
One approach is to just forbid any vehicle with a certain radiation level to pass 
over the border.  A second approach is to take advantage of the fact that 
radioactive elements have characteristic energy spectra that are measureable by 
several types of detection systems.  Under ideal conditions, one can certainly 
discriminate between different types of radioactive elements based on their 
 
 19 
energy spectra. (Kouzes, 2005)  In the United States, there has been a lot of 
activity around developing the Advanced Spectroscopic Panel (ASP) which was 
considered to show promise in this regard.  Laboratory and field tests of the 
ASPs, cost-benefit analyses, and other activities were still under way in 2010 to 
inform Congress and the Administration as to its efficacy in detecting an 
acceptable amount of the threat space while reducing impact of RadNuc 
screening on commerce.(Shea, 2010)  Unfortunately, the ASP Program was 
terminated in 2011, demonstrating that the tradeoff between detection sensitivity 
and impacts on commerce is a delicate balance even now.(U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, 2011) 
 
Need for consensus in metrics related to enduring success  
Another difficulty in planning and assessment in the provision of security involves 
the question of metrics.  Even with a compartmentalization to limit mission space, 
there does not seem to be a consensus on metrics that would indicate enduring 
mission success.  Instead there seems to be an emphasis on measuring things 
that are easier to define and measure.  Establishing metrics around how much 
funding is allocated and committed, how many pieces of equipment are procured, 
and how many first responders are trained to use the equipment does help at 
one level.  But, in the view of the author, there are more important metrics related 
to enduring mission success.  These metrics probably will have to be developed 
in a partnership among the national, state and local agencies whose missions (or 
activities) are touched by the candidate improvements in the security mission 
being considered.  An example of this type of metric might be the commitment of 
the organizations that would have to execute the security improvement.  These 
organizations might include first responders (police department, fire department, 
state and local emergency management personnel, National Guard personnel, 
customs officials) and judges and district attorneys within several contiguous 
municipalities.  A metric that might relate to the quality of commitment among 
these organizations might be the presence and activity level of an integrating 
committee overviewing the joint mission space.  Another metric might be the 
presence in the organizations’ strategic plans of budgets to support the resource 
needs for the security upgrade.  Another metric might be the presence of a public 
awareness campaign to support the changes the citizens might encounter. 
 
According to the literature, some metrics of effectiveness used by Customs 
organizations include the number of times that tariffs or fines are collected.  
Frequently, companion metrics would be the amount of tariff and of fines 
collected.  Other types of metrics include the amount of commodities that are 
processed as a function of time.  The literature points out that these metrics are 
easy to measure.  
 
The Trade and Transport Facilitation Southeast Europe (TTFSE) program funded 
by the World Bank has been exploring the use of a cost benefit analysis 
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approach, like the total cost of administration of customs activities to the revenue 
collected at a border crossing.  TTFSE is a regional partnership involving the 
World Bank, the European Union, and the UN Economic Commission for Europe 
(UNECE), and the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI).  Eight 
client countries were included – Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, and Serbia and Montenegro.  In 
Southeast Europe: Improving the Climate for Trade and Transport, Dumitrescu 
and Moeller state that revenue collection by customs is the major single source 
of revenue for many governments in this region.(Dumitrescu, 2006)  They point 
out that increase or decrease in the flow and value of trade affects the budget 
performance of the government agencies significantly.  
 
In the same report, Dumitrescu and Moeller state that, for the more than 30 
border stations and ports of entry representative of South-Eastern Europe, the 
TTFSE found that each of the agencies associated with operations at the border 
crossing wanted to be responsible only for its own procedures and associated 
delays, and was not prepared to take into account delays associated with the 
other agencies.  They found little if any interest in a holistic look at the border 
crossing operation.  There was a lot of pushback by the agencies involved 
against the notion of a global metric for border crossing operations.  Furthermore, 
they found a culture in which all of the agencies involved were against the idea of 
measuring delays in border crossings, at least initially. 
 
The literature points out that some performance related goals and criteria for one 
agency can lead to a burden on other agencies.  For example, if customs 
organizations have targets related to the annual volume of illegal contraband 
detected, then that might lead to overly rigorous measures that would result in 
prosecuting relatively minor infractions which would increase the number of 
cases to be handled.  That might reduce the time and resources available for 
more serious investigations.  Even if the need to have metrics associated with 
quality of operations is acknowledged, the ability to focus on metrics that are 
easy to measure seems to result in a focus there.   
 
Methodologies for assessing efficacy of new missions 
Shattan provides an excellent discussion of a comparison between cost benefit 
analysis methodologies and the analytic deliberative process methodology for 
selection and deployment of radiation detection systems for shipping ports and 
border crossings.(Shattan, 2008)  In his thesis, Shattan discusses how the U.S. 
government has insisted that any new policy decision be supported by a Cost 
Benefit Analysis (CBA).  He explains that CBA became part of public policy 
decision making in 1981 when President Reagan signed an executive order 
12291 mandating that “No actions by federal agencies should be taken unless 
they result in a net positive value to society”.  In 1993, President Clinton signed 
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executive order 12866 which requires that a regulatory analysis be performed for 
all significant regulatory actions. 
 
Shattan said that CBA is generally regarded to have its roots in the Pareto 
Optimum concept which results in a perspective that a policy change is an 
improvement if some people are better off and no one is worse off as a result of 
the policy.  Shattan points out that in the real world almost all policy changes 
result in someone being worse off.  According to Shattan, most CBA’s today uses 
a revision of Pareto’s original work put forth by Kaldor and Hicks in 1939. 
 
The U.S. Environmental Policy Administration developed guidelines for 
performing a CBA.(U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2000)  To perform a 
CBA, the analyst tries to quantify all the costs and benefits associated with a 
proposed change.  In our case, that would mean the analyst would try to quantify 
all the costs and benefits of adding the RadNuc screening mission to the existing 
border crossing operation.  The costs should include the costs of designing, 
procuring, installing and maintaining the equipment, as well as the costs for 
providing the training required for the organizations that will operate the 
equipment.  Other types of costs that should be included are the government 
regulatory costs, social welfare costs, transitional costs and indirect costs. 
Government regulatory costs will include the costs for the government to 
administer, monitor and enforce the additional regulations.  Social welfare costs 
would include losses in the cost of reduced commerce caused by slowdowns of 
the stream of commerce at the border crossing.  A slowdown in the stream of 
commerce might result in increased prices of goods that have had to cross the 
border at our station.  Transitional costs would include modifications to the border 
crossing station required by the new RadNuc mission.  Indirect costs would 
include fewer companies shipping goods across the border as a result of the new 
mission.  Some of these costs will be relatively easy to define and capture.  
Others may not be so easy because there will be many organizations and 
stakeholders affected by this additional mission.  
 
For the CBA analysis, the benefits may be analyzed from the perspectives of the 
public’s willingness to pay and the public’s willingness to accept the changes 
arising from implementation of the new mission.  Frequently these variables are 
measured by structured surveys.  Another approach is to use a benefit transfer 
method in which results from application of another policy or another location are 
then applied to the new policy under consideration. 
 
French presents a comparison of CBA and Decision Analysis.(French, Bedford, 
& Atherton, 2005)  He points out that in CBA the analyst seeks to describe 
potential courses of action and to show their monetary worth to a large group of 
people.  That means the analyst would like to show the total cost of the policy in 
dollars (in the U.S.) and the total benefit in dollars.  French argues that it would 
be very difficult for two individuals to agree on the monetary values of the specific 
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costs and specific benefits.  It would be very difficult then to produce a single 
objective valuation of any course of action.   
 
There have been some recent issues in the U.S. with the application of CBA to 
the assessments of the efficacy of the Advanced Spectroscopic Panel for a 
RadNuc detection and interdiction mission. (Government Accountability Office, 
2006)  The criticism centered around focusing on reducing the time necessary to 
screen traffic at border check points and reduce the impact of any delays on 
commerce rather than a more complete set of objectives of the larger enterprise. 
 
French argues that multiattribute utility methods (MAUT) provide an alternative 
methodology to CBA. “Through sensitivity analysis MAUT can address the 
perceptions of all stakeholder groups, facilitating constructive discussion and 
elucidating the key points of disagreement.  It is also argued that by being 
explicitly subjective it provides an open, auditable and clear analysis in contrast 
to the illusory objectivity of CBA.  CBA seeks to justify a decision by using a 
common basis for weights (prices), while MAUT recognizes that different parties 
may want to give different valuations.  It then allows the analyst to explore the 
ways in which different parties might (or might not) come to the same conclusion 
even when weighting items differently.”  He points out that a key difference 
between CBA and MAUT is that the analyst assumes in CBA that there is some 
objective weight  that is external to the stakeholders while the analyst using 
MAUT wants to consider the views of all the stakeholders separately and then 
compare them in the end.  He argues that CBA will devolve into a subjective 
process rather than the objective process which is its goal. 
 
The National Research Council published a report in 1996 proposing an analytic-
deliberative process for risk characterization.(Stern, 1996)  In this book, the 
Council points out that analysis and deliberation can be regarded as two 
complementary approaches.  Analysis would require the use of rigorous 
techniques regarded as best practices by a relevant technical community. 
Deliberation would use formal or informal communication to raise and collectively 
consider issues.  The Council emphasizes that the values of all the stakeholders 
should be captured in an evaluation. 
 
Generally, the literature suggests that a combination of subjective surveys used 
jointly with quantitative surveys provides a good coverage.  Subjective surveys, 
based on interviews, panels, and questionnaires do not require a detailed 
analysis, but must be collected with the use of reliable tools.  Quantitative 
surveys, based on the collection of all available data, or a more limited sample 
are credible and cheap to produce, but require subsequent analysis. 
 
Duggan points out that borders are not easily controlled nor secured at the 
desired level and, therefore, the enterprise can be viewed from a risk 
management perspective.(Duggan, 2009)  She points out that it is important to 
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understand the traffic currently crossing the border and to examine how the traffic 
might change as a result of changes related to border security policies and/or 
protocols.  She provides an interesting presentation of the relationships between 
goals, metrics and measures.  Some metrics discussed by Duggan are captured 
here for consideration later within this dissertation.  A high level metric mentioned 
by Duggan is the stability of the border.  Attributes of this metric include how well 
the border is defined, whether the border is registered and the extent to which 
the border is demarcated.  Duggan also, in a discussion of smuggling, introduces 
some metrics that might be relevant to our border crossing.  They include the 
ability to functionally detect the threat, the number of threats detected, the 
amount of material seized, and the number of arrests leading to prosecution.  
 
One approach found in the literature for assessing and planning for improving 
processes related to border crossing operations is benchmarking.(Organization 
for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 2012)  Of course, one of the issues 
would be how to select this best in class border crossing operation, especially 
with a RadNuc mission among all the other missions.  The steps generally will 
include identification of problem areas, identification of organizations (or border 
crossing sites) that seem to be leaders in the areas of interest, visits to them for 
observation of their operations, surveys of their best practices and then choice of 
leading edge approaches to solve some of the problems seen or expected at our 
hypothetical border crossing. 
 
Need for models that support an integrated holistic view of security  
The experiences of the author lead him to the conclusion that a model 
sometimes provides a useful framework for discussion amongst different 
perspectives.  Frequently, analysts and planners build models that are mission 
specific.  These models are easier to build since they are used to support limited 
perspectives.  For security upgrades that touch several organizations, 
appropriate models should enable the analyst/planner to examine the effects on 
all these organizations.  Models of this breadth can allow each organization to 
view the system from their own perspective.  A greater benefit is that each 
organization can see an integrated whole view of the problem, visualize the 
deployment of the security upgrade, and simulate the effects of the upgrade 
(positive and negative).  This simulation might include an integration of physical 
models, information sharing models, models of organizational relationships, 
economic models, training models, and models of the flow of goods, services and 
people throughout the region under consideration.   
 
Shea points out that a country or an initiative needs an integrated layered 
approach to detect and interdict threats.(Shea, 2009)  This type of approach is 
being taken by the U.S. government to protect the nation from terrorist nuclear 
attack.  In this layered approach, the U.S. government is reaching out to other 
nations, assisting them in trying to limit the amount of illicit nuclear and 
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radiological materials leaving their borders.  For our border crossing, then, it 
might make sense to consider the degree to which Country A and Country B 
have mutual agreements for the same purpose.  We might view, then, the border 
crossing RadNuc mission to be a part of a broader strategic plan for mutually 
agreeable purposes between the countries.  Shea goes on to say that decision 
makers attempting to analyze the effectiveness and efficiency of the architecture 
supporting the mission will likely require a methodology for establishing metrics, 
qualitative and quantitative, for each layer or sublayer of the architecture.  He 
says that the appropriate metrics for evaluation might not be those most quickly 
considered, like outcome oriented metrics, like the number of threats found, or 
the number of vehicles cleared.  He suggests that higher level metrics might be 
more appropriate although they may be more difficult to articulate. 
 
One technique that Shea mentions for assessment is “red teaming”.  He points 
out that the effectiveness of these tests in assessing efficacy might be limited if 
the tests are not designed to test the architecture for the purpose it was 
designed.  In a red team test for our border crossing RadNuc screening mission, 
one might put carefully controlled and monitored amounts of nuclear or 
radiological material in a vehicle and determine how well the vehicle is interdicted 
under various conditions of traffic flow, weather, seasonal conditions, etc.  In the 
experience of the author, this type of activity requires a great deal of planning, 
coordination, training, authorization (for use of radioactive materials of significant 
strength and for having red team personnel inside the security envelope of 
operations) and expense.  One obvious analysis that would have to be performed 
is the impact of our RadNuc screening mission on traffic delays at the border.   
 
The importance of transport and trade facilitation is becoming widely recognized, 
and is expected to grow.  However, there are countries that are still applying 
outdated approaches to handling border operations, where wait times at borders 
sometimes last as long as a whole day.(Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe, 2012)  The Handbook states: “As we strive to eliminate 
common misconceptions about border operations and procedures, we should 




How is one, then, to evaluate the efficacy of this type of organizational construct 
to take on a new initiative, like the RadNuc mission?  First, we take a look at the 
general operating envelope at our hypothetical border crossing, examine the 
probable way that the missions are executed there by the organizations we have 
assumed, and then look at how things might change with a RadNuc mission 
initiative added to the mix.  This examination will help us develop criteria that we 
predict would be important for success of the new initiative.  Then we will discuss 




MODEL FOR HYPOTHETICAL BORDER CROSSING LAYOUT, 
MISSIONS AND STAKEHOLDERS 
 
 
There are many possible types of organizational structures for missions 
associated with land border crossings, ranging from a situation in which there is a 
very simple land border crossing where there is one guard who mainly checks for 
correct documentation to an extremely busy crowded border crossing involving 
land, water and air transport of goods and services and pedestrians.  The 
political structures can vary from one in which the federal government handles all 
of the monitoring and response to a much more complex situation in which 
various federal, state, county, and city organizations need to cooperate to 
execute all of the missions associated with movement of people, hazardous 
materials, other controlled materials from one country into another.  
 
To assess the efficacy of adding a RadNuc screening mission to a border 
crossing station, the enterprise was examined from several perspectives, with the 
goal of having a more holistic view of the enterprise.  At first, a diagram of an 
international land border crossing with only vehicular traffic was developed.  That 
means pedestrian traffic or boat traffic did not have to be considered.  In the 
production of the diagrammatic construct, we had to decide whether the border 
crossing was a small crossing with only occasional traffic or a large, complex 
border crossing with various types of commodities and vehicles crossing the 
border, or something in between.  Then we had to decide whether the border 
crossing station was near a large metropolitan area or just a rural area, because 
the difference might be important with respect to resources available for handling 
alarm situations, as we will see later in this dissertation.  Furthermore, backup of 
traffic at a border in a rural area might not be perceived in the same way as a 
backup in a large metropolitan area where traffic conditions at the border might 
affect traffic conditions for many people not involved with crossing the border.  A 
modeler will need to decide what level of traffic volume will be crossing the 
border at our station because that will affect how many lanes of traffic will be 
required and how many personnel will be required to perform the necessary 
functions there. 
 
This leads to the need for a model of the missions extant at the crossings and a 
hypothetical construct for federal organizations that will execute those missions.  
As this construct is developed, we will remember that the literature points out that 
there are several missions and several organizations at large complex border 
crossings.  In the model used in this report, a set of missions and organizations 





To look at the possible effects of adding a new RadNuc mission at our border 
crossing, a modeler would anticipate that there will be impacts on traffic flow, 
operational profiles and concepts of operation.  To get a feel for how much 
impact, one will need an image of the operational area.  That image will help an 
analyst/modeler think through the concept of operations before and after adding 
the new mission.  One question to address is whether there is room at this border 
crossing for a secondary inspection station and if so how many vehicles it might 
hold before traffic would begin to back in the primary inspection zone because of 
space restrictions.  [In fact, there have been some U.S. border crossings which 
have room for only one vehicle in secondary inspection.]   Early deliberation 
resulted in the need for a tertiary inspection station when the RadNuc mission 
was added.  Then a reasonable question (not contemplated before) was whether 
this border crossing would already have a tertiary screening station or the 
modeler would have to add one just because of this new mission. 
 
Considering the problem from the perspective of impact on the flow of goods and 
people through the border crossing station, questions arose as to how much 
traffic flow the model would need to simulate, and how many lanes of traffic will 
cross the border.  For our study, a model produced simulates a high traffic border 
crossing similar to what exists now at U.S. border crossings with Mexico and with 
Canada.  The literature shows that a problem that really confounds supply chain 
planning and projections is the variation in time required to cross the border, not 
just the average time.  Since we want to examine the extent to which the addition 
of our RadNuc mission complicates this problem, then we will need a model to 
support that examination.  This dynamic simulation model will be discussed later 
in this dissertation.  The model was constructed such that it can show variation in 
the traffic flow resulting from variations in the number of vehicles failing the 
primary screening and having to travel to secondary screening.  In our dynamic 
model we also had to prescribe times allowed for screening in primary, 
secondary and tertiary screening.   
 
When the RadNuc screening mission is added, then all of the models come into 
play.  With the physical model, the modeler has to decide what types of radiation 
detection equipment to use and where it will be used at the station.  We will 
decide whether to have this radiation detection equipment in some of the lanes, 
in all of the lanes, whether it will be repeated in secondary and tertiary screening 
or whether we will have different equipment.  If one chooses to use different 
types of equipment, then there will be an increase in the training requirements for 
the personnel using the equipment.  As one considers these types of equipment, 
then he is drawn to consideration of what happens if the system detects radiation 
levels that are above the limit (which the modeler will have to set).  Does anyone 
have the authority to detain that vehicle because of a higher than desired 
radiation level?  If so, who?  If the radiation alarm cannot be resolved readily, 
then does anyone have authority to detain the person further?  What if the 
vehicle has a suspicious radiation reading and no one at the border crossing 
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station is able to resolve the alarm?  How will the vehicle be controlled while the 
alarm resolution continues?  Are there resources that can be called upon for a 
reachback capability (national experts more familiar with radiation characteristics 
than the border crossing staff)?  Then, if there are these resources available and 
there still is a question, the border crossing people might need to open the 
vehicle (trailer, truck or car trunk or bus undercarriage, for example).  Because of 
a concern about a possible explosive device, frequently a bomb squad type 
person may be called in.  These people generally come from a police department 
or a fire department.  That is why the presence of a nearby metropolitan area or 
city or township can be important.  If there is more than one source of this type of 
explosive expert, that is helpful because there might be some sort of problem 
(like a fire or other type emergency) that would affect one source of expert help 
but maybe not another in a separate location (like another precinct or township). 
 
Since the literature shows that different types of commodities have different types 
of radiation levels and therefore have a different likelihood of triggering an alarm, 
that variation will need to be reflected in the model.   Assumptions were made 
about how many vehicles will have various levels of radiation levels (gamma and 
neutron) to account for variability in commerce.  A type of vehicle was added to 
the model to simulate the presence of a driver or passenger who has had a 
radioisotope-based diagnostic test or treatment that leaves them with a 
radioactive level strong enough to set off a primary screening monitor. 
 
As the dynamic simulation model shows traffic backup increase as the modeler 
lowers the alarm trip point of the gamma and the neutron detection, he will need 
to consider the impact on the organizations that operate the facility.  But then the 
question arises about how will increases in the number of vehicles stopped and 
sent to secondary (and maybe tertiary) affect the number of fines or arrests.  As 
the sensitivity to radiation coming from vehicles increases, in the attempt to 
detect more of the threat space, more of a burden on the regional law 
enforcement infrastructure would result because more out of compliance 
situations would be detected involving the transport of radioactive materials. 
Since it is very unlikely that any of these detections would be from an actual 
RadNuc threat (because the probability of a RadNuc presence is so low), then 
these detections become more compliance monitoring, and, therefore would 
increase non-compliance detections. This point indicates the need for 
consideration of the effect of the RadNuc mission on the regional law 
enforcement and safety organizations. 
 
As these constructs and models are built out, a broader better informed 
perspective is gained from which to develop goals for the RadNuc screening 
mission.  The goal statements then can be more strategic and inclusive in nature.  
From these goals, a set of metrics is developed later in this study.  The total set, 
then, of models, goals and metrics form the framework upon which several types 
of analysis can be performed. 
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 Model of Hypothetical Border Crossing Layout 
 
A hypothetical high traffic border crossing on a major highway between two 
hypothetical countries, Country A and Country B, as shown in the Figure 3 was 
considered in this study.  For simplicity, this border crossing was assumed to 
allow only truck and automobile traffic.  For the study discussion, we will assume 
that we are responsible for monitoring and controlling the flow of vehicles (and 
materials and personnel within them) traveling into Country A from Country B. 
 
To illustrate the problem, a hypothetical regional organizational architecture was 
considered.  The region of interest was assumed to include the major 
metropolitan area (MA1) around a city (CityA1), which is located in a County A1 
(CNTYA1), all in a State A in Country A.  The area is assumed also to include 
townships, Township A (TWNA) and Township B (TWNB), all in County A 
(CNTYA) within State A, and to include County A2 (CNTYA2) all in State A. 
 
In our study, our responsibility is to protect metropolitan area MA1 from RadNuc 
threats coming down the interstate from Country B, and if, as described 
previously, our mission has to be supported by cooperation of several 
organizations within the geopolitical structure of Country A, then we should 
examine this structure and the relationships that should be formed to support our 
mission. 
 
One important question is whether Country B organizations need to cooperate 
continuously with Country A organizations for our mission to have enduring 
success?  If that does need that to happen, what would be the metric that one 
would use and how would one measure it?  To get at these questions, a little 
more detail was needed.  Models were developed for help in getting to these 
details. 
 
Another important question is what impact do changes in what Country A does at 
their side of the border crossing have on Country B?  In several of the 
methodologies discussed in our literature review, more optimal solutions were 
likely to be those in which there would be significant positive impacts on some or 
all the stakeholders but no negative impacts among the stakeholders.  In the 
case that there were negative impacts, then some analytical approaches in the 
literature suggest accounting for some remuneration or tradeoff or willingness to 
accept these negative consequences.   
 
For the model development, it was assumed that there would be many non 
RadNuc roles for the hypothetical border crossing location, typical of large, 












Of course, Countries A and B will already have organizational structures in place 
to support their governance requirements, as codified in various laws and 
regulations.  These laws and regulations will, in our example, include agreements 
concerning the flow of goods, commerce and people within them and crossing 
between them.  These agreements may also include provisions for mutual 
support in certain types of law enforcement special events, and possible support 
for response to natural disasters.  For such a border crossing, many federal 
organizations have policies and regulations which apply to monitoring and 
controlling the flow of vehicles carrying materials and people.  To ensure 
compliance with these policies and regulations, we assume that the border 
crossing will have systems, protocols and operations – in alignment with the 
agreements mentioned above - personnel to examine the vehicles and personnel 
within them. 
 
Some example federal organizational constructs for a border crossing were seen 
in our literature review in Chapter II.  A structure similar to that for a U.S. 




Table 2. Country A and country B federal missions and stakeholders for 
hypothetical border crossing 
Mission Objective Country A Country B 






Sets federal policies to facilitate cross 
border travel; inspects goods and 
people 
Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP-A) 
Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP-B) 
Facilitate safe and efficient movement 











Control the import of foods, drugs, 
cosmetics, medical devices, biological 
products, animal feeds and drugs, and 
radiation-emitting instruments 
Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA-A) 
Food and Drug 
Administration  
(FDA-B) 
Regulate the importing of birds and 
wildlife protected by international 
convention 
Fish and Wildlife 
Service (FWS-A) 
Fish and Wildlife 
Service (FWS-B) 
Federal law enforcement, criminal and 
terrorist threat response 
Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI-A) 
Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI-B) 






Develop and implement strategies to 
monitor for diseases in people, 
animals, cargo, and conveyances  
Center for Disease 
Control (CDC-A) 
Center for Disease 
Control (CDC-B) 
Detect and prevent criminal acts by 
targeting the people, money, and 
materials that support criminal 
networks 







Protecting national air, land, and rail 
transportation systems to ensure 








Detect and prevent the entry of 
weapons of mass destruction, 
unauthorized aliens, and drug 
smugglers and other criminals 
Border Patrol (BP-A) Border Patrol (BP-B) 
Implements animal control policies, 








In support of these requirements, States A and B also will have structures, 
policies and agreements in place, especially for routine situations.  Similarly, the 
counties in the region will have organized themselves to deal with normal 
situations, and may have developed mutual support agreements to deal with 
natural or man-made challenges like floods, hurricanes, and widespread fires.  
Our primary city, CityA1 (and assumed target for radiological or nuclear terrorist 
activity), will have, at least for the purposes of this study, developed policies and 
protocols for routine and many types of emergency events, and a structure for 
supporting them. 
 
For the purposes of this paper, we define the regional architecture as the 
complete set of policies, organizational structures, personnel, equipment, 
protocols, agreements, training and budgets in place to meet all the known 
requirements for Country A, for States A and B, for the counties within the region 
and for our city CityA1 and the townships TWNA and TWNB all in MA1.  This is 
an important definition because the execution of any increase in security 
missions within the region probably will be performed by the existing architecture 
or additions/modifications to it. 
 
The diagram in Figure 4 shows a hypothetical structure for these federal 
organizations for Country A.  For our study, we will assume that there is a parallel 
organizational structure for Country B. 
 
For the states in Country A and B, there will be there will be state organizations 
with missions that support the federal missions.  Similarly, we will assume that 
there are organizations at the metropolitan area, city and township levels that 
support these missions.  An important point regarding Country A federal 
organizations is that they each have their own overall missions, strategic plans, 
internal initiatives, and budget priorities.  In many cases, they compete with each 
other for federal resources and occasionally mission space.  The quality of their 
relationships with their international parallels (especially Country B) and states 
(especially State A and State B) will affect their efficacy, to some point.  For State 
A, we will assume the following mission and organizational structure to support 
the missions in alignment with the federal missions, as shown in Table 3. 
 
Later in the dissertation, we will discuss how organizations at the county, 
metropolitan area, city and township levels may need to support the state and 
federal missions associated with our hypothetical border crossing. 
 
How these layers of federal, state, county, metropolitan area, city and township 
missions and organizations interact varies from location to location.  In some 
cases, there is an overall regional integrating organization that helps articulate 
common goals, encourages policy and operational alignment where possible and 
promotes overall communication and information sharing.  In other cases, the 
organizations may act as rigid and totally separate entities.  In any case, there  
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Table 3. State A organizations and missions related to border crossing 
State A organization  Mission 
Department of Transportation (DOT-
SA) 
Ensuring registration and licensing of 
movers of goods and people, protect 
infrastructure from overweight vehicles  
Highway Patrol (HWYPAT-A) State highway law enforcement for 
State A 
Department of Justice (DOJ-A) Sets and adjudicates policy for State A 
Department of Safety (DOS-SA) Ensuring safe transport of goods and 
people within State A 
Department of Health (DOH-SA) Control the import of foods, drugs, 
cosmetics, medical devices, biological 
products, animal feeds and drugs, and 
radiation-emitting instruments 
Department of Agriculture (DOA-SA Implements animal control policies, 
provide inspection services for imported 
animals, implements state policy for 
agricultural products 
State Bureau of Investigation (SBI-A) Sets and implements law enforcement 
intelligence policies 
State Emergency Management 
Administration (SEMA-A) 





are certainly opportunities for development of different and possible competing 
perspectives about importance of missions, training, equipment purchases, 
information sharing and budgets and other resources to advance initiatives. This 
disparity in perspectives may change radically in the face of perceived danger 
from immediate threats, or the need to respond to disasters or attacks. 
 
 
Adding RadNuc Detection and Interdiction Mission to the Model  
 
Many border crossings have stations which include systems of equipment, 
personnel and operational procedures to detect, intercept and handle many of 
types of dangerous materials.  With the perception that terrorists might want to 
smuggle quantities of these dangerous materials sufficiently large to cause 
catastrophic damage, there has been a growing interest in expanding the 
application of these systems and in improving the systems already deployed.  



































































Figure 4. Hypothetical structure for federal organizations in Country A for border crossings 
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A nuclear threat generally is considered to be a weaponized assemblage of a 
significant quantity of nuclear materials in a fashion such that a nuclear chain 
reaction will cause a very dramatic release of energy in a short period of time, 
like in a nuclear bomb.  The nuclear materials most often discussed are highly 
enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium-239.  Neither the exact quantity, chemical 
form nor the choice of nuclear material is important for this dissertation. 
 
A radiological threat generally is considered to be a weaponized assemblage of a 
sufficient quantity of materials that emit ionizing radiation in a fashion such that 
they could be released in a manner to cause significant radiation damage or 
contamination to people or property.  The exact type of material and quantity are 
not important for this dissertation. 
 
In our example, we want to develop an enduring mission around the threats from 
radiological or nuclear terrorist activities.  In our city CityA1, and in the counties in 
which it is located, and in the contiguous counties in State A in Country A and in 
State B in Country B, a broad range of organizations will be impacted.  The 
border and customs officials who generally are policing against smuggling, illegal 
aliens, and other criminal activity may now have to add detection and interdiction 
of illicit radiological and nuclear materials to their mission spaces.  This probably 
will include the purchase and maintenance of new equipment, development of 
new concepts of operations of the new equipment within the existing operational 
requirements, development of new information sharing and fusion agreements, 
development of new training programs, development of new protocols for 
prosecution, development of new agreements between contiguous jurisdictions 
to support tracking and interdiction of the threat, the development of public and 
private business awareness around the changes in policies and procedures, and 
finally the development of budgets within all of the impacted organizations to 
support the additions.  All of these changes will need to fit into the existing 
architectural construct.  The fact that the probability of this type of terrorist activity 
is low (relative to fires, floods, storms, other criminal activities) may engender a 
lack of enduring commitment to the increased mission by some of the 
organizations involved.  
 
According to a report from the U.S. Government Accountability Office, the U.S. 
Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) standard procedures direct vehicles, 
containers, and people coming into the country to pass through portal monitors to 
screen for the presence of radiation.  Most RPMs use technology—known as 
“plastic scintillators” (PVT) – that detect the presence of radiation but cannot 
distinguish between harmless and dangerous nuclear or radiological materials. 
This results in the need for “secondary inspections”.  To confirm and identify the 
presence of radiation, this secondary inspection includes CBP officers using 
Radiation Isotope Identifier Devices (RIIDs) to localize the source of radiation, 
determine whether the radiation being emitted is from a harmless source, such 
as kitty litter, or a dangerous source, such as weapons-grade nuclear material.  
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Typically, completing a secondary inspection takes about 15 minutes but can 
take much longer.(Government Accountability Office, 2006)  
 
In this dissertation, the assumption is made that either of these two types of 
threats could be carried across the border between Country A and Country B in a 
truck, van or automobile.  The implications of adding the mission to detect, 
interdict or deter nuclear and radiological (RadNuc) threats to the mission space 
already existing at our hypothetical border are examined.  The types of 
equipment to be used at the border crossing are typical for detection and 
characterization of radiological and nuclear materials. The equipment types will 
include: 
1. Fixed instruments - Radiation Portal Monitors (RPMs) – capable of 
scanning most sizes of vehicles crossing the border at our station.  These 
RPMS are very sensitive to gamma radiation, partially because of their 
large size, but do not give spectrum information that would be helpful in 
determining the nature of the material emitting the gamma radiation.  They 
also will contain neutron detectors. We will assume that these RPMS will 
be at each lane located at the Primary Screening Station (hereafter called 
Primary), and also one set will be located in the Secondary Screening 
Station (hereafter called Secondary). 
2. Portable radiation detection equipment, including handheld radioisotope 
identifiers (RIIDs).  These will be present at the Secondary Inspection 
Station.  
3. Portable gamma radiation detection equipment, including radiation pagers.  
These are useful because they give a sensitivity that enables the officer in 
Secondary to be able to separate the vehicle with gamma radiation from 
the others.  They can also help identify whether the driver or passengers 
or vehicle are emitting the highest levels of gamma radiation. 
4. Portable neutron search detectors (NSD) will be used in secondary 
Screening to help localize neutron sources in the vehicles. 
5. Whole vehicle x-ray machines that will be gamma through transmission or 
gamma backscatter devices that will produce radiographic images of the 
vehicle as the vehicle drives by or the machine itself can drive by the 
vehicle.  In our case, these systems will be placed in Tertiary screening 
(hereafter called Tertiary) – unless the border crossing station already has 
them in Secondary for non-RadNuc screening purposes. 
 
There are difficulties with this type of mission (RadNuc) in a complex border 
crossing situation, like the one assumed in this study.  One of the difficulties is 
that the border crossing is a location where a great deal of activity may be taking 
place.  As the literature search showed, there may be opportunities for overlap of 
missions resulting in duplication of measurements, 
 
Another difficulty is that the frequency of detecting an actual radiological or 
nuclear threat is very, very low but the frequency of detecting radiological or 
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nuclear material is not low.  Many types of commodities carried across borders 
have enough radioactive materials within them that resultant gamma emissions 
might be intense enough to trigger alarms at screening stations.  Furthermore, 
drivers or passengers occasionally have medical treatments that result in a 
sufficient amount of radioisotopes within their bodies that radiation detection 
equipment will alarm within considerable distances. 
 
The possibility of illicit transport of dangerous materials across borders and into 
highly populated areas has been recognized as a significant threat to most 
industrialized countries – especially the United States of America.(Shea, 2009) 
There are many types of dangerous materials transported across borders of 
countries every day.  Types of materials include: radiological materials, explosive 
materials, hazardous chemicals, ammunition.(Kouzes et al., 2003)  
 
The postulate made earlier was that the development of a set of models can 
facilitate the discussion of how much security is reasonable for a 
government/regional citizenry because it can provide a framework for that 
discussion.  The existence of the model set would be useful in the articulation of 
requirements for security and the metrics that might be used in the tradeoff 
discussions around how much security is reasonable.  The model set should 
support deliberation around:  
1) Political constructs (as shown in the organization type charts) that would 
facilitate/limit the actions required to provide/improve security; 
2) Metrics/measures that would frame discussions around how much security 
is reasonable for the financial resources required, and/or the impacts on 
the citizens of the region, and/or the impacts on other aspects affecting 
the economics of the region; 
3) Amount and types of capabilities that are needed and their geographical 
deployment; 
4) Resources needed to operate and maintain any equipment needed; 
5) Roles and responsibilities of private and public organizations regarding 
deterrence, detection, interdiction, response, recovery; and 
6) Methodologies for assessing the quality of security provided. 
 
In this chapter, we have seen that in Country A there are more than ten federal 
organizations and at least eight state organizations which have missions at the 
hypothetical border crossing.  An introduction of a new mission at the border 
crossing should be examined from the perspectives of each organization which 
might be affected.  We also have raised the question about how a new mission 
for Country A might affect Country B.  There is also the likelihood that other new 
security or trade facilitation initiatives will be introduced into the border crossing 
enterprise.  The analyst should consider how changes in operation borne through 
those initiatives might affect the efficacy of the RadNuc mission.  A further 
consideration is that changes in Country B border operations might affect the 
operations for Country A.   
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These points demonstrate that a simple set of diagrams of physical layout and a 
set of organization type charts (with articulated missions) can provide a 
perspective from which considerable insight could be developed.  It becomes 
obvious that the introduction of new missions into existing border operations 
might be better informed by consideration of a broader, complete set of 










This chapter discusses the development and use of an operational model for a 
hypothetical, high traffic, complex land international border crossing.  The model 
is used to examine the likely operations of the border crossing, the effects of the 
missions at the border crossing on traffic flow, including the necessity for 
secondary screening.  We also discuss likely relevant regional geopolitical 
constructs around the border crossing. 
 
To the hypothetical international border crossing mission space, the mission of 
interdicting and/or deterring radiological and nuclear threats is added.  This 
mission addition requires the addition of radiation portal monitors in the Primary 
location, and radiation portal monitors and portable radiation detectors in the 
Secondary inspection station.  We also add a Tertiary inspection station for the 
cases where additional inspections might be required for further adjudication of 
alarms.  An emphasis is placed on estimating the necessary resources needed to 
maintain security and functionality at the site.  
For this simulation, a computational model approach known as agent-based 
modeling (ABM) is used.  ABMs (also known as multi-agent systems or multi-
agent simulations) use a computational model to simulate the actions and 
interactions of autonomous agents to see their effects on the system as a whole. 
The model discussed in this report was created using an agent-based 
programming language and integrated modeling environment known as NetLogo.  
A 3 dimensional model of the international border crossing was also created 
using a 3D modeling program (Google SketchUp) 
The development of the operational model supported a consideration of how 
agencies associated with the border crossing would have to work together to 
implement the new RadNuc detection and interdiction mission.  The expectation 
was that this model would help us better articulate goals, develop strategic 
questions and discover metrics which we will use later in our framework for 
assessing mission efficacy.  
Before designing the model for the hypothetical international border crossing, 
descriptions of typical international border crossings were considered to get a 
sense of layout, traffic routing, numbers of lanes, and general operational 
profiles.(Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 2012)  This 
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author also has had experience observing operations at border crossings and, 
with others, prepared a restricted distribution report on the application of RadNuc 
screening missions in regions containing border crossings and ports of 
entry.(White, 2011)  From these considerations, preliminary models were 
developed to examine operations before implementation of the RadNuc mission.  
 
Overall Preliminary Model Description 
 
Border crossing model without a RadNuc mission 
The model was developed in a way to support the examination, highlighting and 
demonstration of some aspects of border crossing operations that would be 
impacted by introduction of an initiative around a RadNuc mission.  The first 
aspect of the model is a three dimensional sketch showing the layout of the 
hypothetical border crossing for this work.  This sketch is described in a way that 
demonstrates how the border crossing might be laid out and operated spatially.  
A second aspect of the modeling is a consideration of how some of the relevant 
organizations would have to work together, before and after the RadNuc mission 
begins.  This can be viewed as the geopolitical aspect of the border crossing.  
The third part of the model is a dynamic simulation of the traffic flow through the 
border crossing, including a Secondary inspection area.  This dynamic model 
shows how traffic might back up along the highway crossing the border and how 
the number of vehicles sent to Secondary screening might vary as screening 
parameters change.  The need for a Tertiary Screening Station is discovered and 
discussed. 
 
For simplicity, the model will only take into account an interstate and no other 
crossings such as railways, river crossings, air traffic, or other highways.  The 
interstate at the border station will consist of six lanes of traffic traveling in 
opposite directions, for a total of twelve lanes of traffic. Our responsibility (in this 
research) is to consider the traffic coming from Country B into Country A.  We 
have chosen, however, to include traffic going from Country A into Country B in 
the model to be able to investigate any requirements for cooperation between 
Country A and Country B organizations.  
 
The diagram in Figure 5 was developed using Google SketchUp.  [Licenses for 
SketchUp are available to the public at no cost, but are explicitly limited to non-
commercial use].  It shows six lanes of traffic crossing the border from Country B 
into Country A and six lanes of traffic crossing the border from Country A into 








The six lanes of inbound and outbound traffic will each be equipped with normal 
equipment for a border crossing station.  They will have a Primary inspection 
station booth in which works a border crossing guard.  This guard in a booth in 
each lane is responsible for screening for all the types of parameters described 
previously.  He will follow the Concept of Operations developed by the State A 
Customs and Border Control organization to ensure that the vehicles have the 
required labels, DOT numbers, manifests for cargo, licenses, and identity 
paperwork as described previously in Chapter II.  In some cases, the 
documentation will not be complete and the driver will be directed to Secondary 
screening locations as shown in the diagram.  Other reasons for sending vehicles 
to Secondary include suspicious behavior of the driver or passengers, presence 
of alcoholic beverages, and overweight vehicles.  Occasionally, a vehicle may be 
directed to secondary screening on a random basis.  A good description of 
 
 41 
general operations at a U.S./Canada border crossing is given in the “Border 
Crossing Guide for Commercial Truck Drivers”.(United States Department of 
Transportation, 2008)  The officials in Primary will represent many of the 
requirements and regulations from the missions of several agencies, shown 
previously in Table 2.  State organizations shown previously in Table 3 also will 
have some impact on or be impacted by operations at the border crossing. 
 
There frequently will be law enforcement vehicles at the border crossing as 
shown in Figure 6.  These law enforcement vehicles may be used to: a) escort 
the vehicles from Primary to Secondary screening under positive control; and b) 
to chase down vehicles that cross the border in a way that violates the protocols. 
This on-site law enforcement presence in our model will be provided by the State 
A Highway Patrol under a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the 
Highway Patrol and the Country A Department of Homeland Security.  The MOU 
will specify the number of this type of law enforcement vehicle that will be at the 
border crossing, the number of hours during the day for each day of the week, 
and the manner in which the law enforcement officers will be notified which 
vehicles need to be escorted or chased down. 
 
The legal basis for the State A Highway Patrol officers to chase down the 
vehicles that have violated some protocol at the crossing will be the responsibility 
of the State A Department of Transportation.  The DOT-A will work with state, 
regional and local district attorneys and judges to develop a consensus that the 
concept of operations for detaining these drivers and vehicles is well considered.   
 
As the vehicles are escorted to Secondary, they will follow the escort vehicle until 
they are parked.  In our construct, the drivers will be met in Secondary by officers 
from the Country A Customs and Border Protection (CBP-A).  These officers will 
have a range of inspection protocols for paperwork associated with the driver and 
other occupants of the vehicles and protocols for determining whether proper 
decals are in place, for examination of registrations and for authorization for 
transport of hazardous materials. 
   
In addition to federal and state agencies, some local agencies will be involved in 
activities that support or will be affected by the border crossing station.  The 
sheriff’s department and police department may be involved in interdiction on 
roads or streets near the border crossing.  Police and fire departments frequently 
have roles associated with controlling vehicles carrying hazardous materials.  
They also provide explosives experts who support the opening of suspicious 
vehicles or containers within them.   
 
2-Dimensional dynamic simulation model description 
The purpose of this model is to help discover and understand operational 
features important to the success of the missions at the border crossing.  For 
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clarity and to help visualize the 2 dimensional dynamic simulation model used to 
simulate traffic flow through an international border crossing, an additional model 
perspective includes an isometric view of the crossing station, shown in Figure 6. 
The model consists of 6 lanes of traffic on both the incoming and outgoing sides 
with a secondary inspection location situated between the incoming (right side) 
and outgoing lanes of traffic.  The law enforcement vehicle is shown in the 
innermost lane. 
 
In Figure 7 is another isometric view.  For convenience, the model has a 
construct for the border crossing laid out in a way that there is a contiguous 
arrangement for vehicles coming into Country A and those coming into Country B 
whereas they normally would be separated.  This allowed a little broader 
perspective than just considering flow in one direction.   
 
This dynamic model will simulate the traffic flow through and within the border 
crossing station before and after implementation of the RadNuc screening 
mission.  Before and after this mission implementation, there is interest in the 
backup of vehicles trying to cross the border and the impact of screening 
operations in Secondary on resource requirements there. 
 
Before the addition of the RadNuc mission, normal screening for compliance, 
security and immigration will affect the traffic flow.  The first phase of modeling 
simulates this effect.  But since our focus is on the effects of the RadNuc 
screening mission, we will assume that all of the relevant agencies have worked 
out acceptable fractions of traffic flow sent to secondary inspection, acceptable 
backups at the border and the concepts of operations and supporting 
agreements to enable the enterprise to run smoothly.   
 
In this first phase, the assumption is made that there is a detection system that 
looks over the entire mission space and detects noncompliance, safety concerns, 
immigration issues, and suspicious behavior.  There will also be random 
selection of vehicles for examination.  The model assumes a probabilistic nature 
of the traffic and persons passing through this detection system, resulting in a 
stochastic nature of the number of vehicles failing the Primary detection 
discriminator and consequently sent to Secondary.  After this model simulation 
represents what seems to be a reasonable operating envelope, RadNuc 
screening operational elements are added to the model in the next phase. 
 
Simulation using agent-based modeling 
The dynamic simulation model was built using NetLogo.  [NetLogo is free and 












Figure 7. Alternate view of the border crossing model showing the 




Figure 8 below shows an image of the two-dimensional model designed.  Just as 
in the three-dimensional model, the two-dimensional model consists of 6 lanes of 
traffic on both the incoming and outgoing sides, giving a total of 12 lanes.  The 
incoming side is denoted by red vehicles while the outgoing side has blue 
vehicles.  Each of the 12 lanes has a toll booth which serves as a security 
checkpoint and the primary inspection location.  This is denoted by the vertical 
red bars in the center of the figure. During the agent-based model simulation, 
vehicles are assigned probabilities by a random number generator.  If the 
number assigned exceeds the discriminator threshold then the vehicle is required 
to go to Secondary.  The incoming side is shown at the bottom of the figure while 
the outgoing is shown at the top of the figure. The Secondary is located in the 
middle of the figure between the incoming and outgoing lanes of traffic.  
 
This phase of model development has the purpose of simulating the operation of 
the border crossing without a RadNuc screening mission.  As a simplification, we 
assume that there is one detection system that will look at all of the reasons that 
might require a vehicle to be sent to a Secondary Screening station.  The goal is 
to simulate the number of vehicles coming into Primary, a stochastic variation in 
the number being sent to Secondary and then released from Secondary.   We 
want the model to show that the border crossing operation before the addition of 
RadNuc screening runs efficiently, with a fraction of vehicles going to Secondary 
that is non-zero, but does not overwhelm the officers’ ability to clear the cars from 
Secondary before there is a significant backup in Secondary.  Then In the next 
phase of the model, the RadNuc screening mission will be added to examine the 
effects of this additional mission on the border crossing operation. 
 
For the general detection system (representing the totality of screening due to 
non RadNuc causes), discriminator levels will be varied to get about the right 
level of Primary and Secondary activity to use as a base case before adding 
RadNuc screening.  In this agent-based model, vehicles are assigned 
probabilities by a random number generator. If the number assigned exceeds the 
discriminator threshold then the vehicle is required to go to Secondary.  It can be 
seen from the figure that if the discriminator levels are lowered (increased 
sensitivity) then there is a higher probability of a vehicle exceeding the threshold 
level.  Increasing the sensitivity of a detector would therefore increase the 
number of vehicles that set off alarms.  This would lead to a higher volume of 
vehicles required to receive a secondary screening. 
 
A computational model using agent-based modeling is used to simulate the 
actions and interactions of autonomous agents to see their effects on the system 
as a whole.  For this study an emphasis is placed on determining how varying the 
inputs of traffic volume and discriminator level affect the wait times of vehicles 
crossing the border, the security and functionality of the border crossing, and the 
resources needed to maintain this security and functionality (both manpower and 




Figure 8. Border crossing model during the beginning of the simulation 
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Before the model is started some major initial inputs are required such as the 
number of cars and trucks to be placed in each lane, the maximum speed the 
vehicles can obtain, and most importantly the discriminator level of the Primary 
Screening operation.  The discriminator level is modeled by assigning a random 
value reading to each vehicle that enters the Primary Screening Station.  This is 
accomplished by assigning a different random number from 0 to 1 to each 
vehicle and comparing it to the current Primary discriminator alarm value to 
determine which vehicles will be required to go to the Secondary inspection 
location.  The equation below represents the mathematical form of this. 
 
Sec. Insp. Requirement = ifRandom(0−1) > Current Discriminator Level  
 
The probability distribution of the randomly generated numbers is generated by 
NetLogo.  We used settings in the code to get the general shape we felt 
reasonable.  A typical distribution from the model is given in Figure 9.  The data 
for Figure 9 was obtained by running the model for 35,075 iterations,  
 
Once a discriminator level is chosen the random number of the vehicle is 
compared to the discriminator level.  If the random number is larger than the 
discriminator level the vehicle is treated as if it alarmed a detector in the Primary 
Inspection Area and is required to go to the secondary inspection location.  The 
discriminator alarm levels are chosen through the use of slider bars on the main 
graphic user interface and can be changed at any time throughout the simulation. 
Thus, any probability (detector discriminator level) of being required to go to 
secondary screening can easily be applied.  This is a good feature because it 
allows easy manipulation of the model to see the effects. 
 
It is possible to change the number of cars and trucks to be placed in each lane 
in the model.  For example, choosing a number of 3 for incoming trucks and 3 for 
incoming cars will place 3 trucks and 3 cars in each lane on the incoming side 
(bottom), for a total of 36 vehicles on the incoming side.  A typical case for a 
sample vehicle on the incoming side will be examined in detail to describe the 
process flow of the rest of the model. 
 
During the simulation the vehicles are asked certain questions such as the color 
of the patch that they are on (NetLogo uses patches to describe where the 
vehicles are located on a grid) to determine if an action needs to take place or 
not.  For example, in the beginning of the simulation (as well as throughout the 
rest of the simulation) vehicles are asked if the color of the patch they are on is 
red, the color designating the toll booths.  If so, then the vehicles are required to 
slow down to a speed of nearly 0 to model the time spent at the RPM being 





Figure 9. Probability distribution obtained from the NetLogo model using a 
random number generator for a log-normal distribution 
 
 
Once the vehicles progress through the red region they move until they reach the 
vertical blue bar.  At this point probabilities are assigned to determine if the 
vehicle is required to go to secondary screening or not. If so, the vehicle is re-
routed to the secondary inspection location.  If not the vehicle continues to the 
end of the map at which point it wraps back around and starts the process again. 
The process of wrapping the vehicles around to the beginning of the model 
introduces artificiality into the model that is not ideal.  More realism could be 
added to the model by using a text file to input traffic flow data as a function of 
time.   
 
If the vehicle is required to go to secondary screening it is re-routed and sent to 
the secondary portion of the model.  If there are no vehicles in the secondary 
inspection station then the vehicle will undergo a second screening to validate 
the first “alarm”.  If a vehicle is already present in Secondary then, just as in real 
life, the second vehicle is required to wait in line until the secondary inspection 
screening process becomes available.  The secondary screening takes longer 
(approximately 10 total minutes in this model phase) and is reflected in the model 
by requiring the vehicles to pass slowly through an extended zone larger than the 
primary screening zone.  In this first phase of the model (without the addition of a 
RadNuc screening mission) we assume that all vehicles pass the secondary 
screening and are allowed to pass through the border crossing.  To model this, 
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the vehicles are simply looped around the secondary portion of the model until 
they reach the entrance once again.  At this point a random number is chosen to 
distribute the vehicle back to one of the 6 initial lanes.  After being placed 
randomly onto one of the 6 lanes the vehicle will continue forward until it reaches 
the end of the model and wraps back around to start the process again. 
 
Throughout the simulation the vehicles are required to follow certain rules such 
as a speed limit, maximum acceleration and deceleration, and to stop when they 
reach the vehicle in front of them.  Assumptions made in the simulation include 
the following: 
 
1. That all vehicles passing through the primary and secondary inspection zones 
do so in the same amount of time.  This assumption deviates from actual border 
crossing operations.  More variation will occur more during the secondary 
screening process than during the primary due to the thoroughness of 
examination of paperwork and physical inspection amount done during the 
secondary screening process.  Reviews of documentation, vehicle weight, 
decaling, licensing or safety permit information are generally required at this time.  
 
2. That all vehicles pass the secondary screening process.  In the rare event that 
a vehicle does not pass the secondary screening, extra time must be taken to log 
the event and to notify the proper authorities.  In real life, this process can take 
up to a day in some countries.  But we are assuming we have a relatively modern 
well-functioning border crossing with well-established protocols and well trained 
officers. 
 
3. Any dependent relationship between vehicles in line or in adjacent inspection 
booths was neglected.  It is possible that a group of vehicles with similar 
problems (like lack of proper documentation or decaling) could show up at nearly 
the same time.  This would require the vehicles in any of the Primary Screening 
area that had been alarmed to be escorted to the secondary inspection location 
for further screening.  This type of situation is possible and might cause a 
temporary backup.   
Test Cases for Phase 1 model 
Test cases were designed to address the following questions: 
  
• What probability of detection in primary would cause the security organization to 
have to add one more set of officers (assuming a set equals 3 shifts and 1 back-
up)? 
– Security personnel are only capable of monitoring a certain amount of vehicles 
in the secondary inspection location.  We have made this threshold level of 
secondary screening capability a variable.  It can be set using the slider bar in 
the main graphic user interface.  It represents the maximum number of vehicles 
that can be in the secondary inspection before another trained and certified 
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officer would need to be brought to the station. 
 
– Because of the added length of time that it takes for a secondary inspection it is 
possible for secondary to back up.  Therefore it would be beneficial to determine 
how varying the inspection time in secondary would affect the flow of vehicles 
through secondary and the subsequent requirement of security officers. 
 
Test Case I – Effects of detection rates in primary screening  
If the threshold is exceeded then the Secondary Screening operations will be 
required to add more security officers. In Test Case 1, we address the following 
questions: 
• What flow rate in primary begins to have deleterious effects on wait times and 
number of officers required in secondary? 
– Increased flow rates through the primary inspection systems increase the 
probability of alarming a primary detector, causing a subsequent increase in the 
number of vehicles required to go to the secondary inspection location.  It is 
possible that this increase in vehicles could overwhelm the security personnel 
causing a back-up of vehicles in primary.  
• How does improving the speed of resolution of alarms in secondary affect the 
retardation of flow through secondary as well as the resources (officers) 
required? 
 
To setup the simulation, 5 cars and 5 trucks were chosen to be placed in each of 
the 6 lanes on both the incoming and outgoing sides.  Therefore a total of 120 
vehicles are present in this simulation at all times.  We have set a criterion that 
more than 5 vehicles in the secondary inspection location will result in the 
additional costs of adding one more set of officers (a set being 4 to cover 3 eight 
hour shifts plus a backup).  This is assumed to be the maximum number of 
vehicles that can be present in the secondary inspection location before the 
security officers become overwhelmed.  The test case was run multiple times 
(different simulations) with different primary inspection station discriminator levels 
to determine which level overwhelms the security personnel.  Each simulation 
was run for a maximum of 30,000 ticks (we have chosen a tick to be one 
second).  If the simulation was run for 30,000 ticks without exceeding the 
threshold level it was considered to pass the criterion and a lower discriminator 
level was chosen for the next simulation.  A simulation was considered complete 
and cut short if the threshold level was exceeded.  Also, if a simulation exceeded 
the threshold level it was run again to confirm the validity of the previous 
simulation.  If a simulation was run 3 consecutive times, with all 3 simulations 
exceeding the threshold level, then the simulation with the current inputs was 
confirmed and the result for the minimum detection probability for primary was 




The first simulation (simulation 1) was run with an alarm discriminator level of 
0.85 for both the incoming and outgoing flows of traffic.  Vehicles with a random 
number greater than 0.85 were required to go to Secondary for additional 
screening.  With a discriminator level of 0.85 the simulation ran for the full 30,000 
ticks without the secondary inspection location exceeding 5 vehicles.  The 
maximum number of vehicles to be in the secondary inspection location at one 
time was found to be 1.  This is shown in Figure 10 below.  
 
Simulation 2 was run with an alarm discriminator level of 0.65.  The simulation 
was able to complete a full 30,000 ticks without exceeding the secondary 
inspection threshold level.  Figure 11 shows that secondary met the threshold 
level twice throughout the simulation but never exceeded the level at which the 
Secondary is at capacity. 
 
With these current inputs the security organization would be required to add one 
more set of security officers.  Figures 11 through 13 reflect simulations 3, 3-a, 
and 3-b respectively.  It should be noted that in Figures 12 and 13 the total 
number of vehicles did not fully reach the threshold level on the plot before the 
simulation was stopped.  This is due to the way vehicles are counted in the 
secondary inspection location.  Because of the probability of the random 
numbers generated it is possible that a simulation can be run for a higher 
discriminator level in which the simulation will pass.  Therefore a range of 
discriminator levels should be recorded as the lowest detection probability for 
primary.  Thus, a range of 0.63 to 0.65 was chosen as the minimum detection 
probability in primary without exceeding the threshold level requiring the security 
organization to add another set of security officers.  
 
Test Case II - Effects of primary flow rate 
We examined the effect that the primary flow rate has on the wait times and 
security officers required in secondary.  In this test case simulations were run by 
varying the initial number of vehicles in the model.  Three simulations were run 
for this test case: low, medium, and high volume traffic flows.  Each simulation 
was run for a total of 30,000 ticks.  A secondary inspection location threshold 
level of 5 vehicles was used to determine the effect of the traffic flow on 
secondary.  The discriminator alarm levels for both flows of traffic were set to 
0.65 for each simulation. 
 
Simulation 4 was run with 5 cars and 5 trucks in each lane on both the incoming 
and outgoing sides.  This simulation serves as the low volume traffic flow 
simulation.  It was determined that the average wait time experienced by vehicles 
waiting to cross the border was in the range of 75 to 140 ticks.  This is reflected 




Figure 10. Number of vehicles in secondary screening as a function of time 





Figure 11. Number of vehicles in secondary screening as a function of time 




Figure 12. Number of vehicles in secondary screening as a function of time 




Figure 13. Number of vehicles in secondary screening as a function of time 
for simulation 3-b obtained from the NetLogo model 
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The maximum wait time experienced by a vehicle is shown by the green curve in 
Figure 14.  Figure 15 shows the number of vehicles in secondary screening as a 
function of time.  It can be seen from the figure that the threshold level is 
exceeded for most of the simulation.  Therefore with the current density of traffic 
and discriminator alarm level the security organization would be required to add 
at least one more set of security officers or increase the discriminator level 
temporarily.  Because the maximum number of vehicles in secondary at any one 
time during the simulation was 14 the security organization would be required to 
add two additional sets of security officers, assuming that one new set of officers 
would be required for each increase of 5 vehicles in the Secondary Inspection 
station.  
 
Simulation 5 was run with 15 cars and 15 trucks in each lane of the incoming and 
outgoing lanes of traffic.  This simulation serves as the medium volume traffic 
flow simulation.  From this simulation it was determined that the average wait 
time experienced by all vehicles waiting to cross the border ranged from 250 to 
455 ticks.  This is a longer wait time than the vehicles in simulation 4 
experienced.  Figure 16 gives the wait times of the vehicles waiting to cross the 
border as a function of time, while Figure 17 gives the number of vehicles in 
secondary as a function of time.  It can be seen from Figure 18 that the wait 
times of the incoming vehicles were higher than the outgoing for a portion of the 
simulation.  This was due to the random placement of the vehicles as they are 
wrapped back around the model to start the process again.  On occasion, one 
lane will become longer than the rest resulting in longer wait times for vehicles in 
that lane.  As seen in Figure 19 the maximum number of vehicles in secondary 
was 12. 
 
Therefore using the assumption of a maximum of 5 vehicles with the current 
number of officers, the security organization would be required to add two 
additional sets of officers to operate without becoming overwhelmed. 
Simulation 6 was the same as simulation 5 except that 20 cars and 20 trucks 
were placed in each lane of the incoming and outgoing traffic flows.  This 
simulation serves as the high volume traffic flow simulation.  Figure 18 gives the 
wait times of the vehicles waiting to cross the border as a function of time.  The 
average wait time of vehicles ranged from 350 ticks to 570 ticks.  Figure 19 
shows the number of vehicles in secondary as a function of time.  It can be seen 
from the figure that the threshold level was exceeded once again.  However in 
this simulation the maximum number of vehicles in secondary was 8.  This would 
require the security organization to add only one more set of officers to operate 
without becoming overwhelmed.  Just as was the case for simulation 5, the 
vehicles in simulation 6 experienced longer wait times than those in simulation 4. 
The highest average wait time in simulation 6 (570 ticks) is over 4 times the 






Figure 14. Wait times of vehicles waiting to cross the border as a function 




Figure 15. Number of vehicles in secondary screening as a function of time 




Figure 16. Wait times of vehicles waiting to cross the border as a function 





Figure 17. Number of vehicles in secondary screening as a function of time 




Figure 18. Wait times of vehicles waiting to cross the border as a function 




Figure 19. Number of vehicles in secondary screening as a function of time 
for simulation 6 obtained from the NetLogo model. 
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The results obtained from the simulations run for this test case show that an 
increase in traffic flow leads to an increase in the wait times experienced by 
vehicles waiting to cross the border.  This effect was expected.  The increase in 
the number of vehicles means that more vehicles will be screened in primary.  It 
is possible at very low traffic flow rates that a small increase in the traffic flow will 
not significantly increase the wait times experienced.  However, for the 3 
simulations run here, increases in the traffic flow rate led to significant increases 
in the wait times of the vehicles. 
 
A result that was not expected was the number of vehicles that were required to 
go to secondary screening.  In simulation 4 the maximum number of vehicles in 
secondary was 14.  In simulations 5 and 6 the traffic flow was increased but the 
maximum number of vehicles in secondary was found to decrease to 12 and 9 
respectively.  Reasons for this unexpected nature could be simply due to the fact 
that the vehicles required to go to secondary screening are chosen by 
probabilities assigned from a random number generator.  It is also possible that 
the maximum rate at which vehicles can pass through the primary screening was 
met in simulations 4, 5, and 6.  Therefore the rate at which probabilities are 
assigned to vehicles passing through the crossing is the same in these 3 
simulations.  The only difference in the simulations is that the increased flow rate 
results in longer lines of vehicles backing up behind the primary screening.  
 
Test Case III - Effects of secondary inspection times 
Secondary inspections take an extended amount of time when compared to 
primary inspections.  This extended amount of time could have negative effects 
on the traffic flow through secondary.  Therefore it is desirable to determine how 
improving the speed of resolution of alarms in secondary affects the retardation 
of flow through secondary as well as the required resources (officers).  This test 
case builds upon the two previous test cases in which detection probability and 
traffic flow were varied to determine the effects.  Therefore 3 simulations will be 
given: high, medium, and low speed of resolution.  The 3 simulations will be run 
by varying the amount of time that it takes to clear a secondary inspection. 
Simulation 7 was run with 5 cars and 5 trucks in each lane.  Both the incoming 
and outgoing discriminator levels were set to 0.65 while the average inspection 
time for a vehicle in secondary was 545 ticks.  Just as in other simulations the 
model was run for 30,000 ticks.  This simulation serves as the high speed of 
resolution simulation.  Figure 20 gives the number of vehicles in secondary as a 
function of time. 
 
Just as in simulation 7, simulation 8 was run with 5 cars and 5 trucks in each 
lane.  The simulation was also run for 30,000 ticks.  The only difference between 
the simulations is that simulation 8 was run with an average secondary 
inspection time of 770 ticks.  Figure 21 gives the number of vehicles in secondary 




Figure 20. Number of vehicles in secondary screening as a function of time 




Figure 21. Number of vehicles in secondary screening as a function of time 




Figure 22. Number of vehicles in secondary screening as a function of time 
for simulation 9 obtained from the NetLogo model. 
 
 
For simulation 9, the average secondary inspection time was 1100 ticks.  The 
simulation was run with 5 cars and 5 trucks in each lane, and was run for 30,000 
ticks.  
 
It can be seen from simulations 7 through 9, and their supporting figures, that as 
the average secondary inspection time per vehicle increases, the number of 
vehicles in secondary increases.  This effect is expected. Because of the 




3 major test cases were run to determine the effects that varying major inputs 
have on the wait times on vehicles crossing the border as well as the resources 
required by the security organization.  Test Case I was used to determine the 
probability of detection in the primary inspection location that would cause the 
security organization to add one more set of security officers.  Discriminator 
levels of 0.85, 0.65, and 0.63 were used in simulations of this test case.  From 
these simulations it was found that as the discriminator level is lowered the 
probability of detection of a vehicle with some characteristic requiring Secondary 
Screening increases.  This can be seen in Figure 15.  As the discriminator level 
is lowered the location on the curve is lowered (moved left).  This leads to a 
larger area being above the discriminator threshold level, thus leading to a higher 
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probability of a vehicle alarming a primary detector.  As Figures 18 through 20 
show as the discriminator level is lowered the number of vehicles in secondary 
increases.  When a discriminator level of 0.63 was used it was found that the 
simulation was not able to pass and exceeded the secondary threshold level.  
Two additional simulations were run to verify the same result using the 0.63 
discriminator level.  From this it was determined that the lowest possible 
discriminator level that could be used with the current traffic flow and security 
officers was in the range of 0.63 to 0.65.  Any discriminator level lower than this 
would require the security organization to add another set of security officers. 
 
Test Case II was used to determine the effects of the primary flow rate on wait 
times of vehicles and security officers required in secondary.  Simulations were 
run by varying the initial number of vehicles in the model.  Figures 18 through 21 
show the results of these simulations.  It was found that an increase in traffic flow 
leads to an increase in the wait times experienced by vehicles waiting to cross 
the border.  An unexpected result however was that the number of vehicles 
required to go to secondary screening did not increase with increasing initial 
traffic flow.  A reason for this could be that the maximum rate at which vehicles 
can pass through the primary portals was met in simulations 4, 5, and 6.  This 
means that the number of vehicles required to go to secondary in these 
simulations was strictly dependent upon probability and the numbers generated 
randomly. 
 
Test Case III helped to determine the effects that varying secondary inspection 
times have on the vehicles required to go to secondary.  Three simulations were 
run in which the average inspection time per vehicle in secondary was changed. 
The simulations covered average times of 545, 770, and 1100 ticks.  As Figures 
21 through 22 show, an increase in the average inspection time causes an 
increase in the vehicles in secondary. 
 
Conclusions/Future Directions 
The results obtained led to a richer overall understanding of border crossings, 
traffic flow models, and agent-based modeling.  As expected, the model showed 
that increasing the traffic flow through the crossing ultimately requires the 
security organization to hire additional sets of security officers.  This can be 
rather expensive due to the fact that if one additional security officer is needed 
for a shift, three more officers on top of the initial one are required.  This is 
assuming three 8-hour shifts as well as a backup.  Since we would expect overall 
traffic flow to vary from hour to hour and from day to day, follow-on work should 
take those variations into account. 
 
Results also showed that other inputs to the model such as discriminator alarm 
levels and secondary inspection times have an impact on the system as a whole, 
as expected.  Delays experienced by vehicles waiting to cross the border as well 
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as the number of vehicles required to go to secondary screening all hinge on 
these inputs.  Therefore it is important to understand how these inputs affect the 
system.  This is why an agent-based model was designed and developed.  The 
model enables the user to change inputs with relative ease to see the effects 
visually. 
 
Some of the assumptions made when designing this model could be added in 
future revisions to add more realism to the model and the subsequent 
simulations.  Currently the number of desired vehicles is chosen through the use 
of a graphic user interface and slider bars.  Once the number of vehicles is 
chosen the vehicles are placed randomly throughout the model as described 
before.  A nice addition would be to improve the code so that a text file could be 
created as an input to the model.  The test file would contain data on the traffic 
flow rate as a function of time.  This would allow an added complexity, such as 
rush-hour traffic in the morning and evening, to be added to the simulations to 
see the effects. 
 
Another assumption made was that all vehicles that are required to be screened 
in the secondary inspection location always pass this secondary inspection.  In 
real life this is not the case.  There will be occurrences in which the problem 
causing the primary alarm cannot be resolved with the personnel or equipment 
on site.  There is also the possibility that a more serious situation would be 
suspected, like an explosive or a chemical or biological hazard.  In either case 
the event must be logged and the proper authorities must be notified.  Therefore 
the addition of these scenarios would allow yet another set of effects to be 
viewed that are not possible with the current model. 
 
We have assumed that all primary inspections take the same amount of time.  
We also assumed that for the secondary inspections except the secondary 
inspections were given a longer length of time.  In reality there will be a 
distribution of times that it takes for vehicles to pass through the primary and 
secondary inspections.  Using probability distributions, ranges of times could be 
assigned to all vehicles passing through primary and secondary inspections. 
 
Dynamic Simulation Model for Addition of RadNuc Mission 
 
Addition of RadNuc mission to hypothetical border crossing 
For this next phase, we will assume that Country A has decided to add the 
RadNuc mission to the operations around the border crossing.  The following 
assumptions also are made: 
1. Country B will also add a RadNuc mission to its border crossing 
2. The sponsoring organization for this initiative is Country A Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS-A).  
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3. Instrumentation will be added to the border crossing to help detect the 
presence of radiological and nuclear materials.  
4. DHS-A will specify the operating parameters of the equipment 
5. DHS-A will provide funding for the initial purchase of the equipment. 
6. These RPMs will include measurements of gamma and neutron radiation 
as the vehicles slow down and then stop for Primary Inspection. 
 
Equipment involved 
In our model, there will be a radiation portal monitor (RPM) at each Primary 
Inspection Station.  This will serve as the primary detection location for radiation 
detection.  The RPMs at each toll booth will be equipped with both gamma and 
neutron detection capabilities.  The secondary inspection location will be utilized 
to examine further any vehicles that alarm a detector in the primary inspection 
location.  The secondary inspection location will be comprised of: a second RPM 
to verify the first hit, handheld detectors equipped with an radioisotope identifier, 
and radiography equipment (e.g., to scan a whole truck spatially, etc.) 
Typical operating procedure 
In this section an example is used to show the typical RadNuc screening process 
flow of a vehicle through our hypothetical international border crossing.  As a 
vehicle enters the primary inspection location primary screening begins.  At this 
time the monitor will begin a gross neutron and gamma count.  During primary 
screening official documents such as passports, driver’s licenses, shipment 
manifests, etc. are verified.  Once the vehicle has passed any toll requirements, 
the gross gamma and gross neutron counts recorded will be compared to the 
normal background count.  Depending on the outcome of the count the vehicle is 
either allowed to proceed through the crossing or is required to go to the 
secondary inspection location for further screening. 
 
If the vehicle is required to go to the secondary inspection location, it is escorted 
to a monitoring station where it will first go through another RPM monitoring 
system much like that in Primary to see if the readings that lead to the alarm are 
repeated.  The next step would involve inspectors doing visual inspections as 
well as using a hand-held monitor to determine the location of the radioactive 
materials in the vehicle.  Inspectors will also review any licensing or permit 
information.  If the radioactive material is identified and is found to be an innocent 
source, the occurrence is logged and the individual is released.  If the source is 
identified as not consistent with the list of innocent radiation sources, the 
occurrence is logged and technical assistance is contacted for further guidance.  
If the source cannot be identified then the personnel associated with the vehicle 
as well as the vehicle itself are examined further.  If the cause of the alarm is 
judged to meet requirements and no danger is discovered, the occurrence is 




The following assumptions were made about the radiation portal monitors 
(RPMS), neutron detectors and the level of radioactivity in the trucks and cars. 
Radiation Portal Monitors (RPMs) will include gamma radiation detectors and 
neutron detectors.  The outputs of the RPMs will be gamma and neutron 
readings as a function of time as the vehicle travels by the RPMs.  The 
discriminator settings for gamma alarms and for neutron alarms can be set at 
whatever level we choose.  But there will be consequences for setting the alarms 
at a particular level.  If the discriminator level for gamma radiation is set to zero, 
any gamma reading above zero will trigger an alarm.  If any gamma alarm results 
in a decision to send the vehicle to Secondary, then it might be possible that 
vehicles would be sent to Secondary frequently enough that the capability of the 
existing officers to resolve the alarms would be overcome. 
 
Since one of the new mission spaces for Secondary Inspection will be for 
adjudication of alarms that occur in the Primary lanes, the Secondary station will 
also have more radiation detection equipment that has some isotopic 
identification capabilities and is portable so that hot spots of radioactivity can be 
determined. 
 
Occasionally there will be cases where the Secondary Inspection area will not 
have the capability to resolve the question about whether the radioactive material 
is only normally occurring radioactive material (NORM). 
 
For those cases, we assume the border crossing will have another area called 
Tertiary.  In this area, the drivers and other occupants of the vehicles will be 
separated from the vehicles, the vehicles will be placed under stricter 
administrative controls, and additional assets will be called in to help resolve the 
radiation readings.  In some of these cases, specialized capabilities will be called 
upon to ensure that the vehicles can be inspected manually.  This might involve 
the use of bomb squads from regional police or fire departments.  This Tertiary 
Inspection Area is not shown in the Google SketchUp diagrams but is shown in 
the user interface of the two dimensional dynamic simulation model.  The large 
space between the incoming and outgoing lanes of traffic is the secondary 
inspection location and serves to be a further (second) screening location in the 
event that the primary inspection location detector alarms.  The actual location of 
the secondary screening is the horizontal green bar located in the center at the 
top of the secondary inspection location.  If a primary inspection location detector 
alarms vehicles are escorted to the secondary inspection location by a security 
officer so that a second screening can be done to confirm the validity of the first 
alarm.  Figure 23 below shows an image of the model with the simulation in 
progress.  It can be seen how traffic backs up at the Primary Inspection Areas. 

















Assumptions for vehicle radioactivity (incoming/outgoing colors) 
To screen for the RadNuc threat, the system will measure gamma and/or neutron 
radiation emanated from a vehicle in the field of view of the RPM in Primary 
Screening.  In truck traffic, there will be  a broad range of commodities, most of 
which will not emanate any radiation (detectable by our RPMs).  Some of these, 
however, will still fail some of the screening done in Primary Screening and will 
be sent to Secondary for resolution of the problem.  Possible causes include 
improper paperwork, improper decaling, and vehicle weight different than 
expected and suspicious behavior of the driver or passengers.  At some border 
locations, vehicles are occasionally selected on a random basis for Secondary 
Screening.(Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 2012) 
 
The adapted model will continue to simulate the stochastic variation in the rate at 
which these vehicles are sent to Secondary for reasons not associated with the 
RadNuc screening mission – and then add the impact of vehicles failing the 
radiation screening system in Primary Screening. 
 
In this adapted model, there are six types of vehicles, with differing levels of 
radioactivity either in the commodities carried by the trucks, the luggage in the 
cars, or radioactive medical burdens in the people in the vehicles as a result of 
medical treatments or diagnostic tests.  The types of radiation detected by the 
RPMs and the portable radiation detectors only include gammas and neutrons, 
as is normally the case in border crossings.(International Atomic Energy Agency, 
2013)  In this model, most vehicles (85.6%) do not contain enough gamma or 
neutron radiation to trigger an alarm even at the lowest setting on the RPMs.  
Actual levels of radioactivity in vehicles going across border crossing will vary 
from location to location and occasionally from season to season.  In the dynamic 
Figure 23. Two dimensional simulation model layout of border crossing 
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simulation model, trucks or cars with no measurable radiation are called Non 
RadNuc.  They will show up as red for vehicles coming from Country B into 
Country A and as blue going from Country A into Country B.  [For our model, we 
were constrained by the icons we could assume at one time.  The model uses a 
total of 6 types of vehicles having different types and levels of radioactivity, 
leaving 36 non RadNuc vehicles for a ratio of 85.6%.] 
 
For radioactive classes of trucks and cars, the model uses arbitrary units for the 
expected levels of gamma and neutron radiation.  This approach stays well away 
from any classification issues.  There is a great deal of sensitivity around the 
levels of radiation emanating from vehicles, how well it could be detected by 
RPMs (and more advanced sensors), and the level of radiation given off by 
different types of commodities in different types of packaging in different types of 
vehicles.  These details about radiation levels and energy spectra associated 
with the radiation are really not very relevant to the strategic questions addressed 
in this dissertation.   
 
However, we do want to examine how RadNuc screening at different 
discriminator levels will impact throughput, backups in Secondary and other 
operational considerations.  To give some detail in these operational 
considerations, the model includes various classifications, reflecting broad levels 
of radiation (gamma and neutron) that we might expect to be emanated from the 
vehicles.  The broad categories are named in terms of low or high gamma 
radiation emanations and low or high neutron emanation levels.  
 
Two in 42 (4.8%) of the vehicles will be trucks with a low level of gamma 
radiation and no neutron radiation.  Truck cargo occasionally does have some 
gamma radiation coming from potassium-40 bearing materials taken from the 
earth.  Examples are bricks, stones and plants.  Generally, this type of cargo has 
no neutron radiation.  In the model, these are called Lowgamma trucks.  They will 
show up as brown for vehicles coming from Country B into Country A and as 
violet going from Country A into Country B.  The gamma radiation level was set 
arbitrarily at 5 and the neutron radiation level was set to 0 (since this type of 
cargo has typically has no neutron radiation measureable in our border crossing 
scenario). 
 
One in 42 (2.4%) of the vehicles will be a truck with a medium level of gamma 
radiation and no neutron radiation.  In our model, this type of truck cargo would 
have some more gamma radiation than that coming from potassium-40 bearing 
materials taken from the earth.  Examples are small to medium commercial, 
scientific and medical radioisotopes.(Kouzes, 2009)  Generally, this type of cargo 
has no neutron radiation.  In the model, these trucks are called Medgamma 
trucks.  They will show up as pink for vehicles coming from Country B into 
Country A and as sky blue going from Country A into Country B.  The gamma 
radiation level was arbitrarily set at 10 and the neutron radiation level to 0 (since 
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this type of cargo has typically has no neutron radiation measureable in our 
border crossing scenario). 
 
One in 42 of the vehicles (2.4%) will be a truck with a high level of gamma 
radiation and no neutron radiation.  This type of truck cargo would have 
significantly more gamma radiation than that coming from potassium-40 bearing 
materials taken from the earth.  Examples are large commercial and scientific 
radioisotopes, as well as drivers or passengers who have had recent medical 
treatments.  These are called Highgamma trucks in our model.  They will show 
up as orange for vehicles coming from Country B into Country A and as magenta 
going from Country A into Country B.  The gamma radiation level was arbitrarily 
set at 100 and the neutron radiation level to 0 (since this type of cargo has 
typically has no neutron radiation measureable in our border crossing scenario). 
 
One in 42 (2.4%) of the vehicles will be a truck with a medium level of gamma 
radiation and some detectable neutron radiation.  This type of truck cargo would 
have somewhat more gamma radiation than that coming from potassium-40 
bearing materials taken from the earth.  But in this class of vehicles, there will be 
neutron emanation at a level high enough to be detected in Primary Screening. 
Examples are commercial items like moisture gauges and scientific 
radioisotopes.  Other examples would include trucks carrying significant 
quantities of nuclear reactor fuel (UO2 or UF6).  Another type of neutron alarm 
can be generated when a shower of cosmic ray particles strike high-Z materials 
and generate neutrons.  This occasional spike in neutron levels around materials 
in cargo generates nuisance alarms.  Since plutonium emits neutrons and since 
plutonium is an element of concern for nuclear weapons, any significant neutron 
detection would likely cause a vehicle to be stopped and sent to a Secondary for 
alarm resolution.  We assume that will be the operational concept our model.  
These are called Neutron trucks in the model.  They will show up as yellow for 
vehicles coming from Country B into Country A and as lime going from Country A 
into Country B.  The gamma radiation level was arbitrarily set at 10 and the 
neutron radiation level to 5 (since this type of cargo typically will have neutron 
radiation measureable in our border crossing scenario). 
 
One in 42 (2.4%) of our vehicles will be a car with a high level of gamma 
radiation and no neutron radiation.  In the model, for this case the drivers or 
passengers in the cars will have had recent medical treatments.  These are 
called Cargammas in our model.  They will show up as orange for vehicles 
coming from Country B into Country A and as magenta going from Country A into 
Country B.  The gamma radiation level was arbitrarily set at 100 and neutron 
radiation level to 0 (since people generally have no neutron radiation 
measureable in our border crossing scenario). 
 
A summary of these types of vehicles, their distribution and the color code for 
incoming and outgoing vehicles is shown in Table 4. 
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85.6% 0 0 Red Blue 
Lowgamma Truck 4.8% 5 0 Brown Violet 
Medgamma Truck 2.4% 10 0 Pink Sky 
Highgamma Truck 2.4% 100 0 Orange Magenta 
Neutron Truck 2.4% 10 5 Yellow Lime 
Cargamma Car 2.4% 100 0 Orange Magenta 
 
This means that 14.4% of the vehicles in our model contain radioactive materials 
of a quantity to have gamma or neutron emanations to be detectable by RPMs at 
Primary Screening. 
 
The dynamic simulation model will show the movement of the trucks as cars as a 
function of time.  By observing the shapes (truck icons look like trucks and car 
icons look like cars) and the colors, one can watch how the various classes of 
cars and trucks move through the system, including Secondary. 
 
Developing the concept of operations resulted in questions about how to handle 
a truck with a neutron signature (yellow color for incoming or lime for outgoing).  
Neutron alarms are frequently resolved by a quick scan of the vehicle to see if 
there are still neutrons detected near the vehicle.  In some occasions the 
neutrons emanations were caused by the “ship effect” and, therefore, the new 
measurement will not detect neutrons.(Kouzes, Siciliano, Ely, Keller, & McConn, 
2008)  But in our case, the Neutron Truck actually will have neutron sources on 
board.  The screening official will not know a priori whether it was a ship effect 
measurement.  But when an official measures in Secondary, he will also continue 
to detect neutrons.  This can cause a significant concern.  The author has 
observed border crossing personnel escorting vehicles in this type of situation to 
a separate part of the station, which we will call the Tertiary Screening Station, 
where the vehicle is kept under strict administrative control until the neutron 
alarm is resolved.  In the model analyst interface, the Tertiary Screening Station 
is shown within the large dark gray lot with a peach colored stopping strip.  In the 
model, Neutron Trucks would be held in Tertiary for considerably longer times 
than would be expected for Secondary.  In our model, the officials will stop 
vehicles for about an hour in Tertiary as opposed to 20 minutes in Secondary 
stopping strip. 
 
As we set up the model, there are a number of obvious questions which spring 
up.  Where would Tertiary Screening actually take place?  What would really 
happen in Tertiary screening?  What organizations would need to be involved?  
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How could we be assured that those organizations are committed to support 
Tertiary Screening, especially if they have simultaneous demands on their time 
elsewhere? 
 
The first question about where Tertiary screening would take place points out 
that the Country A General Services Administration, GSA-A, will have to make a 
special place available for Tertiary Screening at the border crossing station.  That 
might require allocation of already limited space at the station.  It might require 
special fencing or other physical boundaries to help secure the vehicle.  It might 
also require a low background radiation site.  A correlated question would be 
whether there already was a Tertiary Screening Area at the station because of a 
similar need for Non-RadNuc reasons.  Some border stations already have large 
x-ray stations that can radiograph an entire tractor trailer to nonintrusively 
produce an image of the cargo inside the vehicle.  In that situation, provision of 
the space might be simple.  But for the case where there is limited space 
available, this might be an obstacle.  
 
The second question addresses the concept of operations for Tertiary Screening 
for RadNuc threats.  Possibilities include further examination of the information 
related to the manifest, the driver, the vehicle and the shipper.  Other possibilities 
include slower, more complete scanning of the vehicle for better characterization 
of any radiation hot spots, using higher resolution gamma detectors to look for 
radioisotopes that have gamma and neutron emanations.  Another possibility is a 
reachback capability in which a group of experts with more advanced knowledge 
of radiological and nuclear threats would review the information and provide 
advice.  A related question then would be which organization would provide this 
reachback capability and how would we know they had an enduring commitment 
to provide it?  A possibility is that some official would decide that the inside of the 
vehicle and its cargo should be examined physically.  This would require legal 
standing to open a car trunk or to open the trailer behind a truck.  But that 
decision would probably require first that the vehicle be examined to ensure there 
was an acceptable risk that opening the trunk or trailer would result in 
catastrophic results.  For example, a bomb squad would travel to the border 
crossing station from some nearby authority to examine the vehicle for some sort 
of explosive device.  We have observed that some police organizations and 
some fire organizations have this capability.  That possibility then raises another 
set of questions.  Which organization would have the responsibility (and with 
what liability) to certify the vehicle safe to open?  What set of agreements would 
need to be in place to provide this service on a timely basis?  Our assumption is 
that this capability would not be needed frequently at the station and, therefore, 
would not reside at the facility.  But if there were situations in which this capability 
would be required for three hours a day, which would be problematic.  It is 
possible, then, that this capability might be offered by more than one organization 
in the region.  In that situation, there would be a more complicated, but maybe 




These questions add to our list of discovered questions and metrics for 
consideration later in the dissertation. 
 
Cases Investigated 
Four cases were examined.  The first case, Case A, represents the situation at 
the border crossing before the RadNuc mission is introduced.  The dynamic 
situation model was made to correspond to this case by setting the discriminator 
alarm levels for gammas and for neutron above any radiation level exhibited by 
the trucks and cars.  The model should show that traffic will flow along readily, 
with some vehicles sent to Secondary to resolve paperwork or other issues not 
associated with the RadNuc mission.  The buildup of vehicles in Secondary 
should be on the average below 5 vehicles because we have designed our 
protocols to be manageable with the number of Secondary screeners on site to 
handle up to 5 vehicles at one time. 
 
The second case, Case B, shows the impacts of adding a RadNuc screening 
mission onto the existing framework of mission screenings (law enforcement, 
immigration, vehicle safety, vehicle registration, etc.).  For Case B, the RPM 
discriminators at set a level where some vehicles would set off radiation alarms 
in Primary and then be sent to Secondary for resolution of RadNuc alarms.  For 
this case, the secondary screeners will have to be trained to use a set of 
specialized equipment and to use additional protocol steps beyond those already 
in place for non-RadNuc mission space.  For this and other RadNuc cases, the 
model has to include a Tertiary for the situations where the Secondary screeners 
cannot resolve the alarms.  This might occur if the instrumentation indicates the 
gamma radiation profiles or neutron presence that seem out of character from 
the vehicle manifests or the explanations of the drivers of the vehicles.  These 
situations can be difficult to adjudicate.  In some cases, radiographic images of 
the entire vehicle can be performed with specialized equipment and specially 
trained operators.  These images can help the officer to understand the 
configuration of the cargo and verify it agrees with the description in the manifest 
and/or the explanation given by the driver.  Sometimes off site support may be 
required from reachback specialists in characteristics of RadNuc threats.  In 
Tertiary, there may be a requirement for opening the vehicles and performing 
manual inspection of the cargo.  But if the vehicles and their cargo in Tertiary are 
considered possible RadNuc threats, other specialists might be required to 
determine whether it would be safe to open the vehicles (trailers, trucks or trunks 
of cars, for example).  These specialized skills generally are found in local police 
or fire departments.  The time to resolve alarms in Tertiary Screening can vary 
widely.  Our model assumes a resolution time of one hour. 
 
The third case, Case C, examines the impact of a more aggressive application of 
RadNuc screening.  The discriminator settings for gamma and neutron radiation 
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are set to only alarm for pretty significant gamma levels and for pretty low 
neutron levels.  The model should show that more vehicles would be sent to 
Secondary and occasionally to Tertiary. 
 
The fourth case, Case D, examines the effect of very aggressive application of 
RadNuc screening.  The discriminator settings for gammas and neutrons will be 
set so that any detection of gammas or neutrons will cause the vehicles to be 
sent to Secondary Inspection.  We would expect enough vehicles to be sent to 
Secondary to overwhelm the capacity for Secondary screeners to resolve the 
alarms in reasonable time frames.  The model should show that the number of 
vehicles sent to Tertiary might overwhelm the capacity of the specialized teams 
to adjudicate the alarms. 
 
The summary of the conditions in Cases A through D is given in Table 5.  The 
results of these dynamic simulations for each of these cases will be discussed 
first.  Then the impacts of these results on the geopolitical constructs will be 
considered.  This will support our discussion of metrics for predicting the long 
term efficacy of applying the RadNuc mission into this border crossing construct. 
 
For the user interface of our updated dynamic model, we use the color coding 
shown in Table 6.  This will make it possible to see which types of vehicles are at 
what positions at various times during the simulation.  In fact, one can watch 
individual vehicles as they move throughout the system during the simulation, 
observing whether they pass through Primary without significant delay, have to 
go to Secondary or even have to go to Tertiary Screening, as shown in Figure 
23.  The analyst can see how long each vehicle stays within the screening areas. 
This allows us to determine the effects of changing discriminator levels of various 
types of vehicles during the simulation. 
 
We show in Figure 24 a more complete view of the analyst interface for this 
updated model.  On the left side of the analyst interface to the dynamic 
simulation model, we have located 15 slider bars.  The sliders can be moved to 
change the values of fifteen parameters.  The first parameter is the number of 
nonradioactive trucks in the simulation set up.  The second slider bar is to set the 
number of nonradioactive cars.  The third is the number of Lowgamma trucks 
(which we have described as having the radiation levels of gamma reading of 5 
for gammas, and 0 for neutrons).  The fourth is the number of Medgamma trucks 
(gamma reading of 10, neutron 0), and the fifth is the number of Highgamma 
trucks (gamma reading of 100, neutron 0).  The sixth is the number of 
Cargammas (gamma reading of 100, neutron 0), and the seventh is the number 
of neutron trucks (gamma reading 10, neutron 5).  The eighth is the discriminator 
level we use for normal screening (regulatory compliance, immigration, safety, 
etc.) for traffic coming into Country A, the ninth slider bar is the discriminator level 













A 143 (>100) 7 (>5) Case where no RadNuc screening is 
carried out 
B 41(>10) 1 Lower level of RadNuc mission 
screening 
C 8 (>5) 1 Medium level of RadNuc mission 
screening  
D 0 0 Very aggressive screening; any 




Table 6. Color coding for dynamic simulation model layout 
Feature Description Color on model 
graphic 
Border Crossing Hypothetical border crossing Red 
Radiation 
Detector 
Radiation portal monitor station (RPM) (Blue/Sky Blue) 
Secondary Secondary inspection zone Light Gray 
Secondary 
Stopping Strip 
Location where secondary screening 
occurs 
Light Green 
Tertiary Area where suspect vehicles failing 




Strip where model counts vehicles as 




The tenth is for the discriminator level for neutrons, the eleventh is the 
discriminator level for gammas.  The twelfth sets the criterion for the allowable 
number of vehicles in tertiary screening, the slider bar next to that is to set the 
criterion for the acceptable number of vehicles in secondary screening.  The two 
bottom slider bars are to set the acceleration and deceleration values for the 
vehicles in our simulation. 
 
Results for Case A  
In Case A, we set the discriminator levels for gammas and neutrons so high that 
none of our vehicles trigger an alarm.  This case could represent the situation 
before the RadNuc mission would be applied to the border crossing.  Since there 
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will be no alarms, then the only vehicles that would be sent to Secondary would 
be those that are sent there because of some other issues for which the border 
crossing officers in Primary are not satisfied.  The actual model settings for this 
case have the discriminator setting for gamma counts at 143 and the neutron 
count rate set at 7.  Since in our model the highest gamma reading for any truck 
or car is 100 and the highest neutron reading is 5, it is clear that there would be 
no situation for which a truck or car would be sent to secondary for a RadNuc 
mission for Case A.  These settings are shown in the slider bar section of the 
analyst interface in Figure 24. 
 
A larger view of the part of the analyst interface showing simulated traffic at 
10800 seconds is shown in Figure 25.  The model shows that there are two 
trucks in the outgoing Secondary, one of which is in the way out.  In Figure 26, 
the model shows that the number of vehicles that are in secondary screening for 
incoming and outgoing both reach 3 but remain below the threshold of 5 vehicles 
above which we are assuming that additional secondary screening officers would 
be required.  Therefore, no extra secondary screening personnel or additional 
secondary space is necessary.  In Figure 27, results show 4 vehicles in incoming 
secondary at about 7500 seconds, but they are cleared out of Secondary by the 
end of the simulation. 
 
As we also would expect, there are no cars or trucks sent to Tertiary because 
this is the case for which there is no RadNuc mission screening.  It remains 
empty at the highest discriminator level because the RPMs are essentially turned 
off.  The plot in Figure 28 below shows a value of zero for the number of vehicles 
sent to Tertiary. 
 
The number of vehicles waiting to cross the border during the simulation for Case 
A is about 30 to 35 for both incoming and outgoing (for a total of 70-72), as 
shown in Figure 29, or about 6 per lane for the 12 lanes.  We will assume that 
this level of backup is acceptable to the Customs and Border Patrol of Country A 
and Country B.  This seems like a reasonable assumption for a border crossing 
operation that is very efficient. 
 
In Figure 30, model results show that around 1050 incoming and 1050 outgoing 
vehicles (for a total of 2100) have crossed the border in the 10,800 seconds of 
simulated time (3 hours).  This means that an average of about 59 vehicles per 
hour will cross the border in each lane.  This rate of vehicles passing through 
each lane would indicate that our border crossing process is reasonably efficient 
and that the concept of operations for dealing with all of the missions before 










































Figure 30. Number of vehicles that have crossed the border for Case A 
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For reference, according to the U.S. GSA, the world’s busiest Land Port of Entry 
(LPOE), the San Ysidro LPOE supports 24 northbound vehicle lanes into the 
United States serving more than 50,000 northbound vehicles daily.  That means 
they have an average of 2083 per hour crossing the border going north per hour 
in each of 24 lanes, or 86 vehicles per hour per lane.  According to their website, 
they expect traffic to increase by 87% by 2030.(U.S. General Services 
Adminstration, 2013) 
In Figure 31, the model shows that 155 vehicles which have radioactive materials 
in their cargo, luggage or persons have crossed the border from Country B into 
Country A, and that 145 vehicles that have radioactive materials have crossed 
from Country A into Country B in the 10,800 second run.  That means that a total 
of 300 vehicles carrying radioactive materials have crossed the border in one 
direction or the other out of a total of 2120 vehicles, or about 14.15% which is 
consistent with the 14.3% shown in Table 4.  This indicates that our simulation 
model is working well.  There is a difference in the number of incoming and 
outgoing radioactive vehicles.  This is because of the randomness in our model 
probability distribution function for the non-radioactive vehicles. 
 
The wait times for vehicles to cross the border are shown in Figure 32.  The 
maximum wait times seem to be 600 to 700 seconds.   
 
A pictorial view of the traffic showing back up in the Primary Inspections Areas 
and the number of vehicles in Secondary Inspection is given in Figure 33.  In the 
screen shot of the model shown in Figure 33, the number of cars backing up in 
the lanes is shown to vary from lane to lane.  The interface shows that are only 2 
vehicles remaining in the incoming secondary after 3 hours.  One is a car and the 
other is a truck. 
 
As expected, there are no vehicles in Tertiary screening, as shown in Figure 34.  Figure 
35 shows the number of vehicles in Secondary Screening for vehicles coming 
into Country A from Country B as a function of time for Case A.  Only trucks and 
cars with verification issues are screened in secondary.  The total reaches 3 
incoming vehicles at 10000 seconds.  Since we have set our threshold at 5 
vehicles in Secondary before additional manpower would be required, our model 


























Figure 35. Number of vehicles in Secondary Screening for Case A 
 
 
Results for Case B 
In this second case, Case B, the impacts of adding a RadNuc screening mission 
onto the existing framework of mission screenings (law enforcement, 
immigration, vehicle safety, vehicle registration, etc.) will be examined.  For Case 
B, the RPM discriminators are set at a level where we would expect to see that 
some vehicles would set off radiation alarms in Primary and then be sent to 
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Secondary for resolution of RadNuc alarms.  The gamma discriminator level was 
set at 41 and the neutron discriminator level at 1, as shown in the analyst 
operator interface in Figure 36.  At these settings, the Highgamma trucks 
(gamma level set at 100) and Neutron trucks (neutron level set at 5) would be 
detected, interdicted and sent to the Secondary.  For this case, the secondary 
screeners will have to be trained to use a set of specialized equipment and to 
use additional protocol steps beyond those already in place for non-RadNuc 
mission space.   
 
The model may now begin to show what happens when the Secondary 
screeners cannot resolve the alarms.  This might occur if the instrumentation 
indicates gamma radiation profiles or neutron presence that seem out of 
character from the vehicle manifests or the explanations of the drivers of the 
vehicles.  These situations can be difficult to adjudicate.  They may require 
specialists in RadNuc threats understanding and characterization.  In Tertiary, 
there may be a requirement for opening the vehicles and performing manual 
inspection of the cargo.  But if the vehicles and their cargo in Tertiary are 
considered possible RadNuc threats, other specialists might be required to 
determine whether it would be safe to open the vehicles (trailers, trucks or trunks 
of cars, for example).  These specialized skills generally are found in local police 
or fire departments.  The time to resolve alarms in Tertiary Screening can vary 




Figure 36. Analyst interface for two-dimensional dynamic simulation model 





In Figure 37, the model results show that in this case, Case B, even though we 
have set the discriminators for gammas at 41 and for neutrons at 1, the number 
of vehicles coming from Country B into Country A sent to Secondary (Incoming 
only shown in the figure 38), reaches 7 and the number for traffic going from 
Country A to Country B reaches 4.  The graph shows that the dynamic model 
calculates that the Outgoing secondary never reaches the threshold of 5 vehicles 
and the Incoming surpasses that threshold criterion at 1200 seconds.  In our 
model, the criterion is that once there are 5 vehicles in secondary screening, then 
Secondary has reached the limit of the capability to resolve the alarms.  
Therefore, the model will assume that another secondary screening officer will 
have to be brought on board for each shift.  If we assume that the border 
operates 24 hours per day, then that would mean adding at least three screening 
officers, each of which would have to have training on RadNuc missions.  This 
training would have to be provided and financed by the geopolitical structure.  In 
our model, we assume the CBP-A (and corresponding CBP-B) would provide the 
officers, the initial training and provide refreshed training over the foreseeable 
future. 
 
In Figures 39 and 40 results show that some vehicles are sent to the Tertiary 
area.  They are present there from 2000 – 4000 seconds and 6000 – 10800 
seconds.  Within our geopolitical construct the model assumptions are that the 
Tertiary Inspection Screening area is where: 
a. vehicles will be held under tighter administrative control by CBP-A,  
b. special inspection capabilities like full vehicle radiography might be used 
by CBP-A, 
c. specialists (like bomb squad technicians from CityA1 police department or 
Township A or Township B or fire department) will determine whether the 
truck or car can be inspected manually,  
d. those manual inspections would occur by CBP-A  or perhaps the FBI-A 
(requiring opening of truck or trailer containers) and opening of car trunks, 
opening of packages, and 
























Figure 40. Number of vehicles in incoming tertiary screening for Case B 
 
 
Figure 41 shows that the number of vehicles waiting to cross the border during 
the simulation for Case B is about 30 to 35 for both incoming an outgoing, or 
about 6 per lane for the 12 lanes, much like in Case A.  We will assume that this 
level of backup is acceptable to the Customs and Border Patrol of Country A and 
Country B. This seems like a reasonable assumption. 
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In Figure 42 the model shows that about 2050 vehicles cross the border, a little bit 
less than for Case A (2100), in which we did not screen for vehicles with 
radioactive materials, because fewer vehicles are sent to Secondary.  This 
means that if we only look for vehicles with very high rates of gamma emissions 
and/or any measurable neutron emissions, we would not expect to see much 
effect on the total number of vehicles crossing the border.  But we would need 
need to add some space and skills to resolve alarms in a Tertiary. 
 
Results shown in Figure 43 are that around 170 radioactive vehicles cross the 
border in Case B because of the high gamma and neutron discriminator settings.  
Figure 44 shows that the wait times for vehicles crossing the border reaches a 
maximum of about 630 seconds, but on the average is about 100 seconds for 
both incoming and outgoing vehicles.  Results indicate that this least aggressive 
level of screening for radioactive materials does have some effect on wait times 


















Figure 44. Wait times of vehicles crossing the border for Case B 
 
 
Results for Case C 
The third case, Case C, models the impact of a more aggressive application of 
RadNuc screening.  The discriminator settings for gamma and neutron radiation 
are set to only alarm for pretty significant gamma levels and any of our vehicles 
emitting neutrons.  We would expect that more vehicles would be sent to 
Secondary Inspection and occasionally to Tertiary Inspection. 
 
The analyst interface for the two-dimensional simulation model for Case C is 
shown in Figure 45.  Results in Figure 46 are that the number of vehicles sent to 
Secondary exceeds our criterion of 5 quickly.  In Figure 47, the model shows that 
the number of vehicles in incoming Secondary first exceeds the threshold around 






Figure 45. Analyst interface for two-dimensional dynamic simulation model 












Figure 47. Number of incoming vehicles in secondary screening for Case C 
 
 
The number of vehicles in tertiary screening is shown in Figure 48.  Generally the 
number in incoming tertiary varies from 0 to 1, as does the number in outgoing 











Figure 49. Number of incoming vehicles in tertiary screening for Case C 
 
 
The number of vehicles waiting to cross the border is about 30 in each of the 
outgoing and incoming cases, as shown in Figure 50.  The number of vehicles 
crossing the border is about 2000 cars in Case C, with about the same number of 













Figure 52 shows that around 100 total radioactive vehicles crossed the border in 
this case.  All low gammas crossed without being screened to Secondary (two 
incoming and two outgoing), plus around 10 medium or high gammas as well as 
any neutrons that cleared secondary in time to cross the border. 
 
The average wait time to cross the border for case C is about 150 seconds, with 
















Figure 54. Expanded view of screen shot for Case C showing traffic flows 
 
 
The analyst interface, shown Figure 54 above, displays an enlarged view of the 
traffic simulation.  At 10800 seconds, there are 5 vehicles in the incoming 
Secondary and 6 in the outgoing Secondary.  There is one truck in the outgoing 
Tertiary and one car just leaving the incoming Tertiary. 
 
Results for Case D 
The fourth case, Case D, models the impact of very aggressive application of 
RadNuc screening.  The discriminator settings for gammas and neutrons were 
set so that any detection of gammas or neutrons will cause the vehicles to be 
sent to Secondary.  Expectations are that enough vehicles would be sent to 
Secondary to overwhelm the capacity for Secondary screeners to resolve the 
alarms in reasonable time frames.  The number of vehicles sent to Tertiary would 
be expected to overwhelm the capacity of the specialized teams to adjudicate the 
alarms.  The analyst interface for the two-dimensional simulation model for Case 





Figure 55. Analyst interface for two-dimensional dynamic simulation model 




An enlargement of the operator interface to show visually the backup of vehicles 
at 10800 seconds is shown in Figure 56.  We can see here there are 9 vehicles 




Figure 56 Dynamic simulation model of traffic backup for Case D 
 
 
In Figure 57, the graph shows that extra personnel would become necessary 
almost immediately.  Both incoming and outgoing traffic piled up in Secondary 





Figure 57. Number of vehicles waiting in secondary for Case D 
 
 
A view of the number of vehicles in the incoming Secondary only is shown in 
Figure 58.  The number of vehicles in Secondary will overwhelm the screening 




Figure 58. Number of incoming vehicles in secondary screening 
 
 
Figure 59 and Figure 60 show that the number of vehicles in Tertiary screening is 1 for 
incoming and outgoing vehicles.  The number of vehicles waiting to cross the border 

















Figure 61. Number of vehicles waiting to cross the border in Case D 
 
 
The total number of vehicles that have crossed the border in 3 hours is around 
1900 or 633/hr, as shown in Figure 62.  Figure 63 shows that almost no 
radioactive vehicles cross the border. Around 10 vehicles were able to clear 
secondary in time to cross the border in three hours (10800 seconds). 
 
The maximum wait times reached 553 seconds for vehicles that did not go 


























Developed Model of Geopolitical Structure and Examined Effects 
of RadNuc Mission Addition 
 
The construction of the hypothetical concept of operations for the border crossing 
showed that there would be state, regional and local organizations on which the 
mission would depend.  There would be a need for the State A Highway Patrol to 
agree to chase down vehicles that might run through the border crossing after an 
alarm at the Primary Screening Station.  It is reasonable to assume that this 
provision already is made under an existing memorandum of agreement for other 
situations involving a driver that would refuse to stop at the border.  This 
situation, however, would be more complicated because the vehicle might 
contain a radiological or nuclear threat.  There might need to be a provision in the 
memorandum about how to handle that concern.  We would expect to see 
sections in any memorandum of agreement and in the concept of operations 
covering this situation.  
 
It is also possible that the local Sheriff Department or Police Department would 
get involved in the interdiction and arrest.  In our isometric model of the border 
crossing station, there is an icon to represent the presence of a local police car.  
The icon could represent the Highway Patrol, Sheriff’s Department or Police 
Department presence.  For the situation in which there is criminal activity related 
to radiological or nuclear materials at our hypothetical border crossing, the 
Metropolitan Area MA1 police department (in our case) will be responsible for 
escorting the driver, passengers and/or vehicle to their headquarters – unless a 
threat is suspected or found in the vehicle.  In the case of a found threat, then the 
vehicle may be escorted by an FBI or military representative to a secure location 
removed from populations centers.  There would need to be a memorandum of 
agreement among these organizations articulating which of them will be 
responsible for these special cases.  These cases also should be covered in a 
regional concept of operations. 
 
In the case of criminal behavior, the local District Attorney’s office would be 
involved.  For the case of radiological and nuclear materials, a District Attorney 
with the most relevant capability might have agreed to take the case.  If a 
radiological or nuclear weapon was found or suspected, federal assets would be 
called in after the local officials had secured the situation.  In our large 
metropolitan area, an Information Fusion Center will have been established and 
will communicate with the State A Information Fusion Center about the vehicle, 
driver and cargo to see if there is any more information relevant to the situation 
that might help the border crossing officials or the local law enforcement officials 
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DISCUSSION OF METRICS 
 
 
Systems Engineering, Requirements and Metrics for Enduring 
Mission Success 
 
If we assume that there is a for need continuing participation by all of the relevant 
organizations in all of the relevant jurisdictions throughout the region, then there 
would be a need to develop enduring consensus and commitments around goals, 
objectives, requirements and expectations.  However, these attributes are not 
stand alone, but rather they will exist in a pool of other previous agreements and 
commitments.  Furthermore, consensus may erode due to changing perspectives 
and/or pressures on resources.  Our system for detection, interdiction and 
response to radiological and nuclear threats will need to blend into the existing 
system of systems in the region.  This is a typical systems engineering problem 
in which interface requirements become very important.  For example, the 
systems engineer will need to determine how much of what kind of information 
can be shared at what speed under what conditions between the systems within 
the information fusion centers of Country A and B, States A1 and B1, and the city 
CYA1.   
 
Techniques for development of consensus goals, objectives and requirements 
are well known by systems engineers, especially for new systems.  At this level 
the focus generally is on increasing the probability of threat detection and 
interdiction assuming certain levels of efficacy for the equipment to be provided. 
Plans and budgets are built around providing enough equipment to provide 
coverage of likely pathways for threat introduction and for the training of the 
personnel who would man the equipment and respond to threat indications.  
 
For this case of adding functionality to an existing system of systems, the basic 
systems engineering constructs still seem applicable.  More emphasis needs to 
be placed on interface requirements and on impacts on the existing 
infrastructure, like power requirements, data storage capabilities, information 
fusion capabilities, space availability for equipment, manpower ceilings of state 
and local organizations, modifications to training modules, and modifications to 
existing concepts of operations.   
 
When the additional mission cuts across multiple state, local, and federal 
jurisdictions, the problem is more complicated.  There will be many competing 
priorities.  The outlying counties in State A1 may not feel as threatened as  
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City CYA1, and, therefore, feel that less priority should be put on low probability 
high consequence events.  The systems engineer cannot force a commitment 
from these partners, but will need to understand and plan for what the partners 
will pledge to provide. 
 
When an additional mission execution requires international coordination (as in 
our example), then another level of complexity is introduced.  Country B may be 
more interested in protecting its citizens from threats traveling into their country 
from Country A than they are interested in detecting threats moving into Country 
A.  Agreements will need to be in place to support building of plans, protocols 
and budgets for effective partnering between Countries A and B. 
 
The metrics to support planning of a program to add or increase a radiological 
and nuclear threat mission of a region should include those factors that are 
important to enduring mission success.  Another factor that should be considered 
is the degree to which this mission and the activities necessary to support it are 
symbiotic with other missions at the international, national, regional and local 
levels.  If the new mission is viewed as part of an larger set of missions important 
to the security of a broad base of stakeholders as well as providing benefits 
locally, then the prospects for continuing willingness to accept this mission 
probably will increase.  This chapter discusses the types of metrics that will be 
helpful in planning and assessing this type of program. 
 
Different perceptions around increase in security from radiological and 
nuclear threats 
Development of requirements for an integrated system should take into account 
all the perspectives of the partners in the enterprise.  Many partners are more 
interested in increasing overall security from every day threats than low 
probability high consequence events.  Examples might be businessmen, police 
officers, district attorneys.  An official within the Country A Department of 
Homeland Security, the Country A Environmental Protection Agency, the Country 
A Department of Health or the Country A Environmental Protection agency may 
define security in terms that also include low probability but very high 
consequence events.  The public at large may define security in absolute terms, 
wanting the government to provide total protection from any threat.  Security 
professionals might define security in relative terms, knowing that security may 
never be absolute.  
 
The funding available to the planner may be applicable only to a particular type of 
security problem.  The Country A Department of Homeland Security mission has 
funding available primarily for detection and interdicting radiological and nuclear 
threats, but not for recovery from a detonation of such a threat.  Nor does it have 
funds available for dealing with chemical or biological threats or natural disasters. 
The Country A Federal Emergency Management Agency does not have funding 
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for detection and interdiction, but has funds applicable to preparedness and 
response/recovery from almost any kind of disaster.  The Country A 
Environmental Protection Agency, the Country A Transportation Security 
Administration, the Country A Department of Agriculture, and the Country A 
Department of Justice all have different missions that give their planners different 
perspectives around the definition of security.   
 
These differences in perspective and restrictions within the appropriations and 
budget processes frequently lead to a compartmentalization of security missions.  
With this compartmentalization may come a compartmentalization of goals, 
objectives, and requirements.  Especially in the example where multinational, 
multi-state and multi-jurisdictional authorities will be involved in execution of the 
mission, there is a need to establish requirements and metrics that meet the new 
mission needs while also continuing to meet the pre-existing mission needs of all 
the partners.  There may be two opposing forces, then.  One force is the drive to 
keep planning simple, controllable and easy to measure (compartmentalized).  
Another possible competing force is to develop systems that support the existing 
missions within the region while enabling the new functionalities of the 
radiological and nuclear missions.  This would require the articulation of broader 
consensus of goals, objective and requirements and associated metrics.   
 
Strategic Goals and Questions 
 
A set of strategic goals were developed for this hypothetical enterprise.  Then a 
set of strategic questions were developed that will help articulate metrics 
important for assessment of overall efficacy. 
 
Strategic goals 
The first strategic goal would be to establish a new worthwhile mission of 
detection and interdiction of radiological and nuclear threats at the hypothetical 
border crossing.  
 
The second strategic goal would be to provide enduring support to this new 
mission at the border crossing station. 
 
The third strategic goal would be to bring support to the international, national 
and regional missions and associated initiatives that affect or are affected by 
RadNuc screening operations related to the border crossing without doing any 





Related to strategic goal for a worthwhile mission, what is the process used by 
whom to judge the effectiveness of the mission and with what results?  
 
Related to the strategic goal about enduring support, are adequate plans put into 
place for organizations to continue to support this mission and at what levels? 
 
Related to the strategic goal for bringing support to other missions affected by 
this RadNuc mission, how will which organizations ensure that this mission is 
symbiotic with the other international, national, state and local missions that 
affect or are affected by operations related to the border crossing? 
 
Development of Supporting Questions  
 
The development of the next level of questions to expand our understanding of 
the efficacy of the addition of RadNuc screening to the border crossing station is 
accompanied by a discussion of some related metrics.  For each strategic 
question, a set of supporting questions is developed.   
 
Is the new mission worthwhile? 
The exploration of the questions as to whether the new mission will be 
worthwhile leads to suggestions for more detailed questions that will provide 
insight into the process and the metrics used to answer this question.  The first 
supporting set of questions is related to the ability of this new mission to provide 
deterrence of radiological and nuclear threats.  As our literature survey shows, 
this set of instruments, protocols and trained officers will not, even in the best of 
circumstances, be expected to be able to detect and interdict every type of threat 
100% of the time.  However, the very presence of the mission capabilities at the 
border crossing station is expected to add another layer of difficulty for the 
adversary to consider when contemplating an attack.  This will provide some 
degree of deterrence.  A next set of questions would be concerned with what 
fraction of the RadNuc threat space does the RadNuc screening operations have 
to detect and interdict RadNuc threats.  To detect the threats, a level of 
discrimination will have to be used sufficient to provide sensitivity to the presence 
of the threat.  But we have seen from our dynamic simulation model results that 
as we increase the sensitivity to gamma and neutron radiation, there will be 
consequences in terms of traffic backup and in terms of number of Secondary 
screening personnel.  The literature clearly shows that as traffic backs up and the 
amount of trade going through the border crossing decreases, there are serious 
concerns about associated costs.  We also saw that in some cases, a Tertiary 
screening capability would be needed, with likely support from national level 
assets for reachback and for local bomb squad support.  It is certainly probable 
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that as the level of detection increases, then the number of arrests might 
increase, with an attendant increase in case loads for investigation and 
prosecution.  
 
From the diagrams showing the broad range of agencies that would be involved 
or affected, it seems clear that there would likely be a large group of 
stakeholders.  When we consider that businesses and trade activities will be 
affected, and that their commodities shipped across the border will cause alarms, 
it becomes clear that they will in some way be stakeholders.  Considering that 
people crossing the border in private cars will be affected by traffic slowdowns, 
occasionally get stopped because of radioactive materials in their bodies from 
medical test and procedures, and also have to deal with reminders of their 
vulnerability to radiological and nuclear threats, leads to the conclusion that the 
public affected by the border crossing also will be stakeholders.  As the benefits 
and costs associated with this mission are considered, there will be a need to 
define a broad set of stakeholders for whom we want to assess the benefits and 
costs (and the willingness to pay the costs or accept other considerations). 
 
As we consider the costs, we will want to ask how the costs will be controlled.  
The first requirement will be to examine the full range of costs to the stakeholders 
identified.  An examination will also consider how costs could be lowered by 
leveraging assets already available in the region.  Benchmarking of similar 
mission stand up and operations will help ensure that costs are reasonable.  
There will need to be a well detailed and reviewed procurement plan including 
provisions for requisite training and maintenance (including spare parts 
management). 
 
Beyond the consideration of cost, stakeholders will ask whether the system will 
work to meet the expectations.  Included in this line of reasoning will be 
questions about what fraction of the threat space is covered by the innate 
capacity of the equipment, whether the staff has the requisite training to use the 
equipment, whether there are adequate concepts of operations, and whether 
there is adequate supporting reachback and response staff to resolve the alarms 
and respond to incidents of illicit transport (or threats).  Associated with whether 
the system will work are considerations around readiness of the equipment and 
the staff.  With respect to readiness, there will be questions about the 
commitment of the requisite staff to actually operate and respond to the 
equipment. 
 
From these considerations, supporting questions around deterrence and fraction 
of threat space addressed are: 
1. Given the limitations of the RadNuc screening mission that may exist, is 
there a consensus on the level of deterrence provided versus that 
needed?  We would look for metrics related to the level of deterrence the 
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presence of this mission activity at the border would provide.  In the 
literature, we have not found a widely accepted set of metrics on this 
subject.  In fact, there is a difficult question around who should make that 
evaluation.  It could be made at a local level, but since this system might 
be part of one layer in a multi-layer RadNuc architecture, then the 
evaluation might need to include the perspectives of national (and perhaps 
international) partners.  Furthermore, since discussions around this type of 
metric might be considered sensitive and not open for public discussion, 
there is a question about how to discuss deterrence at a high level in a 
way to gain broad support by the people and organizations likely to pay 
the costs of delays in transit at the border crossing.  While getting multi-
party agreement on the level of deterrence would be difficult, we would 
expect to see an acknowledgement that some aspect of worthiness of the 
enterprise should be discussed with respect to deterrence.  The most 
valuable metric then is likely the most difficult to obtain.  To support our 
approach, we still need to articulate the metrics most likely related to 
deterrence. Related metrics are: 
– A broad enduring consensus of the definition of deterrence 
– A broad enduring consensus on the definition of deterrence of the 
Radnuc threat 
– A broad enduring consensus on the level of deterrence of the 
RadNuc threat that is worthwhile 
– A consensus among the agencies associated with the border 
crossing of the level of deterrence achievable at an acceptable 
cost. 
2. When we developed the diagrams showing the large list of agencies 
whose missions would include, support or affect our new RadNuc mission, 
we pointed out that many of these would be stakeholders for the mission.  
We also noted that the public and businesses affected by the border 
crossing operations would be stakeholders.  The exact number and types 
of stakeholders will vary from location to location.  The question here is 
whether the appropriate stakeholders have been identified.  Related 
metrics will be  
– The presence and quality of a reviewed consensus document 
acknowledging the stakeholders and describing how they have 
been considered in the planning for, the execution of and the 
assessment of the prospects for the success of the mission.  These 
stakeholders may come from international, national, regional and 
local considerations.  The stakeholders will also include 
representatives of the regional public. 
– The presence and quality of a document that articulates the 
benefits and costs to all of the stakeholders that will: 
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 Derive benefit from the mission  
 Be affected by the mission  
 Affect the mission as they execute their other missions 
– Documentation recording committee formation to discuss ways to 
increase benefits and decrease or compensate costs to all of the 
stakeholders. 
– Documentation showing agreements among the stakeholders on 
how costs and benefits are assessed.  This is likely to be a difficult 
metric because of the wide range of interests and goals of the 
stakeholders. 
3. Has there been sufficient activity to elevate awareness of the threat, of the 
approach to counter the threat and of the expected consequences of the 
approach?  Increasing public awareness is a way to help stakeholders find 
a rationale to accept the cost of the system, the cost of the deployment 
operations and the cost to trade and to convenience would seem to be 
one way to establish a pathway for getting their buy-in of the mission.  
Related metrics would include: 
– The number of times the mission is discussed in the popular 
regional press 
– Frequency of popular media showing delay times at the border 
crossing before and those predicted after installation of the mission 
screening operations 
– Number of workshops held to brief community leaders on the 
nature of the threat, on non-threat sources of radiation, on detection 
methods, on operational considerations, and on expected costs to 
trade and convenience 
– Number and quality of advanced training courses and workshops in 
law enforcement and emergency response communities 
– Number and fraction of relevant district attorneys and judges have 
been briefed on the initiative 
– Documentation identifying necessary legal points of contact 
relevant to RadNuc mission actions 
– Quality of communication to support the medical community. This 
would include raising their awareness around the intensity of 
radiation emitted from patients receiving diagnostic tests or 
treatments that result in radioisotopes residing in the bodies of 
patients.  This also would include supporting the medical 
community in explaining to the patients that they might cause 
alarms in the detection systems at our border crossing.  An 
associated metric would be the fraction of these patients who would 
have access to documentation to carry with them in case 
documenting why they would have elevated radiation levels for a 
certain period of time. 
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4. What portion of the RadNuc threat space can be addressed by the 
equipment utilized?  Under the proposed operational protocols, how much 
of that space will be covered?  Related metrics include: 
– Types of equipment purchased for Primary, Secondary and Tertiary 
screening stations 
– Types of equipment purchased to support communications within 
the station and to regional or national information fusion centers 
– Test results giving the probability of detecting various threat types 
for the RPMs in the presence of the nuisance alarms expected 
– Test results giving the probability of resolving the threats in 
Secondary screening 
– Modeling results that estimate the effects of varying conditions, like 
traffic speed, weather conditions, temperature changes on the 
ability to detect threats and resolve alarms 
5. How does the lead agency assure readiness of the equipment, the 
operations personnel and support services? Related metrics include: 
– Failure modes and effects of the various system components, like 
detectors, communication systems, displays, procedures 
– Calibration plans and reports 
– Data related to quality assurance of the measurements systems  
– Effectiveness of training 
– Trainee knowledge scores following initial and refresher training 
courses 
– Fraction of trainees demonstrably capable of executing RadNuc 
screening duties 
– Evaluation scores during drills and other exercises. 
6. How well does this RadNuc mission deployment at the border crossing 
support the Country A’s overarching missions related to radiological and 
nuclear materials?  Country A will have broader missions related to 
radiological and nuclear materials.  Some of these missions will include 
ensuring the transport of these materials along the federal highways is 
done in a controlled and safe manner, ensuring that all attempts to import 
or export these types of materials is authorized, participation in 
international agreements to control and interdict the unauthorized 
production, storage and trade of these types of materials. Related metrics 
are: 
– The presence of written and reviewed documents (or set of 
documents) articulating how this mission of screening at the border 
crossing supports these broader missions related to radiological 
and nuclear materials. 
– The presence of a reviewed plan to continue to upgrade the level of 
support as technology and methodology advances.  Examples 
would include agreements to support the operational evaluation of 
these advancing technologies in detection, communication and 
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information fusion.  Other examples would include evaluation of 
more integrated concepts of operation as the mission gets a 
broader footprint. 
7. What is the likely rate of encounter with normally occurring radiological 
and nuclear material?  We have seen in the literature that there are many 
types of NORM that can cause alarms.  What effect will this rate of 
interaction have on operations at the border crossing station? Related 
metrics are: 
– Types and quantities of commodities expected to flow through the 
border crossing 
– Types of packaging and packing that might change the levels of the 
radiation reaching the RPMs from these commodities 
– Predictions of frequency of nuisance alarms in primary screening 
as a function of detection settings for gammas and for neutrons. 
8. As was discussed in previous Chapters, the response to a NORM alarm 
might require a Tertiary screening which might require specialized 
capabilities (like bomb squads from regional and local police stations or 
fire stations). Related metrics are: 
– The predicted times for responses by these special capabilities 
– The expected minimum and maximum times for resolution 
– The variation inability to respond depending on frequency of 
request, and other factors like regional fires, weather conditions, 
and public events 
– Documentation (like Memoranda of Agreements or some other 
documentation) describing the commitments among these 
organizations to provide timely, certified support to the border 
crossing station. 
9. Are there documented concept of operations and reachback protocols? 
Are they benchmarked against some other installation regarded as 
successful?  Are they being implemented?  Are they being tested with red 
team exercises and/or drills?  If so, what are the results?  Related metrics 
include: 
– The presence of a signed regional concept of operations (ConOps), 
detailing the roles, responsibilities and protocols for all the principal 
partners.   
– How frequently the basic concept of operations is tested.  This 
would involve testing of actions taken by the primary screening 
station upon the presence of an alarm.  Does the operator send the 
vehicle to secondary under physical control?  Is the concept of 
operation for secondary followed? 
– How frequently the complete concept of operations is tested.  This 
would include the operation of secondary and tertiary screening as 
well as reachback and bomb squad support.  Since this type of 
operation generally involves cooperation between multiple 
organizations in more than one jurisdiction and since we expect the 
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occurrence of radiological and nuclear threats to be low in 
frequency, we might expect the concept of operations to be less 
familiar to the personnel whose daily attention is placed elsewhere. 
– The response time to adjudicate alarms during the more frequent 
detection of normally occurring small quantities of radiological and 
nuclear materials being transported throughout the region in the 
course of normal business activities. 
10. What is the level of commitment to this RadNuc screening mission by the 
people at the border crossing station, and by the people who have to 
respond from off site?  Metrics related to level of commitment may be 
difficult to develop and measure.  Related metrics include: 
– The types and amount of additional equipment they have to operate 
– The types and amount of additional equipment they have to 
maintain 
– The degree of additional concept of operations responsibilities they 
have to train for and execute 
– The degree that these personnel feel that the changes brought 
about by the RadNuc mission enables them to perform their jobs 
more or less effectively 
– The degree to which they have confidence in the equipment to 
detect things they care about 
– The degree to which they are likely to turn off the equipment or 
ignore alarms. 
11. What is the appropriate level of information sharing to support this new 
mission requirement?  Radiological and nuclear threats can be 
transported throughout a region very quickly.  To improve the likelihood of 
detecting the movement of these threats, a region can use data and 
information fusion centers. Relevant metrics include: 
– The presence and use of information fusion centers for collecting, 
analyzing and sharing information that might be relevant to all sorts 
of criminal activity, and relevant to situational awareness for natural 
disasters, like fires, floods, earthquakes, severe storms, etc.  
– Memoranda of agreements among the institutions (international, 
national, state, regional) which would have or want this data. We 
expect this to be a difficult metric because information that is 
aggregated up to sensitive or classified levels will have restrictions 
on distribution.  This information is also likely to contain personal 
information that will need to be controlled, like driver’s license 
information, passport data and arrest records,  
– The partners might have to decide how to share threat information, 
situational awareness reports, and readiness levels  
– Ability to get timely and sufficient information to the users 
throughout the region, as demonstrated in exercises. 
12. What will be the cost of the equipment?  This will include purchase price, 
installation cost, maintenance cost for an acceptable frequency of 
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maintenance, and cost of spare parts. We expect that some metrics in this 
area will be easy to capture.  They would include publicly available budget 
projections and reports related to: 
– Capital and annual support costs for each equipment type 
– Routine calibration, maintenance and repair costs 
– Average cost to equip and train each type of equipment operator.  
13. What will be the cost to the other agencies not directly related to this 
mission but affected because of it?  Obtaining an answer to this question 
might be difficult because these organizations will be accustomed to 
accounting nomenclature and information clustering and cost tracking 
around the missions for which they have lead responsibility.  Related 
metrics are:  
– The annual cost for each relevant organization to execute and 
support the new or increased mission 
– Cost of red team exercises and/or drills for each participating 
organization. 
14. What space will be required for this RadNuc screening operation?  Will a 
Tertiary screening station be required, and is there space to accommodate 
that need?  Related metrics include: 
– The presence and quality of a space utilization plan showing how 
the space required for this mission fits into the overall space 
management strategy 
– The presence and quality of a plan to provide special needs for 
Tertiary screening, where the vehicle should be placed under 
stricter control, access by others should be controlled, special 
equipment will be used. 
15. How are RadNuc equipment types/models for procurement selected? 
Related metrics are: 
– Presence of a committee responsible for selection of equipment for 
the RadNuc mission.  The members of this committee should 
include representatives knowledgeable about current and planned 
the infrastructure at the border crossing station.  
– Committee members are familiar with testing of the RadNuc 
equipment in accordance with expected operating requirements 
(power quality, power cycles, temperature, vibration, moisture, 
wind, ground currents, thermal shock, dropping, snow, rain, 
temperatures, radiofrequency spectrum, time required to start up 
after operational upsets).  
– Reference to benchmarking performance with similar equipment 
used in other locations. 
16. Does procurement of the equipment follow a procurement plan approved 
at the appropriate levels?  Related metrics include: 




– Clarity around which organization will be responsible for the first 
purchase of equipment, and then which organizations will continue 
to buy equipment as needed 
– Degree of consideration of standardization of equipment throughout 
Country A, or at least in DHS-A  
– The presence and quality of a plan reviewed by competent experts, 
supported by modeling and simulation that establishes the number 
and types of equipment needed  
– The level of understanding by the authorizers of the procurement 
around the mission requirements and at some level the technical 
basis for the equipment selection   
– The level of consideration of the long term requirements for 
maintenance and spare parts, and spare instruments   
– The quality of adequate conditioned space for storage of the 
equipment, including spare parts  
– The presence and quality of an analysis around whether the 
procurement plan helps or hurts the prospects of any of the other 
missions relevant to the border crossing   
– Clarity of the acceptance requirements for procured equipment. 
17. How well is the procurement plan being followed?  We would expect to 
see: 
– Evidence that the acceptance tests were performed in accordance 
with the plan   
– Documented results of testing  
– Evidence of communication of the results to the appropriate people  
– Data showing how much of the equipment was found to be 
unacceptable and why. 
18. Is there a maintenance plan for the long term maintenance of the 
equipment, reviewed by the appropriate authorities?  Related metrics 
include: 
– The presence and quality of a written and reviewed maintenance 
plan that details how the equipment will be maintained: by 
individual agencies, by a regional capability, and/or by vendors 
– Inclusion of the costs of this maintenance plan in the estimated 
procurement and operating costs  
– Degree to which the maintenance planning addresses the 
equipment of all of the agencies which will support the mission. 
19. Are the costs incorporated into an overall business model that also 
includes the costs of impact of the screening?  Related metrics include: 
– Quality of a business model 
– Discussion of cost expectations related to impact on flow of 
commerce through the border crossing   
– Revenue generation from fines and tariffs 
– Costs of additional caseloads associated with arrests 
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– Presence of periodic updates to validate or improve business 
model. 
20. Does this mission leverage existing capabilities in the region for detection 
and interdiction of RadNuc threats?  These capabilities might include 
equipment (like handheld radioisotope identifiers, radiation pagers, and 
calibration sources), protocols (like protocols used by police or emergency 
management organizations dealing with hazardous materials), training (for 
dealing with suspicious cargo or vehicles) and legal constructs (right to 
stop, detain, arrest suspicious vehicles or persons)?  To what degree does 
this mission application use these existing resources to control costs to 
lower or control costs?  Related metrics will include: 
– Type and numbers of equipment 
– Documentation of training and certifications for hazardous materials 
characterization, handling, examination, especially radiological and 
nuclear  
– Number and quality of existing protocols and procedures for 
response to radiological situations (spills, orphaned sources) 
– Type and number of exercises and drills in the country, state and 
region applicable to the RadNuc mission operational envelope 
– Number and type of emergency responders within each agency in 
the region.  
21. What approach was taken (e.g. seminars, workshops, meeting, etc.) to 
establish a common understanding of the RadNuc mission among partner 
agency representatives (e.g., the nature of the threat, detection methods, 
etc.)?  Which agency leaders participated in these efforts?  Related 
metrics include: 
– Types and numbers of their planned workshops, seminars for 
RadNuc reachback operations 
– Types and numbers of drills to reinforce learning and test skill 
levels and protocol efficacy 
– Types and numbers of agency leadership participation in drills. 
 
How will the mission endure? 
The literature showed that that there are many new security related initiatives 
being placed onto border crossing operations.  In some cases funding is provided 
for initial startup and initial operations of security missions but there may be an 
expectation that the mission will be integrated into border crossing operations in 
a manner that continuing funding from the originating agency for the mission will 
stop or at least be reduced as time goes on.  A further challenge is that the 
RadNuc screening mission can be viewed as looking for a threat that hopefully 
will never occur.  That means that for an entire career, a border crossing official 
will be dealing with nuisance alarms and may never see an actual threat, all the 
while having to execute his other mission responsibilities.  This is exacerbated by 
the fact that, as we saw in the literature, he may be evaluated by the amount of 
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goods he processes or the amount of violations of regulations he detects.  His 
management may not have a mechanism to get any revenue from this RadNuc 
screening operation.  As we saw from the literature, in some countries, a 
significant part of their budget comes from tariffs and fines at border crossings.  
In the case of RadNuc screening, there may have to be some sort of revenue 
generating paradigm. 
 
Another challenge is that the public may get tired of paying the cost in terms of 
delays in vehicle crossings, in terms of increased costs of goods that have to be 
screened, and in terms of societal costs of being reminded about their 
vulnerability to radiological or nuclear terrorism. 
 
Supporting questions related to whether the mission will endure are: 
1. Is there a championing organization in the region for the mission and for 
the application of the mission to the border crossing?  Related metrics 
include: 
– Level of advocacy publicly through the press 
– Level of advocacy at planning meetings among the stakeholders. 
2. How will an enduring awareness of the need for the RadNuc mission be 
established?  As metrics, we might expect to see: 
– Scores from public opinion polls around whether the cost 
(financial as well as societal) is reasonable for the threats  
– Number of threat awareness, detection, interdiction and 
response workshops held 
– Number of press/media releases 
– Presence of and participation in citizen engagement programs 
for radiological and nuclear security 
– Quality of a plan to establish and maintain a sound legal basis 
for detection and interdiction. 
3. How is this mission regarded in Country B, in other countries, in other 
states and regions? Is the threat continuing to be viewed as credible? 
4. How will political support in Country A be maintained?  Related metrics 
include: 
– The number and fraction of appropriate officials briefed 
– Number and fraction of strong partnerships with international, 
national, regional, state and local organizations associated or 
affected by the mission. 
5. What levels of legal support are required, and how will that support be 
sustained?  Related metrics include: 
– The quality of a plan to establish and maintain a sound legal 
basis for detection and interdiction.  




6. Has the lead agency implemented a transition plan and sustainment 
concept to provide the ability to maintain operational capabilities?  Related 
metrics include: 
– The presence and quality of an approved plan for long term 
operations 
– The presence in the budgets of other agencies of the necessary 
funding to fully support the mission long term as necessary 
– A sustainable consensus between partners over the multiple 
years required to develop and solidify an effective regional 
capability 
– Presence and quality of a clear business model for the RadNuc 
mission in the region 
– Evidence that the agencies involved or affected have a clear 
understanding of the transition plan for the operations to go from 
startup to multi-year term continuous operation. 
7. How will the lead agency engender an enduring commitment by the 
personnel to continue to use the appropriate detection equipment and do 
so in a manner aligned with the agreed upon concept of operations? 
When the mission is new and there may be some excitement about the 
new equipment and new relationships associated with the concept of 
operations, then the level of commitment might be high.  However, if there 
are several nuisance alarms that take time away from other activities the 
personnel normally do, then that might lead to an erosion of commitment. 
In our case, we want to protect the metropolitan area MA1 From which we 
would expect many of the staff to come.  But if the staff feels the threat is 
really to areas outside their circle of interest, they also might have an 
erosion of commitment.  Related metrics include: 
– The presence and quality of a written and reviewed plan to 
maintain commitment.   
– Results of benchmarking for maintaining commitment in similar 
mission spaces 
– The presence and quality of a methodology to assess 
commitment, including a discussion of best practices in other 
similar low mission spaces 
– Documentation discussing quality of commitment during 
refresher training  
– Demonstrated capabilities of personnel in red teaming exercises. 
8. Does a plan for sufficient continuing training beyond first operation include 
all of the agencies and personnel necessary to support the RadNuc 
mission? Is the planning being followed?  Related metrics include: 
– Number and type of training courses for each agency 
– An assessment of the quality of the training around the concepts 
of operations training  
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– Availability of additional complementary specialized training 
(hazardous materials, responder operations, tactical operations, 
response, FBI-A training on handling suspected or actual threats 
of different types, and vendor training)  
– Written and budget authorized plans for requalification of 
personnel involved in scanning, especially in Secondary, in 
Tertiary and in reachback operations 
– Availability and use of refresher training and/or requalification 
– Frequency of updates to the training plan  
– Degree to which training costs are controlled, minimized and 
judged reasonable by the agencies and the individual 
participants. 
9. How many additional personnel need to be trained for each agency as a 
result of this additional mission?  We would expect to see analyses of the 
impact on other agencies affected by the new mission. 
10. What drills and other exercises are planned/performed that include the 
border crossing station?  Related metrics include: 
– How many personnel from each partner agency participated in 
each? 
– Is participant performance quantified as part of these exercises?  
If so, how, and with what results?  
– What is the number and quality of after action reports? 
11. Is there evidence of taking stock about what seems to be working well and 
what does not work well regarding inter-agency coordination? We would 
expect to see: 
a. Committee meetings for the purpose of discussion around inter-
agency coordination issues and approaches for optimization. 
12. What are the strengths and weaknesses of the RadNuc screening mission 
program and the program structure?  What could be done better? Related 
metrics are: 
– Transparency of structure 
– Transparency of decision-making processes 
– Clarity of long range view 
– Continuing assessment of costs of the mission application 
– Continuing assessment of the benefits, including the difference 
the mission is making relative to regional security (expected 
benefits would include improved technologies and integrated 
concepts of operations resulting in increased detection of other 
regulatory compliance transgressions) 
– Long term collection of data in accordance with a written plan on 
the subjects of alarms, calibration results, equipment issues, 
noncompliance with concepts of operations. This metric may be 
difficult because we would expect that agencies and personnel 
will be reluctant to share operational issues. 
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13. Are lessons learned from other benchmarking locations being 
communicated and utilized?  We would expect to see metrics around 
benchmarking activity and how lessons learned are being considered in 
revisions to planning. 
14. How important is standardization in this mission space for this application?  
To what degree is standardization being explored, planned, executed and 
evaluated?  Standardization could apply to the equipment, the types of 
personnel, training, maintenance, and concepts of operations, standards 
of operations and accounting and assessment of the mission.  Related 
metrics include: 
– Establishment and use of standardized equipment configurations 
and detection parameter settings. We expect that 
standardization in this area would simplify and make more 
effective activities including  training, planning for and analysis of 
exercises, the adjudication of alarms and maintenance of 
equipment, and acquisition of spare parts.  
15. How well is the concept of operations being followed and how 
effective is it?  Does it contain steps that can be eliminated, 
streamlined, improved?  Are there additional steps that would make 
the mission space more effective?  To what degree is the concept of 
operations seen as reasonable and well integrated? Related metrics 
include: 
– The degree of standardization within the concept of operations 
– The degree to which the concept of operations is being followed 
– The degree to which the concept of operations is aligned with the 
region, the state and international best practices 
– The degree to which the concept of operations is aligned with 
training, equipment procurement, reporting, evidentiary data 
gathering 
– The number of times the concept of operations is not followed, 
the reasons why and any consequences 
– The quality of the concept of operations as viewed by the 
operating personnel, the reachback support, local law 
enforcement and the trainers 
– The quality of the concept of operations as seen by the 
remaining stakeholders 
– The presence of a committee or other group to review and 
assess the concept of operations, including the incorporation of 
lessons learned from drills and red team exercises and results of 
benchmarking with similar mission deployments at other 
locations. 
16. How well are lessons learned from drills, red team exercises and normal 
operations being utilized?  Related metrics are: 
– A documented formal process/plan to capture lessons learned 
from each workshop, drill, and exercise 
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– Lessons learned from drills and exercises are captured in after-
action reports and briefings from the exercises.   
– The presence of a formal process for reporting of learnings from 
normal operation and how much it is being used. 
17. How effective is the sharing of lessons learned to the appropriate 
stakeholders? Related metrics will be: 
– Number and quality of reviewed reports documenting lessons 
learned 
– Presence and quality of reviewed periodic summaries of lessons 
learned 
– Number and quality of meetings to brief lessons learned to 
stakeholders 
– Presence and quality of web addressable resources for 
reviewing or adding lessons learned. 
18. What legal/jurisdictional/inter-agency issues were identified as part of 
STC?  Related metrics are: 
– To what extent were the Country A Attorney/District Attorney 
Offices were involved in developing the mission 
– To what level they remain committed to the mission 
– Comparison between what they expected to happen and what 
has happened 
– The quality of the experience with issues around the necessity 
for probable cause, reasonable suspicion, search and seizure, 
as well help in obtaining search warrants relative to the RadNuc 
mission.   
 
Is the new RadNuc mission symbiotic with the other international, national, 
state and local missions? 
We have made the point that this RadNuc screening mission will have to be 
integrated into an existing set of missions at the border crossing.  We should also 
point out that the missions already being executed at the border crossing are part 
of a broader national (and probably international) set of mission responsibilities.  
Just as those missions extant at our border crossing should be integrated into a 
larger strategic security plan, so should this new RadNuc screening mission.  
Advantages are that there more likely will be support from the other mission 
resources, like sharing of information technology infrastructure, sharing of space, 
and willingness to integrate concepts of operations including interdiction and 
response.  In terms of willingness to accept costs among the agencies, a 
symbiotic relationship would be expected to be a positive. 
 
Supporting questions around this question of symbiosis are: 
1. How are the international, national, regional and local partnerships created 
to support this RadNuc screening initiative and how have the partners 
embraced the mission as evidenced by developing tactics, techniques and 
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procedures that will help achieve the overall enterprise goals?  Related 
metrics include: 
– The presence and quality of multiagency committees that 
address the full scope of missions related to trade facilitation, 
regulatory compliance, security at all levels, regional and local 
governmental operations and public perception and impact and 
how this RadNuc mission is related 
– Frequency of documented meetings of these committees 
– Level of representation of the partner delegates at these 
meetings 
– Written plan assessing effectiveness with respect to this mission 
– of the partnerships and the likelihood of continuing them 
– Written description of the RadNuc mission program metrics and 
the level of acceptance by these partners 
– Level of agreement among the partners on how mission 
performance will be measured and what data will need to be 
collected to enable the measurement 
– Amount and quality of data collected as planned 
– Level of involvement with international stakeholders affected by 
this mission. 
2. Are the costs of this new mission characterized by each stakeholder and 
acceptable to those agencies that are affected at the local, national and 
international levels?  Related metrics include: 
– Presence and quality of written and reviewed analyses of 
financial and other costs to each organization  
– Documentation of meetings discussing these costs, ways to 
control them, ways to reduce them in the future, and ways to 
compensate for them. 
3. Are the benefits to each stakeholder characterized and accepted by 
relevant representatives of the stakeholder?  Related metrics include: 
– Presence and quality of written and reviewed analyses of 
benefits to each organization  
– Documentation of meetings discussing these benefits, ways to 
continue or increase them 
– Evidence of success in maintain or improving benefits to 
stakeholders in a way that does not cause uncompensated loss 
to others. 
4. To what degree is the equipment to be used for RadNuc screening 
compatible with the equipment being used in related activities like law 
enforcement, customs compliance checks, safety checks, reachback and 
emergency management?  Related metrics include: 
– Evidence of committees continuing to work toward better 
integration of equipment used at the border crossing station. 
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5. How compatible are the concepts of operations for RadNuc screening with 
the concepts of operation for the other missions at the border crossing?  
Related metrics include: 
– Evidence of committees continuing to work toward better 
integration of the operations used at the border crossing station. 
6. Does the RadNuc mission positively or negatively impact the ability to 
execute other law enforcement missions?  Related metrics include: 
– Written analysis of increase or decrease in arrests, fines, tariffs 
at the border crossing not related to the RadNuc mission 
– Written analysis of an increase or decrease in personnel 
required at the border crossing and in the region caused by the 
RadNuc mission. 
7. What is the quality of commitment by the partners to support this 
increased mission space in the region (especially at the border crossing)?  
We would look for evidence a significant dialogue around the increase in 
mission space and how it was bringing various levels of cost and benefits 
to the partners.  Related metrics include: 
– The presence of relevant high level strategic goals in the 
strategic plans of all of the partners,  
– Inclusions of the new mission space into the existing mission 
statements of all of the partners,  
– Budget and appropriations processes for each of the partners to 
support the new mission 
– Evidence of a strong consensus needed between the lead 
agency and the relevant partners on programmatic goals and 
objectives, timelines and metrics.  
8. Have the partners established and committed to a governance structure 
that includes this new mission?  If a threat is detected but not interdicted in 
one part of the region, will the authorities in another part of the region 
interdict it?  Will the legal framework support this type of interdiction 
throughout the region?  Metrics that might be applicable include 
– Establishment of necessary regional committees and 
subcommittees 
– Number and fraction of relevant state and local government 
agencies/representatives involved 
– Number and fraction of relevant federal agencies/officials 
involved 
– Number and fraction of needed cooperative agreements signed 
– Requisite number and frequency of committee, subcommittee 
meetings 
– Presence of a signed regional ConOps 
– Degree of participation in region-wide red team exercises around 
the new mission space. 
9. Are there partnerships with other international, federal, and state and local 
organizations that are mutually beneficial?  For example, federal and state 
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and local emergency management organizations might want to share 
equipment requirements development processes.  They also might want 
to provide mutual procurement activities.  Furthermore, planning for 
response to and recovery from the detonation of a radiological or nuclear 
threat should include many of the resources that will be used in the 
detection and interdiction phases.  Related metrics include: 
– Agreements around what types of information could be shared 
with which organizations in the event of a detonation  
– Signed memoranda of understanding about information sharing 
– Presence of signed protocols to support these memoranda 
– Presence in the information sharing software architecture to 
support the protocols 
– Presence of effective integrated planning teams to continually 
assess and advocate improvements in architectural elements of 
the combined mission space. 
 
From these considerations, then, an interesting set of metrics related to planning 
and management of the RadNuc mission can be developed for our hypothetical 
border crossing station.   
 
A summary of the metrics derived in the report is shown here.  The list will be 
followed by a series of tables describing how the values of some of these metrics 
can be found.  Other metrics will prove difficult to measure or obtain.  
Unfortunately they are the ones most valuable in determining the efficacy of our 
enterprise. 
 
1. Deterrence metrics 
– Consensus definition of deterrence 
– Consensus definition of deterrence of the Radnuc threat 
– Consensus on the level of deterrence of the RadNuc threat that is 
worthwhile 
– Consensus on level of deterrence achievable at an acceptable cost 
– Actual deterrence effect on adversaries 
2.  Stakeholder planning commitment metrics 
– Presence of a championing organization in the region 
– Level of advocacy for the mission 
– Degree of involvement by stakeholders in planning 
– Consensus on benefits and costs to all deriving benefit  
– Consensus on benefits and costs to all affected by the mission  
– Committee to discuss ways to increase benefits and decrease or 
compensate costs to all of the stakeholders. 
– Consensus on how costs and benefits are assessed 
– Number of jurisdictions involved 




3. RadNuc awareness metrics 
– Frequency of press coverage 
– Fraction of informed press coverage  
– Frequency of popular media comparing effects of RadNuc mission 
compared to predictions (delay times, costs, arrests) 
– Number of workshops held to brief community leaders 
– Number and quality of advanced training courses and workshops in 
law enforcement and emergency response communities 
– Fraction of relevant district attorneys and judges have briefed  
– Availability of  relevant legal points of contact  
– Quality of communication to support the medical community.  
– Fraction of these patients with documentation about radioisotopes from 
medical procedures 
– Presence of and participation by citizen engagement programs  
– Number and fraction of authorized source holders briefed/provided  
– Scores from public opinion polls around whether the cost 
(financial as well as societal) is reasonable for the threats  
– Presence of and participation in citizen engagement programs 
for radiological and nuclear security 
– Quality of a plan to establish and maintain a sound legal basis 
for detection and interdiction 
4. Coverage of threat space metrics 
– Types of equipment purchased for screening stations 
– Types of equipment purchased to support communications  
– Test results giving the probability of detecting threats in Primary 
– Test results giving the probability of resolving the threats in Secondary  
– Test results giving the probability of resolving the threats in Tertiary  
– Modeling results that show systems capability under  varying 
conditions  
– Modeling results showing probability of encountering threat quantity  
materials 
5. Readiness metrics 
– Consideration of system component failure modes and effects  
– Quality of calibration plans  
– Data related to quality assurance of the measurements systems  
– Effectiveness of training 
– Trainee knowledge scores following initial and refresher training 
courses 
– Fraction of trainees capable of executing RadNuc duties 
– Evaluation scores during drills and other exercises 
– Number of emergency responders initially trained for each course 
– Refresher training frequency 
– Percentage of emergency responders trained for each partner agency 
– Number/frequency of discussion-based exercises (seminars, 
workshops, tabletops)  
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– Number/frequency of operations-based exercises (functional, drills, full 
scale) 
– Level of partner agency participation in each exercise 
– Training and exercise participant feedback metrics 
– Number and type of training courses for each agency 
– An assessment of the quality of the training around the concepts 
of operations training  
– Availability of additional complementary specialized training (  
– Written and budget authorized plans for requalification of 
personnel involved in scanning 
– Availability and use of refresher training and/or requalification 
– Frequency of updates to the training plan  
– Degree to which training costs are controlled, minimized and 
judged reasonable 
6. Support to Country A’s overarching missions metrics 
– Consensus on how screening at the border crossing supports broader 
radiological and nuclear missions. 
– Agreements to support the operational evaluation of advancing 
technologies in detection, communication and information fusion at 
border crossing   
– Agreements on evaluation of more integrated concepts of operation at 
the border crossing as the mission gets a broader footprint. 
7. Rate of threat material encounter metrics 
– Types and quantities of commodities expected g 
– Types of packaging and packing that might alter radiation levels 
– Predictions of frequency of nuisance alarms from NORM 
8. Commitment for Tertiary screening support 
– The predicted times for responses by requisite special capabilities 
– The expected minimum and maximum times for resolution of alerts 
– The variation in ability to respond depending on frequency of request, 
and other factors like regional fires, weather conditions, and public 
events 
– Documentation of commitments to provide timely, certified support 
9. Concept of operations and reachback metrics 
– Benchmarked against some other installation regarded as successful 
– Degree of implementation 
– Presence of a signed regional concept of operations (ConOps) 
– Frequent validation of integrated concept of operations 
– Frequent validation of reachback and bomb squad support. operations 
– Response time to adjudicate alarms in Secondary and Tertiary 
– The degree of standardization within the concept of operations 
– The degree to which the concept of operations is being followed 
– The degree to which the concept of operations is aligned with the 
region, the state and international best practices 
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– The degree to which the concept of operations is aligned with 
training, equipment procurement, reporting, evidentiary data 
gathering 
– The number of times the concept of operations is not followed, 
the reasons why and any consequences 
– The quality of the concept of operations as viewed by the 
operating personnel, the reachback support, local law 
enforcement and the trainers 
– The quality of the concept of operations as seen by the 
remaining stakeholders 
– Continuing assessment of concept of operations 
10. Operations impact at border crossing metrics 
– The types and amount of additional equipment to operate 
– The types and amount of additional equipment to maintain 
– The degree of additional concept of operations responsibilities  
– The degree that personnel feel that the changes enable them to 
perform their jobs more or less effectively 
– The degree to which they have confidence in the equipment  
– The degree to which they are likely to turn off the equipment or ignore 
alarms 
– Delays in passenger vehicles caused by RadNuc screening mission 
– Delays in commercial vehicles caused by RadNuc screening mission 
– Impact of delays on just-in-time trade 
– Number of safety events at border crossing caused by RadNuc 
screening operations 
– Quality of the experience as public go through screening 
11. Information sharing metrics 
– The presence and use of information fusion centers  
– Agreements among relevant institutions (international, national, state, 
regional) to provide and share data.  
– Agreement on how to share threat information and situational 
awareness reports 
– Ability to get timely and sufficient information to the users throughout 
the region, as demonstrated in exercises 
12. Cost of the equipment metrics 
– Capital and annual support costs for each equipment type 
– Routine calibration, maintenance and repair costs 
– Average cost to equip and train each type of equipment operator.  
13. Cost to other agencies metrics 
– Annual cost for each relevant organization to support the mission  
– Cost of red team exercises and/or drills for each organization 
14. Space requirements metrics 
– Space utilization plan showing how mission fits  
– Plan to provide special needs for Tertiary screening 
15. Procurement metrics 
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– Qualified procurement committee responsible for selection of 
equipment  
– Reference to benchmarking performance with similar equipment  
– Clarity of description of source of funding (federal, state, and/or 
local agencies) 
– Clarity around which organization will be responsible each phase 
of procurement 
– Modeling and simulation that establishes the number and types 
of equipment needed  
– Level of understanding by the authorizers of the procurement 
around the mission requirements 
– Level of understanding of technical basis for the equipment 
selection   
– Quality of long term planning for for maintenance and spare 
parts, and spare instruments   
– Quality of adequate conditioned space for storage of the 
equipment, including spare parts  
– Analysis around whether the procurement plan helps or hurts the 
prospects of any of the other missions relevant to the border 
crossing 
– Clarity of the acceptance requirements for procured equipment 
– Evidence that the acceptance tests were performed per plan 
– Documented results of testing  communicated to appropriate 
people  
– Data showing how much of the equipment failed acceptance 
tests 
16. Maintenance planning metrics 
– The presence and quality of a written and reviewed maintenance 
plan that details how the equipment will be maintained: by 
individual agencies, by a regional capability, and/or by vendors 
– Inclusion of the costs of this maintenance plan in the estimated 
procurement and operating costs  
– Degree to which the maintenance planning addresses the 
equipment of all of the agencies which will support the mission 
17. Leverage of existing capabilities metrics 
– Type and numbers of existing equipment 
– Existing training and certifications for hazardous materials 
characterization, handling, examination, especially radiological 
and nuclear  
– Number and quality of existing protocols and procedures for 
response to radiological situations (spills, orphaned sources) 
– Type and number of exercises and drills in the country, state and 
region applicable to the RadNuc mission operational envelope 
– Number and type of emergency responders within each agency  
18. Partnership-related metrics 
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– Number and fraction of relevant State A and local government 
agencies/representatives involved 
– Number and fraction of relevant Country A agencies/officials 
involved 
– Number and fraction of needed cooperative 
agreements/MOUs/MOAs signed 
– Frequency of committee, subcommittee and other related 
meetings 
– Time/effort required to develop and finalize ConOps; revision 
frequency 
– Number and fraction of needed agency-specific standard 
operating procedures in place; revision frequency 
– Types and numbers of drills to reinforce learning and test skill 
levels and protocol efficacy 
– Types and numbers of agency leadership participation in drills 
19. External viewpoint metrics 
– Value of the mission as viewed by relevant international 
organizations 
– Alignment with international security missions 
– Alignment with Country A security missions 
20.  Quality of Operations metrics 
– Number of jurisdictions involved in screening, interdiction, response 
– Number of people involved 
– Consistency of operations 
– Operational characteristics of portal monitors and other fixed detectors 
– Frequency of alarms 
– Causes of alarms 
– Number and fraction of alerts referred to secondary screening, tertiary 
screening 
– Response times for primary detection, secondary screening, tertiary 
screening, technical reachback 
– Operational difficulties in escorting and controlling alarming vehicles to 
secondary and then to tertiary screening (when necessary) 
– Results of analysis of alarm adjudication/resolution results (categories, 
outcomes, etc.) 
– Results of analysis of number/frequency of missed alarms (red 
teaming, exercises, known calibration sources) 
 
Further Categorization of Metrics 
 
In this section the following general questions are addressed as they pertain to 
the proposed metrics for regional nuclear security upgrades.  These questions 
ask: 
(1) From what sources are particular data for metrics obtained?, and 
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(2) What methodologies are most applicable to obtaining the data? 
 
Understanding how to categorize the metrics and their data helps us determine 
the best means for gathering the necessary data.  No one organization collects 
or stores all the data for a particular metric, partly because the scale of the data 
must be taken into account and understanding the scope of the data is 
necessary.  There exist different organizations that store data at the federal, 
state, and local levels; thus, it would be incorrect to focus on any one specific 
organization from which to obtain a particular subset of metric data. 
 
Three broad principal metric types may be categorized in this study: financial 
metrics, operational metrics, and performance metrics.  Generally, financial 
metrics help determine the cost-benefits of the program, operational metrics 
describe how an organization or agency conducts itself within the context of a 
larger system, and performance metrics aid us in understanding the 
effectiveness of the program implementation.   
 
Alternatively, some metrics do not lend themselves well to categorization under 
these three types because their data are more specific.  They fit best within 
categories tailored to their role within the mission space.  Some of these metrics 
will be available within the public sphere of knowledge through organizations 
such as the Country A Transportation Security Administration (TSA-A), 
Department of Transportation (DOT-A), and Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS-A), while others will be more difficult to obtain due to their sensitivity.  
These metrics are categorized into groups that are defined based on the needs 
of the proposed mission space. 
 
Both static and dynamic data will exist.  Generally, static data includes 
infrastructure data such as border crossing layout and facilities, roadways and 
waterways into and out of a region or cost data for equipment and facilities.  
Dynamic data is that which changes with time such as traffic flow, commodity 
profile data for a region or response times to threat alerts.  Time-in-motion data is 
a form of dynamic data that may be used for operational assessments.  This 
particular data type is useful, for example, for determining the best changes to 
the existing organizational structure in order to increase the efficacy and 
effectiveness of the RadNuc mission.  For much of the metrics, however, the 
designation is provided or assumed that the data collected will consist of an 




The implementation and increase in mission space can be a financial burden on 
a government or agency or businesses, and financial metrics are used to 
calculate direct and indirect costs.  Measuring the costs against the estimated 
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overall benefit of the new mission space allows an agency to determine the 
effectiveness of the program.  Ultimately, this information will help an agency 
decide the degree of implementation available for the new program. 
 
Financial metrics generally include metrics dealing with cash flow, including 
spending and earnings.  In an assessment, we would analyze financial metrics 
such as equipment repair costs, costs of training exercises, and cost/benefit data 
regarding impacts to commerce in a region.  Any piece of data which provides 
insight into how money is managed within an organization is applicable under 
this category.  These metrics are important to the stakeholders of the mission, 
especially those who make decisions of whether or not to fund particular projects 
under the sustained mission. 
 
Mostly, the data for financial metrics already exist in some form.  Some of this 
data like equipment costs and warranties may come from the manufacturer or an 
insurance agency.  Other data such as costs for training each type of RadNuc 
operator may come from those conducting the training, the agencies being 
trained, or both.  Furthermore, data necessary for determining the total cost for 
each agency to execute and sustain the missions will come from a variety of 
public and agency specific sources and may even need to be synthesized from 




Operational metrics mostly concern the utilization of resources within each 
agency.  They track the dynamics of each organization and how they are linked 
to other organizations.  Metrics which address the operational level may include 
the “number of something” on the agency level, such as number and type of 
equipment owned and maintained and number of emergency responders who 
undergo RadNuc training.  They may also include regional level metrics such as 
number of roadways/waterways near the border crossing or into or out of a 
region and the number of vehicles using these roadways.  Some of this data 
such as number of roadways into and out of a region may be obtained simply by 
analyzing a current map of the region.  Others, such as number and type of traffic 
across these roadways, will need to be acquired from Department of 
Transportation (DOT-A) databases and state and local transportation agency 
sources. 
 
To help measure how agencies are linked within the existing architecture, metrics 
dealing with information sharing may fall under this category as well.  These 
include the number of interconnected regional fusion centers, number of shared 
“lessons learned” incident reports, and community-of-interest feedback and 
inquired.  The metrics involving information sharing help determine the level of 
interconnectedness between agencies and also the appropriate behaviors a 
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particular agency should undertake in a variety of situations.  For instance, when 
a threat is detected, what level of information may one agency share with another 
or, when a known threat crosses into another agency’s jurisdiction, what process 
is required for an agency to either continue pursuing the threat or pass along the 
pursuit.  The data for these metrics are likely to be sensitive in nature since they 
include specific details on how each agency and how the integrated mission 
operates and thus may not be available in the public domain.  Because of this, 
close cooperation with agencies will need to be established in order to obtain the 




Some metrics assess how well an organization performs against a set of criteria.  
These performance metrics may focus on how well an organization performs 
against itself.  For instance, during an in-house upgrade, a before and after 
performance snapshot may be taken to determine the effectiveness of the 
upgrade.  Under this category fall metrics such as knowledge scores from before 
and after training courses and probability of detection of various types of threats 
before and after equipment upgrades.  Other performance metrics may focus on 
how well an organization performs against a critical success factor, in our case 
defeating a radiological or nuclear threat.  “Red cell” results and data from threat 
alerts would be used to assess the performance of an organization versus 
multiple threat types and a variety of threat pathways.  Benchmarking also 
provides a source of data.  These metrics could then be used to modify the 
mission to improve the effectiveness of the organization at combating these 
threats. 
 
Data for these metrics may be obtained from a full spectrum of sources, some 
public and others agency specific.  Even still, due to the nature of performance 
metrics, some data would need to be obtained through more sensitive channels.  
This is because these data may be used to outline capabilities and weaknesses 
and could be used by an enemy to negatively impact the agency or mission. 
Data Sources for Metrics 
 
Surveys 
One approach to data collection consists of surveys.  These surveys may be 
questionnaires or polls, which serve to determine key data on any scale whether 
it is at a regional or local level.  They must focus on the metrics they collect data 
for due to the difficulty in follow-up questions to clarify responses.  
Questionnaires may be automated, freeing up time for later analysis.  One must 
keep in mind, however, that while questionnaire type surveys are relatively 
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simply to generate and collect, they may receive a small response from the 
population of interest.  Further time would need to be spent to determine if this 
level of response is sufficient for the purposes of our study.  Data for metrics that 
involve the public stakeholder (public, press, decision and policy makers, etc.) 
support and acceptance for the increase in mission space may be collected using 
questionnaires and polls.  Furthermore, individual agency data and statistics may 
be obtained through the use of questionnaires. 
 
Interviews/Expert panels 
Other types of surveys include interviews and expert panels.  These surveys are 
not as scalable as questionnaires and are more time intensive.  They may 
require large amounts of resources and represent narrow viewpoints.  However, 
when facing a complex issue, direct input from those involved on a day-to-day 
basis helps collect valuable information.  While raw quantitative data may not be 
obtained from an interview or expert panel, other useful information may be 
recorded. 
 
Government/Agency maintained databases 
Empirical data may be obtained from databases maintained by the government 
and local supporting agencies.  The data found here are generally highly 
credible.  Some databases may contain information sensitive in nature and thus 
data collection from them may be difficult.  These databases may contain data 
that are both static and dynamic, which would affect data collection methods. 
 
Suggested Data Sources for Various Metrics 
 
Country A Transportation Security Administration (TSA-A) 
The TSA-A collects and assesses transportation security data for the entire 
Country A.  Much of this data includes infrastructure data and usage data for the 
many threat pathways relevant to by our RadNuc mission.  Some of the 
information is sensitive such as training information and threat procedures for 
security personnel in the transportation field.  Also collected may be technology 
data that relates to security.  Crucial to an assessment of regional security, this 
may include efficiency data and detection rates for portal monitors and other 
radiation detectors.   
 
Metrics for which data may be collected from TSA-A databases include test 
results giving probability of detecting various threat types for each detector type, 
response data to alerts including alarm adjudication/resolution results, causes of 
alerts, and frequency of alerts.  Much of the data relating to national security may 
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be sensitive in nature, and estimation may be required to determine data for 
certain metrics. 
 
Country A Department of Homeland Security (DHS-A)  
The DHS-A collects and provides data and statistics from multiple response 
layers of the nuclear detection architecture.  These response layers address 
emergency planning and recovery, infrastructure protection, and threat mapping 
for regional police, fire, and emergency teams.  While possibly sensitive, this 
data would be essential in determine numerous metrics such as number and 
frequency of missed and incorrectly handled alerts, “red cell” results, and 
operating characteristics of portal monitors and other fixed detectors. 
 
Critical Infrastructure and Key Resource (CIKR) data may be laid over the 
foundational maps.  These may include data associated with law enforcement 
facilities, commercial facilities, emergency services, healthcare and public health 
centers, and regional and local government facilities.  Metrics for which data may 
be collected using DHS-A databases and these tools include mapping regional 
jurisdictions of emergency and medical response agencies and estimating 
response times for interdiction of detected threats.  Included would be metrics 
dealing with roadways along with traffic data for these pathways. 
 
Country A Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA-A) 
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA-A) is part of the DHS-A.  
In developing an integrated regional RadNuc security plan, data from FEMA-A 
would aid in determining the level of interoperability among the existing 
emergency organizations.  Furthermore, data for metrics such as the degree of 
collaboration on the existing emergency response infrastructure, number and 
types of benefits to state, local, and federal emergency responders, and number 
and fraction of current standard operating procedures (SOP) for emergency 
threats are available from FEMA-A.  This information would help determine the 
overall quality of information sharing and mutual benefit among organizations, 
along with the overall preparedness of individual organizations and agencies to 
combat a threat.  Because FEMA-A develops response data to natural disasters 
as well as terrorist threats, they are an ideal source for developing an integrated 
model. 
 
Country A Department of Transportation (DOT-A) and Bureau of 
Transportation Statistics (BTS-A) 
The Department of Transportation (DOT-A) and its organizations provide 
transportation data and statistics on federal and state levels.  An example of a 
state level organization under the DOT is the State A Department of 
Transportation (DOT-A1).  These organizations maintain and provide dynamic 
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volume data such as population by area or cargo through specific pathways.  For 
instance, volumes of commodities of different types expected to pass through our 
border crossing will be included in data the DOT-A maintains.  This data would 
aid in developing metrics such as random encounter probability of a threat along 
pathways, number/frequency/durations of vehicles and vessels patrolling region 
and of surge deployments, and integration of partnerships among regions. 
 
Equipment vendors 
Individual vendors of detection equipment would need to be contacted to collect 
data on specific equipment metrics.  These metrics would focus on statistical 




Local and regional agencies are expected to be a vital resource when 
investigating metrics dealing with these agencies specifically.  Each agency 
operates differently, and because of this, specific attention will need to be 
committed to each to appropriately address particular metrics.  These metrics for 
equipment and training purposes may include fraction of time equipment is 
applied to the mission, fraction of time equipment is found to be improperly 
calibrated, number and frequency of seminars, workshops, and tabletops.  Other 
metrics, which deal with the quality of regional partnerships, support for the 
increase in mission space, and mutual benefits among agencies, include number 
and fraction of agency-specific SOPs in place, number and fraction of authorized 
source holders briefed/provided with “best practice” reports, and number of 
signed MOAs about information sharing. 
 
Data from these agencies may be provided by each within their own databases 
or even maintained by a higher-level agency.  For instance, local agencies may 
provide data to district or state organizations.  If not, methods such as interviews 




The following three tables are simply examples of how the metrics may be 
tabulated to chart the types of data they are associated with, whether the data 
may change over time, and from where the data may be obtained.  Under the 
“source(s)” column, “agency” is listed for any metrics from which the organization 
that provides the data may differ from region to region in the case of local 
agencies; “agency” may also refer to multiple agencies from which the data may 
be obtained.   
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Type Static/Dynamic Source(s) 
Number of each type 
of equipment 
purchased 
Operational Static CBP-A 
Number of each type 
of equipment 
maintained 
Operational Static GSA 
Costs of procurement 
and maintenance Financial Static 
CBP-A, Vendor, 
GSA 
Fraction of time 
equipment is 
available for use (fully 
functional and 
operational) 
Operational Dynamic CBP-A 
Fraction of time 
equipment is applied 
to mission 
Operational Dynamic CBP-A 
Mean time to repair Operational Dynamic Vendor 
Rates of equipment 
loss/upgrade/replace
ment 
Operational Dynamic CBP-A 
Causes of failure and 
failure modes Operational Dynamic Vendor 
Calibration frequency 
for each type of 
equipment 
Operational Static CBP-A 
Fraction of time 
equipment is found to 
be improperly 
calibrated 
Operational Dynamic CBP-A 
Instrumentation 
quality control data Operational Dynamic CBP-A 
Capital, recurring 
(equipment warranty), 
and routine costs 
(calibration, 
maintenance, and 
repair) for each 
equipment type 





Table 9. Metrics associated with financial considerations 
Personnel training, 
perceived benefits of 
training, and costs 
Type Static/Dynamic Source(s) 
Number of emergency 
responders who undergo 
initial training 
Operational Static CBP-A, Training Provider 
Number of refresher 
courses for trained 
emergency responders 
Operational Static Agency, Training Provider 
Number and Fraction of 
emergency responders 
trained within each 
agency 
Operational Static Agency, Training Provider 
Number and frequency of 
seminars, workshops, and 
tabletops 
Operational Static Agency, Exercise Provider(s) 
Number and frequency of 
functional exercises, full 
scale exercises, and drills 
Operational Dynamic Agency, Exercise Provider(s) 
Feedback from training 




Evaluation scores during 
drills and other exercises Performance Dynamic Training Provider 
Trainee knowledge scores 
following initial and 
refresher training courses 
Performance Dynamic Training Provider 
Fraction of trainees 
demonstrably capable of 
executing PRND duties 
Operational Dynamic Training Provider 
Costs of training 
(exercises, refresher 
courses, workshops, 
seminars, tabletops, and 
drills) 
Financial Static Agency, Training Provider 
Average cost to equip and 
train each type of PRND 
operator (PRD, RIID, 
backpack, mobile 
detector, portal monitor, 
fixed detectors) 





Table 10. Metrics associated with threat types and pathways 
Coverage of threat types 
and pathways Type Static/Dynamic Source(s) 
Size and fraction of the 
physical area actually 
covered by screening 
operations 
Operational Static GSA-A,DOT-A 
Number of lanes used at 
border crossing equipped 
with RPMs 
Operational Static CBP-A 
Number of vehicles using 
roadways 
(interior/perimeter) 
Operational Static DOT-A, BTS 
Fraction of trainees 
demonstrably capable of 
executing RadNuc duties 
Performance Dynamic Training Provider 
Number/frequency/duration 
of vehicles patrolling region 
and available 
Operational Static 
State A Highway 
Patrol, MA1 Police 
Department, 
County Sheriff  
Operating characteristics of 
portal monitors and other 
fixed detectors 
Operational Static Vendor 
Number and fraction of 
emergency responders 
carrying detection 
equipment on shifts daily 
Operational Dynamic Agency 
Causes of alerts Operational Dynamic Agency 
Frequency of alerts Operational Dynamic Agency 
Number and fraction of 
alerts referred to 
secondary screening or 
tertiary screening 
Operational Static CBP-A 
Alarm adjudication results 
(categories, outcomes, 
etc.) 
Performance Static CBP-A 
Number and frequency of 
missed alerts Performance Dynamic CBP-A 
Number and frequency of 
incorrectly handled alerts Performance Dynamic CBP-A 
Response times for 
primary detection, 
secondary screening, and 
technical reachback 
Performance Dynamic CBP-A 
 “Red teaming” results Performance Dynamic Training Provider 
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Table 10. Continued 
Coverage of threat types 
and pathways Type Static/Dynamic Source(s) 
Test results giving 
probability of detecting 
various threat types for 
each detector type 
Performance Static Vendor 
Modeling results which 
estimate the probability of 
detecting threats under 
varying conditions 
Operational Static Vendor, Assessment Team 
 
Metrics requiring broader consideration, discussion and consensus 
The metrics in the previous three tables can be achieved with surveys and/or just 
a few meetings with single organizations.  There are many important metrics, 
however, that will require multi-organization discussions, probably over a 
substantial length of time. In fact, in the introduction of a new mission to an 
already complex environment, a phased approach is recommended.  The first 
phase would involve building relationships with a broad community of 
stakeholders.  In this phase, high level broad goals would be developed for not 
only this new mission but goals that are broader that would include this new 
mission.  The next phase could include considerations of how the existing 
architecture would have to be modified to support this broader mission – and to 
support the new mission. Benchmarking of similar enterprises could be 
leveraged. This phase could also include plans to transition the enterprise from 
startup to sustained operation.  The next steps could include phased installation 
of the equipment, development of integrated concepts of operations, and 
synthesis of lessons learned.   
 
A list of some of the metrics associated with this broader planning and support 





Table 11. Broader more meaningful and difficult metrics 
Broader planning and 
consensus building Type Static/Dynamic Source(s) 
Deterrence provide by 












and state public 
representatives 
Symbiosis with other 




Acceptable cost to trade Cost Static 






Public support for mission Value Dynamic 
Federal, state and 
local press, 
Country B press, 
regional citizen 
action groups  
Inclusion in strategic 
planning (transition plans) Value Dynamic 
Country A 
agencies, State A 
agencies, regional 
trade 
Mission advocacy Value Dynamic Regional champion, DHS-A 
Quality of information 







Quality of regional 









Table 11. Continued 
Broader planning and 
consensus building Type Static/Dynamic Source(s) 
















Summary Discussion Regarding Metrics 
 
In a large metropolitan area, there are many organizations involved in detection 
and interdiction (and prosecution) of criminal activities.  There are also several 
organizations involved in the planning and execution of response and recovery 
from natural disasters and terrorist activities.  These organizations generally have 
federal, state and local connections.  Frequently, there are also international 
connections.  Each of these organizations has an architectural construct 
(whether identified or not) to support its needs (like policy development, budget 
management, operations, legal, etc.)   The introduction (or expansion) of the 
mission of detection and interdiction of radiological and nuclear threats will add 
requirements to many of these organizations.  This additional burden will be 
continuous.  If the program designed to introduce this added functionality/burden 
to the organizations with the region is compartmentalized to consider only its 
near-term and limited perspective, then the metrics used to assess the quality of 
the program also will be limited, and may not be representative of the attributes 
necessary for sustained mission success. 
 
If one broadens his perspective to consider how this new mission can interleave 
with the missions space already existing in the region, then other metrics might 
be developed.  These metrics are more about the quality of partnerships, 
commitment by the partners to continue to support the new missions, perception 
of mutual benefit to other federal and state and local programs, and public 
acceptance of the cost and societal impact of the new mission.  These other 
metrics are more difficult to articulate and to measure.  However, the act of 
constructing the consensus around the definitions of these metrics and 
consensus around how to assess them is viewed by the author as very valuable.  
 
Of course, if the application of RadNuc screening at our border crossing can 
deter the adversary from trying to attack anywhere within Country A, that result 
would be very beneficial.  If this can be done with acceptable cost, then the 
solution is nearing ideal.  But the level of deterrence can only be approximated 
since the mind of the adversary is not known.  Nonetheless, the discussion 
around how much deterrence might be provided by this border crossing 
application, in concert with a layered architecture of other deterrence strategies, 
would be an excellent way to improve the prospects.  This is one of the 
objectives espoused by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, who 
proposes a Global Nuclear Detection Architecture, or GNDA.(Government 
Accountability Office, 2012) 
 
The chart in Figure 65 below depicts the relationship between the difficulty in 
obtaining metrics and their value to assessing overall efficacy of the new RadNuc 
mission.  The metric concerning direct measure of deterrence is considered as 
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most difficult but most significant.  At the lower left part of the chart are shown 
those metrics most often discussed in the literature and in the experience of this 
author.  These metrics are easiest to measure.  Because of the emphasis in cost 
benefit ratio, they are popular since they feed easily into CBA analyses.  
However, the most important costs are likely those that are not so easily 
measured, like the costs to the other agencies, the costs to business and the 
cost to the public.  Similarly, the benefits are broadly difficult to measure, beyond 
those most often mentioned in the literature – like goals associated with how 
much tariff is generated, or how many arrests are made.  More important benefits 
would be taking the opportunity to develop a broad informed consensus on trade 





Figure 65. Metrics for success of RadNuc mission added to existing border 















































































CHAPTER VI  
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
The author has shown a framework for assessment of the long term efficacy of 
RadNuc detection systems at international land border crossings.  This 
framework is composed of five elements.  The first element is a three 
dimensional model of the border crossing to help develop strategic questions.  
This three dimensional model should include perspectives showing primary, 
secondary and tertiary screening locations.  The second element is a two 
dimensional dynamic model of the traffic flow across the border, including the 
degree to which different types of vehicles might be delayed.  This two 
dimensional dynamic model also should include primary, secondary and tertiary 
screening simulation.  The third element is a model of the organizational 
structure which will be necessary to implement the RadNuc mission, including its 
relationship with the organizational structure already extant in the region to 
support all the other missions associated with the border crossing.  The fourth 
element is a strategic view of how the RadNuc screening mission at the border 
crossing fits into the overall global, national and regional picture.  The fifth 
element is an approach to develop the metrics by which one can judge the 
efficacy of the overall enterprise in executing this RadNuc mission addition. 
 
From the literature search, we have seen how several types of approaches have 
been undertaken to get at the issue of assessing efficacy of border crossing 
operation – even before the introduction of the additional RadNuc screening 
mission.  We have seen that the general conclusion is that some combination of 
objective and subjective techniques might provide different perspectives that 
would but supportive in the development of a holistic view of the situation. 
 
What has been surprising to the author is that the literature discusses the 
importance of getting the views of a broad collection of relevant stakeholders but 
when the analysis is actually done, the collection of stakeholders becomes 
relatively narrow compared to the community of stakeholders affected by the 
notional policy change or mission additions.  In fact, the author has concluded 
that one characteristic that hampers the quality of the analysis is that the mission 
statement is imprecise in spite of obvious effort to make the statement precise.  
The imprecision comes from a lack of full understanding of the potential impacts 
on the full range of important stakeholders.  An example is the statement that we 
want to examine the efficacy of the RadNuc screening mission at an international 
border crossing.  A better statement would be that we want to examine how the 
addition of a RadNuc screening mission impacts the efficacy of the complete set 
of missions and operations of the entire enterprise in contact with the border 
crossing.  Of course, one will want to limit the scope of any analysis.  But the 
author believes that a deliberative process should be developed (and reviewed) 
for selection of which stakeholders might be impacted in the long run.  Another 
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conclusion is that the analysis should include a steady state operation (which is 
what most of the literature seems to represent) but also should include unusual 
conditions to determine if there is an unexpected set of stakeholders or missions 
to consider.  An example might be how a hurricane or a flood or a fire at the 
border crossing station or an armed insurrection might affect the ability to 
execute the RadNuc mission or how the RadNuc mission might affect the ability 
of the enterprise to execute the planned response to these upset conditions. 
 
The use of a static isometric view of the border crossing location and of a 
dynamic simulation model helps bring to mind what if questions that will elicit 
perspectives not obvious previously. 
 
The model of the organizational structure helps one ask questions about the 
quality of relationships that would be important to ensuring the long term efficacy 
of the enterprise when the RadNuc mission is added to it.  It makes obvious 
questions about metrics like whether joint working groups have been developed, 
and are still operational and effective.  It raises obvious questions about who has 
responsibility for what part of the mission space under differing conditions. 
 
One of the most important conclusions, from the point of view of the author, is 
that the most important metrics will be some of the most difficult to articulate to 
everyone’s satisfaction, and the hardest to measure.  But the dialogue around 
articulating the metrics is likely to be very important in shaping a holistic view of 
the enterprise in which our new mission will reside.  Everyone may view the 
picture through a different perspective.  But everyone’s perspective likely will be 
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Program Code for NetLogo Model 
 
1 g loba l s [ sample−car 
2 rn ; ; Random number . 
3 num−cars−secondary−incoming ; ; The t o t a l number of incoming v ehi c l e s 
in the secondary screening por t ion of the model . 
4 num−cars−secondary−outgoing ; ; The t o t a l number of outgoing vehi c l e s 
in the secondary screening por t ion of the model . 
5 tot−secondary ; ; Total number of v ehi c l e s in secondary 
s c reening . 
6 num−cars−incoming ; ; The t o t a l number of v ehi c l e s wai t ing 
in l i n e to c ros s the border on the incoming s ide . 
7 num−cars−outgoing ; ; Tht t o t a l number of v ehi c l e s waiting 
in l i n e to c ros s the border on the outgoing s ide . 
8 tot−wait ; ; Total number of v ehi c l e s wai t ing in 
l i n e to cros s the border . 
9 s−l imi t ; ; The speed limi t f o r a l l vehi c l e s . 
10 s2−l imi t ; ; The lowset s tar t ing speed given to a 
veh i c l e . 
11 s2−upper−l imi t ; ; The upper l imi t f o r the random f l o a t 
given to the speed of v ehi c l e s . 
12 tot−num−cars−incoming ; ; Used in determining the number of 
veh i c l e s that have crossed the border . 
13 tot−num−cars−outgoing ; ; Used in determining the number of 
veh i c l e s that have crossed the border . 
14 tot−num−cars ; ; Total cars c ros s ing border . 
15 incoming−t r a f f i c −data ; ; Used f o r l oading incoming t r a f f i c data. 
16 outgoing−t r a f f i c −data ; ; 
17 flowtime−data ; ; 
18 f lowtime ; ; The time assoc iated with the t r a f f i c f l ow . txt data . Used to t e l l 
NetLogo when to generate veh i c l e s . 
19 t r a f f i c −flow−incoming ; ; Number of v ehi c l e s incoming according to Traf f 
icFlow . txt (this i s cur rent ly not being used .) 
20 t r a f f i c −flow−outgoing ; ; Number of vehi c l e s outgoing according 
to Traf f icFlow . txt ( th i s i s cur rent ly not being used . ) 
21 bob ; ; Used to t e s t the random number 
generator 
22 d i s t r i b u t i on ; ; . 








30 to setup 
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31 c lear−a l l 
32 ask patches [ setup−world ] 
33 ask patches [ setup−road ] 
34 ask patches [ setup−secondary ] 
35 ask patches [ setup−boundary ] 
36 ask patches [ setup−lane1 ] 
37 setup−cars 
38 setup−trucks 
39 do−p l o t s 
40 load−t r a f f i c −data 
41 s e t t r a f f i c −flow−incoming 1 
42 s e t z 0 
43 ; watch sample−car 
44 reset−t i c k s 
45 end 
46 
47 to load−t r a f f i c −data 
48 ; ; This procedure loads in patch data from a f i l e . The format of the 
f i l e i s : pxcor 
49 ; ; pycor pcolor . You can view the f i l e by opening the f i l e Fi le IO 
Patch Data . txt 
50 ; ; using a simple text editor . Note that i t automatical ly loads the 
f i l e ” Fil e IO 
51 ; ; Patch Data . txt ”. To have the user choose their own file , see load−own 
−patch−data . 
52 
53 ; ; We check to make sure the f i l e exi s t s f i r s t 
54 i f e l s e ( f i l e −e x i s t s ? ”Flowtime . txt ” ) 
55 [ 
56 ; ; We are saving the data into a l i s t , so i t only needs to be loaded 
once . 
57 s e t incoming−t r a f f i c −data [ ] 
58 
59 ; ; This opens the f i l e , so we can use i t . 
60 f i l e −open ”Flowtime . txt ” 
61 
62 ; ; Read in a l l the data in the f i l e 
63 whi le [ not file−at−end? ] 
64 [ 
65 ; ; f i l e −read give s you va r i abl e s . In th i s case numbers . 
66 ; ; We store them in a double l i s t ( ex [ [ 1 1 9.9999] [1 2 9.9999] 
. . . 
67 ; ; Each i t e rat ion we append the next three−tuple to the current 
l i s t 
68 s e t incoming−t r a f f i c −data sentence incoming−t r a f f i c −data ( l i s t 
f i l e −read ) ; f i l e −read f i l e −read ) ) 
69 ] 
70 




73 ; ; Done reading in patch information . Close the f i l e . 
74 f i l e −c los e 
75 ] 








83 to setup−world 
84 ; color 63 is a dark green 
85 i f ( pcolor = black ) [ set pcolor 63] 
86 end 
87 
88 to do−p l o t s 
89 c lear−plot 
90 s e t di s t r ibut ion [1 997 2375 3170 3363 3302 3106 2827 2524 2162 1904 
1644 1352 1163 976 842 595 534 423 376 255 257 202 141 125 91 53 
72 50 37 34 28 17 11 16 12 10 5 7 3 3 3 1 1 0 2 1 0 0 2 0] 
91 s e t prob [0 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.2 0.22 0.24 
0.26 0.28 0.3 0.32 0.34 0.36 0.38 0.4 0.42 0.44 0.46 0.48 0.5 0.52 
0.54 0.56 0.58 0.6 0.62 0.64 0.66 0.68 0.7 0.72 0.74 0.76 0.78 
0.8 0.82 0.84 0.86 0.88 0.9 0.92 0.94 0.96 0.98 1] 
92 l e t m 0 
93 ; set−current−plot−pen ” Dist ” 
94 whi le [m < l ength di s t r ibut i on ] 
95 [ plotxy item m prob item m distribution 
96 s e t m m + 1] 
97 end 
98 
99 to setup−road ; ; patch procedure 
100 ; ; This i s f o r the incoming ( bottom) lane s 
101 i f ( pycor < −12) and ( pycor > −19) [ s e t pcolor white ] 
102 i f ( pxcor < 2) and ( pxcor > 0) and ( pycor < −12) and ( pycor > −19) [ 
s e t pcolor red ] 
103 i f ( pxcor < 37) and ( pxcor > 35) and ( pycor < −12) and ( pycor > −19) [ 
s e t pcolor blue ] 
104 ; ; This i s f o r the outgoing ( top ) lane s 
105 i f ( pycor < 18) and ( pycor > 11) [ s e t pcolor white ] 
106 i f ( pxcor < 2) and ( pxcor > 0) and ( pycor < 18) and ( pycor > 11) [ s e t 
pcol o r red ] 
107 i f ( pxcor < −34) and ( pxcor > −36) and ( pycor < 18) and ( pycor > 11) [ 
s e t pcolor 86] 
108 ; ; This i s f o r changing the color of the incoming lane s be for e the 
por t a l s 
109 i f ( pxcor < 1 ) and (pxcor > −57) and ( pycor < −12) and ( pycor > −19) 
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[ set pcolor 9.8] 
110 ; ; This i s f o r changing the color of the outgoing lane s be for e the 
por t a l s 
111 i f ( pxcor < 57) and ( pxcor > 1) and ( pycor < 18) and ( pycor > 11) [ s e t 
pcol o r 9 . 7 ] 
112 end 
113 
114 to setup−secondary ; ; patch procedure 
115 i f ( pycor < 10) and ( pycor > −11) and ( pxcor < 40) and ( pxcor > −40) [ 
s e t pcolor 9 ] 
116 i f ( pycor < 8) and ( pycor > 6) and ( pxcor < 4) and ( pxcor > −1) [ s e t 
pcol o r green ] 
117 i f ( pycor < 8) and ( pycor > 6) and ( pxcor < 40) and ( pxcor > 38) [ s e t pcol o r 
orange ] 
118 i f ( pycor < 8) and ( pycor > 6) and ( pxcor < −37) and ( pxcor > −39) [ s e t pcolor 
85 ] 
119 i f ( pycor < −8) and ( pycor > −10) and ( pxcor < −37) and ( pxcor > −39) [ set pcolor 
84 ] 
120 i f ( pycor < −8) and ( pycor > −10) and ( pxcor < 37) and ( pxcor > 35) [ s e t pcolor 
83 ] 
121 ; ; Patch used f o r outgoing−secondary s c r e ening v ehi c l e s ( bottom l e f t 
patch of secondary ) 
122 i f ( pycor < −9) and ( pycor > −11) and ( pxcor < −38) and ( pxcor > −40) [ set pcolor 
87 ] 
123 i f ( pycor < −9) and ( pycor > −11) and ( pxcor < 40) and ( pxcor > 38) [ s e t pcolor 
88 ] 




127 to setup−boundary ; ; patch procedure 
128 i f ( pycor < −12) and ( pycor > −19) and ( pxcor > 55) and ( pxcor < 57) [ set pcolor 
yellow ] 




132 to setup−lane1 ; ; patch procedure 
133 ; ; lane f o r incoming ( bottom) lane s 
134 i f ( pycor < −10) and ( pycor > −13) and ( pxcor < 40) and ( pxcor > 35) [s e t pcolor 
white ] 
135 ; ; lane f o r outoging ( top ) lanes 




139 to setup−trucks 




142 user−message (word ”There are too many trucks f o r the amount of road. Please 
decrease the NUMBER−OF−TRUCKS s l i d e r to below ” 
143 ( world−width + 1) 
144 ” and pres s the SETUP button again . The setup has stopped . ” ) 
145 stop 
146 ] 
147 s e t s−l imi t 0.4 
148 s e t s2−l imi t 0.0000001 
149 s e t s2−upper−l imi t 0.3000009 
150 ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; 
151 ; ; ; This section i s used to construct 6 lanes of t r a f f i c on the INCOMING 
(BOTTOM) s i d e 
152 set−default−shape t u r t l e s ” truck ” 
153 c r t number−of−incoming−trucks [ 
154 s e t color red 
155 s e t xcor random−xcor 
156 s e t ycor −13 
157 s e t heading 90 
158 ; ; ; set i n i t i a l speed to be in range 0.1 to 1.0 
159 s e t speed s2−l imi t + random−f l o a t s2−upper−l imi t 
160 s e t speed−l imi t s−l imi t 
161 s e t speed−min 0 
162 s e t total 0 
163 s e t x 2 
164 s e t wait−time 0 




169 c r t number−of−incoming−trucks [ 
170 s e t color red 
171 s e t xcor random−xcor 
172 s e t ycor −14 
173 s e t heading 90 
174 ; ; ; set i n i t i a l speed to be in range 0.1 to 1.0 
175 s e t speed s2−l imi t + random−f l o a t s2−upper−l imi t 
176 s e t speed−l imi t s−l imi t 
177 s e t speed−min 0 
178 s e t total 0 
179 s e t x 2 
180 s e t wait−time 0 




185 c r t number−of−incoming−trucks [ 
186 s e t color red 
187 s e t xcor random−xcor 
188 s e t ycor −15 
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189 s e t heading 90 
190 ; ; ; set i n i t i a l speed to be in range 0.1 to 1.0 
191 s e t speed s2−l imi t + random−f l o a t s2−upper−l imi t 
192 s e t speed−l imi t s−l imi t 
193 s e t speed−min 0 
194 s e t total 0 
195 s e t x 2 
196 s e t wait−time 0 




201 c r t number−of−incoming−trucks [ 
202 s e t color red 
203 s e t xcor random−xcor 
204 s e t ycor −16 
205 s e t heading 90 
206 ; ; ; set i n i t i a l speed to be in range 0.1 to 1.0 
207 s e t speed s2−l imi t + random−f l o a t s2−upper−l imi t 
208 s e t speed−l imi t s−l imi t 
209 s e t speed−min 0 
210 s e t total 0 
211 s e t x 2 
212 s e t wait−time 0 




217 c r t number−of−incoming−trucks [ 
218 s e t color red 
219 s e t xcor random−xcor 
220 s e t ycor −17 
221 s e t heading 90 
222 ; ; ; set i n i t i a l speed to be in range 0.1 to 1.0 
223 s e t speed s2−l imi t + random−f l o a t s2−upper−l imi t 
224 s e t speed−l imi t s−l imi t 
225 s e t speed−min 0 
226 s e t total 0 
227 s e t x 2 
228 s e t wait−time 0 




233 c r t number−of−incoming−trucks [ 
234 s e t color red 
235 s e t xcor random−xcor 
236 s e t ycor −18 
237 s e t heading 90 
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238 ; ; ; set i n i t i a l speed to be in range 0.1 to 1.0 
239 s e t speed s2−l imi t + random−f l o a t s2−upper−l imi t 
240 s e t speed−l imi t s−l imi t 
241 s e t speed−min 0 
242 s e t total 0 
243 s e t x 2 
244 s e t wait−time 0 




249 ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; 
250 ; ; ; This section i s used to construct 6 lanes of t r a f f i c on the OUTGOING 
(TOP) s i d e 
251 c r t number−of−outgoing−trucks [ 
252 s e t color blue 
253 s e t xcor random−xcor 
254 s e t ycor 12 
255 s e t heading −90 
256 ; ; ; set i n i t i a l speed to be in range 0.1 to 1.0 
257 s e t speed s2−l imi t + random−f l o a t s2−upper−l imi t 
258 s e t speed−l imi t s−l imi t 
259 s e t speed−min 0 
260 s e t total 0 
261 s e t x 2 
262 s e t wait−time 0 




267 c r t number−of−outgoing−trucks [ 
268 s e t color blue 
269 s e t xcor random−xcor 
270 s e t ycor 13 
271 s e t heading −90 
272 ; ; ; set i n i t i a l speed to be in range 0.1 to 1.0 
273 s e t speed s2−l imi t + random−f l o a t s2−upper−l imi t 
274 s e t speed−l imi t s−l imi t 
275 s e t speed−min 0 
276 s e t total 0 
277 s e t x 2 
278 s e t wait−time 0 




283 c r t number−of−outgoing−trucks [ 
284 s e t color blue 
285 s e t xcor random−xcor 
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286 s e t ycor 14 
287 s e t heading −90 
288 ; ; ; set i n i t i a l speed to be in range 0.1 to 1.0 
289 s e t speed s2−l imi t + random−f l o a t s2−upper−l imi t 
290 s e t speed−l imi t s−l imi t 
291 s e t speed−min 0 
292 s e t total 0 
293 s e t x 2 
294 s e t wait−time 0 




299 c r t number−of−outgoing−trucks [ 
300 s e t color blue 
301 s e t xcor random−xcor 
302 s e t ycor 15 
303 s e t heading −90 
304 ; ; ; set i n i t i a l speed to be in range 0.1 to 1.0 
305 s e t speed s2−l imi t + random−f l o a t s2−upper−l imi t 
306 s e t speed−l imi t s−l imi t 
307 s e t speed−min 0 
308 s e t total 0 
309 s e t x 2 
310 s e t wait−time 0 




315 c r t number−of−outgoing−trucks [ 
316 s e t color blue 
317 s e t xcor random−xcor 
318 s e t ycor 16 
319 s e t heading −90 
320 ; ; ; set i n i t i a l speed to be in range 0.1 to 1.0 
321 s e t speed s2−l imi t + random−f l o a t s2−upper−l imi t 
322 s e t speed−l imi t s−l imi t 
323 s e t speed−min 0 
324 s e t total 0 
325 s e t x 2 
326 s e t wait−time 0 




331 c r t number−of−outgoing−trucks [ 
332 s e t color blue 
333 s e t xcor random−xcor 
334 s e t ycor 17 
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335 s e t heading −90 
336 ; ; ; set i n i t i a l speed to be in range 0.1 to 1.0 
337 s e t speed s2−l imi t + random−f l o a t s2−upper−l imi t 
338 s e t speed−l imi t s−l imi t 
339 s e t speed−min 0 
340 s e t total 0 
341 s e t x 2 
342 s e t wait−time 0 





348 to setup−cars 
349 i f number−of−incoming−cars > world−width 
350 [ 
351 user−message (word ”There are too many cars f o r the amount of road . 
Please decrease the NUMBER−OF−CARS s l ide r to below ” 
352 ( world−width + 1) 
353 ” and press the SETUP button again . The setup has stopped . ” ) 
354 stop 
355 ] 
356 s e t s−limi t 0.4 
357 s e t s2−limi t 0.000001 
358 s e t s2−upper−limi t 0.3000009 
359 ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; 
360 ; ; ; This section i s used to construct 6 lanes of t r a f f i c on the INCOMING 
(BOTTOM) side 
361 set−default−shape t u r t l e s ” car ” 
362 c r t number−of−incoming−cars [ 
363 set color red 
364 set xcor random−xcor 
365 set ycor −13 
366 set heading 90 
367 ; ; ; set initial speed to be in range 0.1 to 1.0 
368 set speed s2−l imi t + random−f l o a t s2−upper−l imi t 
369 set speed−l imi t s−l imi t 
370 set speed−min 0 
371 set total 0 
372 set x 2 
373 set wait−time 0 




378 c r t number−of−incoming−cars [ 
379 s e t color red 
380 s e t xcor random−xcor 
381 s e t ycor −14 
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382 s e t heading 90 
383 ; ; ; set i n i t i a l speed to be in range 0.1 to 1.0 
384 s e t speed s2−l imi t + random−f l o a t s2−upper−l imi t 
385 s e t speed−l imi t s−l imi t 
386 s e t speed−min 0 
387 s e t total 0 
388 s e t x 2 
389 s e t wait−time 0 




394 c r t number−of−incoming−cars [ 
395 s e t color red 
396 s e t xcor random−xcor 
397 s e t ycor −15 
398 s e t heading 90 
399 ; ; ; set i n i t i a l speed to be in range 0.1 to 1.0 
400 s e t speed s2−l imi t + random−f l o a t s2−upper−l imi t 
401 s e t speed−l imi t s−l imi t 
402 s e t speed−min 0 
403 s e t total 0 
404 s e t x 2 
405 s e t wait−time 0 




410 c r t number−of−incoming−cars [ 
411 s e t color red 
412 s e t xcor random−xcor 
413 s e t ycor −16 
414 s e t heading 90 
415 ; ; ; set i n i t i a l speed to be in range 0.1 to 1.0 
416 s e t speed s2−l imi t + random−f l o a t s2−upper−l imi t 
417 s e t speed−l imi t s−l imi t 
418 s e t speed−min 0 
419 s e t total 0 
420 s e t x 2 
421 s e t wait−time 0 




426 c r t number−of−incoming−cars [ 
427 s e t color red 
428 s e t xcor random−xcor 
429 s e t ycor −17 
430 s e t heading 90 
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431 ; ; ; set i n i t i a l speed to be in range 0.1 to 1.0 
432 s e t speed s2−l imi t + random−f l o a t s2−upper−l imi t 
433 s e t speed−l imi t s−l imi t 
434 s e t speed−min 0 
435 s e t total 0 
436 s e t x 2 
437 s e t wait−time 0 




442 c r t number−of−incoming−cars [ 
443 s e t color red 
444 s e t xcor random−xcor 
445 s e t ycor −18 
446 s e t heading 90 
447 ; ; ; set i n i t i a l speed to be in range 0.1 to 1.0 
448 s e t speed s2−l imi t + random−f l o a t s2−upper−l imi t 
449 s e t speed−l imi t s−l imi t 
450 s e t speed−min 0 
451 s e t total 0 
452 s e t x 2 
453 s e t wait−time 0 
454 s e t wait−time−i 0 
455 separate−cars 
456 ] 
457 ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; 
458 ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; 
459 ; ; ; This section i s used to construct 6 lanes of t r a f f i c on the OUTGOING 
(TOP) s i d e 
460 set−default−shape t u r t l e s ” car ” 
461 c r t number−of−outgoing−cars [ 
462 s e t color blue 
463 s e t xcor random−xcor 
464 s e t ycor 12 
465 s e t heading −90 
466 ; ; ; set i n i t i a l speed to be in range 0.1 to 1.0 
467 s e t speed s2−l imi t + random−f l o a t s2−upper−l imi t 
468 s e t speed−l imi t s−l imi t 
469 s e t speed−min 0 
470 s e t total 0 
471 s e t x 2 
472 s e t wait−time 0 




477 c r t number−of−outgoing−cars [ 
478 s e t color blue 
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479 s e t xcor random−xcor 
480 s e t ycor 13 
481 s e t heading −90 
482 ; ; ; set i n i t i a l speed to be in range 0.1 to 1.0 
483 s e t speed s2−l imi t + random−f l o a t s2−upper−l imi t 
484 s e t speed−l imi t s−l imi t 
485 s e t speed−min 0 
486 s e t total 0 
487 s e t x 2 
488 s e t wait−time 0 




493 c r t number−of−outgoing−cars [ 
494 s e t color blue 
495 s e t xcor random−xcor 
496 s e t ycor 14 
497 s e t heading −90 
498 ; ; ; set i n i t i a l speed to be in range 0.1 to 1.0 
499 s e t speed s2−l imi t + random−f l o a t s2−upper−l imi t 
500 s e t speed−l imi t s−l imi t 
501 s e t speed−min 0 
502 s e t total 0 
503 s e t x 2 
504 s e t wait−time 0 




509 c r t number−of−outgoing−cars [ 
510 s e t color blue 
511 s e t xcor random−xcor 
512 s e t ycor 15 
513 s e t heading −90 
514 ; ; ; set i n i t i a l speed to be in range 0.1 to 1.0 
515 s e t speed s2−l imi t + random−f l o a t s2−upper−l imi t 
516 s e t speed−l imi t s−l imi t 
517 s e t speed−min 0 
518 s e t total 0 
519 s e t x 2 
520 s e t wait−time 0 




525 c r t number−of−outgoing−cars [ 
526 s e t color blue 
527 s e t xcor random−xcor 
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528 s e t ycor 16 
529 s e t heading −90 
530 ; ; ; set i n i t i a l speed to be in range 0.1 to 1.0 
531 s e t speed s2−l imi t + random−f l o a t s2−upper−l imi t 
532 s e t speed−l imi t s−l imi t 
533 s e t speed−min 0 
534 s e t total 0 
535 s e t x 2 
536 s e t wait−time 0 




541 c r t number−of−outgoing−cars [ 
542 s e t color blue 
543 s e t xcor random−xcor 
544 s e t ycor 17 
545 s e t heading −90 
546 ; ; ; set i n i t i a l speed to be in range 0.1 to 1.0 
547 s e t speed s2−l imi t + random−f l o a t s2−upper−l imi t 
548 s e t speed−l imi t s−l imi t 
549 s e t speed−min 0 
550 s e t total 0 
551 s e t x 2 
552 s e t wait−time 0 
553 s e t wait−time−o 0 
554 separate−cars 
555 ] 
556 ; set sample−car one−of tur t l e s 
557 ; ask sample−car [ s e t color red ] 
558 end 
559 
560 ; th i s procedure i s needed so when we c l i c k ”Setup” we 
561 ; don’ t end up with any two car s on the same patch 
562 to separate−trucks ; ; t u r t l e procedure 
563 i f any? other t u r t l e s −here 
564 [ fd 1 
565 separate−trucks ] 
566 end 
567 to separate−cars ; ; t u r t l e procedure 
568 i f any? other t u r t l e s −here 
569 [ fd 1 




574 to go 




577 ; s e t t r a f f i c −flow−incoming 1 
578 ; i f z = incoming−t r a f f i c −data [ 
579 ; c r t t r a f f i c −flow−incoming [ 
580 ; s e t c o lor red 
581 ; s e t xcor −56 
582 ; s e t ycor −13 
583 ; s e t heading 90 
584 ; ; ; ; s e t i n i t i a l speed to be in range 0 .1 to 1.0 
585 ; s e t speed s2−l imi t + random−f l o a t s2−upper−l imi t 
586 ; s e t speed−l imi t s−l imi t 
587 ; s e t speed−min 0 
588 ; s e t t o t a l 0 
589 ; s e t x 2 
590 ; separate−trucks 
591 ; 
592 ; ] ] 
593 ; s e t z z + 1 
594 ; p r int z 
595 ; whi l e [m < l ength d i s t r i b u t i on ] 
596 ; [ plotxy item m prob item m d i s t r i b u t i on 
597 ; s e t m m + 1 ] 
598 
599 
600 ; ; makes the t u r t l e s ’ Pause ’ at each t o l l booth . 
601 ask t u r t l e s [ i f ( pcolor = red ) and ( t o t a l = 0) [ s e t speed 0.04 s e t 
t o t a l t o t a l + 1 ] ] 
602 ; ; i f the v e h i c l e s have a t o tal = 1 you do not want to add 1 to the 
t o t a l again . Hence the next l i n e . 
603 ask t u r t l e s [ i f ( pcolor = red ) and ( t o t a l = 1) [ s e t speed 0 . 0 4 ] ] 
604 
605 ; ; Determine i f t u r t l e s go to secondary based on probabi l i ty 
606 ; ; The d i s c riminator alarm l e v e l can be changed on the i n t e r f a c e screen . 
607 ; ; Incoming 
608 ask t u r t l e s [ i f ( pcolor = blue ) and ( t o tal = 0 or t o tal = 1) and ( bob 
> Discriminator−l e v e l −incoming ) [ move−to patch 39 −12 s e t heading 0 ] ] 
609 ; ; Outgoing 
610 ask t u r t l e s [ i f ( pcolor = 86) and ( t o t a l = 0 or t o t a l = 1) and ( bob > 
Discriminator−l e v e l −outgoing ) [ move−to patch −39 11 s e t heading 180 ] ] 
611 
612 ; ; Used f o r determining the t o tal number of cars that have passed through the c r 
o s s i n g . 
613 ; ; Incoming Side 
614 ask t u r t l e s [ i f c o lor = red and ( pcol o r = yel low ) and ( x = 2) [ s e t 
tot−num−cars−incoming tot−num−cars−incoming + 1 s e t x x + 1 ] ] 
615 ask t u r t l e s [ i f c o lor = red and ( pcol o r = red ) [ s e t x 2 ] ] 
616 ; ; Outgoing Side 
617 ask t u r t l e s [ i f c o lor = blue and ( pco lor = yellow ) and ( x = 2) [ s e t 
tot−num−cars−outgoing tot−num−cars−outgoing + 1 s e t x x + 1 ] ] 




620 s e t tot−num−cars tot−num−cars−incoming + tot−num−cars−outgoing 
621 
622 ; ; used to makes veh i c l e s in secondary turn l e f t 
623 ask t u r t l e s [ i f ( pcolor = orange ) [ s e t heading −90]] 
624 
625 ; ; Make veh i c l e s stop in secondary f o r screening 
626 ask t u r t l e s [ i f ( pcolor = green ) [ s e t speed 0 ] ] 
627 
628 ; ; making vehi c l e s turn once they reach the cyan patch 
629 ask t u r t l e s [ i f ( pcolor = 85) [ s e t heading −180]] 
630 
631 ; ; making vehi c l e s turn once they reach the second cyan patch ( c o lor 84) 
632 ask t u r t l e s [ i f ( pcolor = 84) [ s e t heading 9 0 ] ] 
633 
634 ; ; making vehi c l e s turn once they reach patch of col or 87 
635 ask t u r t l e s [ i f ( pcolor = 87) [ s e t heading 9 0 ] ] 
636 
637 ask t u r t l e s [ i f c o lor = blue and ( pco lor = 88) [ s e t heading 0 ] ] 
638 
639 s e t num−cars−secondary−incoming 0 
640 
641 s e t num−cars−incoming 0 
642 s e t num−cars−outgoing 0 
643 
644 ; ; Determining how many incoming vehi c l e s are in the secondary 
s c reening por t ion 
645 ask t u r t l e s [ i f c o lor = red and ( ( pcol o r = 9) or ( pcol o r = green ) or ( 
pcol o r = orange ) 
646 or ( pco lor = 85) or ( pcol o r = 84) or ( pcol o r = 83) or ( pco lor = 88) 
or ( pco lor = 64) ) [ s e t num−cars−secondary−incoming num−cars− 
secondary−incoming + 1 ] ] 
647 
648 s e t num−cars−secondary−outgoing 0 
649 ; ; Determining how many outgoing vehi c l e s are in the secondary 
s c reening por t ion 
650 ask t u r t l e s [ i f c o lor = blue and ( ( pcol o r = 9) or ( pcol o r = green ) or 
( pco lor = orange ) 
651 or ( pco lor = 83) or ( pcol o r = 87) or ( pcol o r = 88) or ( pco lor = 64) ) 
[ s e t num−cars−secondary−outgoing num−cars−secondary−outgoing + 
1 ] ] 
652 
653 ; ; Determining the number of veh i c l e s in secondary screening . 
654 s e t tot−secondary num−cars−secondary−incoming + num−cars−secondary− 
outgoing 
655 
656 ; i f tot−secondary > Threshold [ stop ] 




659 ; ; Determining the number of veh i c l e s in l i n e to c r o s s the border on 
the incoming s i de 
660 ask t u r t l e s [ i f ( pcol o r = 9 . 8 ) [ s e t num−cars−incoming num−cars− 
incoming + 1 ] ] 
661 
662 ; ; Determining the wait time of veh i c l e s c r o s s i n g the border . 
663 ; ; Incoming 
664 ask t u r t l e s [ i f ( pcol o r = 9 . 8 ) or ( pcol o r = red ) [ s e t wait−time wait− 
time + 1 ] ] 
665 ask t u r t l e s [ i f ( pcol o r = 9 . 8 ) or ( pcol o r = red ) [ s e t wait−time−i wait 
−time−i + 1 ] ] 
666 ; ; Outgoing 
667 ask t u r t l e s [ i f ( pcol o r = 9 . 7 ) or ( pcol o r = red ) [ s e t wait−time wait− 
time + 1 ] ] 
668 ask t u r t l e s [ i f ( pcol o r = 9 . 7 ) or ( pcol o r = red ) [ s e t wait−time−o wait 
−time−o + 1 ] ] 
669 ; ; Resetting the wait time so i t i s not a continual sum 
670 ask t u r t l e s [ i f ( pcol o r = yel low ) [ s e t wait−time 0 ] ] 
671 ask t u r t l e s [ i f ( pcol o r = yel low ) [ s e t wait−time−i 0 ] ] 
672 ask t u r t l e s [ i f ( pcol o r = yel low ) [ s e t wait−time−o 0 ] ] 
673 
674 ; ; Determining the number of veh i c l e s in l i n e to c r o s s the border on 
the outgoing s ide 
675 ask t u r t l e s [ i f ( pcol o r = 9 . 7 ) [ s e t num−cars−outgoing num−cars− 
outgoing + 1 ] ] 
676 
677 ; ; Determining the t o t a l number of vehi c l e s waiting to c r o s s the 
border . 
678 s e t tot−wait num−cars−incoming + num−cars−outgoing 
679 
680 s e t rn random 100 
681 ; ; Making t u r t l e s from OUTGOING s ide leave secondary a f t e r screening 
682 ; ; t u r t l e s are randomly d i s t r ibuted to the 6 OUTGOING l anes . 
683 ask t u r t l e s [ i f c o lor = blue and ( pco lor = 64) and ( rn < 16) [ move−to 
patch −40 1 2 ] ] 
684 ask t u r t l e s [ i f c o lor = blue and ( pco lor = 64) and ( rn >= 16) and ( rn 
< 33) [ move−to patch −40 1 3 ] ] 
685 ask t u r t l e s [ i f c o lor = blue and ( pco lor = 64) and ( rn >= 33) and ( rn 
< 50) [ move−to patch −40 1 4 ] ] 
686 ask t u r t l e s [ i f c o lor = blue and ( pco lor = 64) and ( rn >= 50) and ( rn 
< 66) [ move−to patch −40 1 5 ] ] 
687 ask t u r t l e s [ i f c o lor = blue and ( pco lor = 64) and ( rn >= 66) and ( rn 
< 83) [ move−to patch −40 1 6 ] ] 
688 ask t u r t l e s [ i f c o lor = blue and ( pco lor = 64) and ( rn >= 83) [ move−to 
patch −40 1 7 ] ] 
689 
690 
691 ; ; making vehi c l e s go to s t a r t t r i p over again . 
692 ask t u r t l e s [ i f ( pcolor = 83) and ( rn < 16) [ move−to patch 40 −13] ] 
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693 ask t u r t l e s [ i f ( pcolor = 83) and ( rn >= 16) and ( rn < 33) [ move−to 
patch 40 −14]] 
694 ask t u r t l e s [ i f ( pcolor = 83) and ( rn >= 33) and ( rn < 50) [ move−to 
patch 40 −15]] 
695 ask t u r t l e s [ i f ( pcolor = 83) and ( rn >= 50) and ( rn < 66. ) [ move−to 
patch 40 −16]] 
696 ask t u r t l e s [ i f ( pcolor = 83) and ( rn >= 66. ) and ( rn < 83. ) [ move−to 
patch 40 −17] ] 
697 ask t u r t l e s [ i f ( pcolor = 83) and ( rn >= 83. ) [ move−to patch 40 −18]] 
698 ; ; i f the v e h i c l e s reach the boundary then they die 
699 ask t u r t l e s [ i f ( pcolor = yel low ) and ( t o t a l = 1) [ s e t t o t a l 0 ] ] 
700 ; ask t u r t l e s [ i f ( pcol o r = yel low ) [ die ] ] 
701 
702 
703 ; ; Making the outgoing t u r t l e s go to a random lane when they wrap 
around the world . 
704 ask t u r t l e s [ i f c o lor = blue and ( pco lor = yellow ) and ( rn < 16) [ move 
−to patch 56 1 2 ] ] 
705 ask t u r t l e s [ i f c o lor = blue and ( pco lor = yellow ) and ( rn >= 16) and 
( rn < 33) [ move−to patch 56 1 3 ] ] 
706 ask t u r t l e s [ i f c o lor = blue and ( pco lor = yellow ) and ( rn >= 33) and 
( rn < 50) [ move−to patch 56 1 4 ] ] 
707 ask t u r t l e s [ i f c o lor = blue and ( pco lor = yellow ) and ( rn >= 50) and 
( rn < 66) [ move−to patch 56 1 5 ] ] 
708 ask t u r t l e s [ i f c o lor = blue and ( pco lor = yellow ) and ( rn >= 66) and 
( rn < 83) [ move−to patch 56 1 6 ] ] 
709 ask t u r t l e s [ i f c o lor = blue and ( pco lor = yellow ) and ( rn >= 83) [ 
move−to patch 56 1 7 ] ] 
710 
711 ; ; Making the incoming t u r t l e s go to a random lane when thy wrap 
around the world . 
712 ask t u r t l e s [ i f c o lor = red and ( pcol o r = yel low ) and ( rn < 16) [ move 
−to patch −56 −13]] 
713 ask t u r t l e s [ i f c o lor = red and ( pcol o r = yel low ) and ( rn >= 16) and 
( rn < 33) [ move−to patch −56 −14]] 
714 ask t u r t l e s [ i f c o lor = red and ( pcol o r = yel low ) and ( rn >= 33) and 
( rn < 50) [ move−to patch −56 −15]] 
715 ask t u r t l e s [ i f c o lor = red and ( pcol o r = yel low ) and ( rn >= 50) and 
( rn < 66. ) [ move−to patch −56 −16] ] 
716 ask t u r t l e s [ i f c o lor = red and ( pcol o r = yel low ) and ( rn >= 66. ) and 
( rn < 83. ) [ move−to patch −56 −17]] 
717 ask t u r t l e s [ i f c o lor = red and ( pcol o r = yel low ) and ( rn >= 83. ) [ 
move−to patch −56 −18] ] 
718 
719 
720 ; ; Determining how many times a car i s asked something whi le in the portal 
721 ; ask sample−car [ i f ( pcol o r = red ) and ( t o tal = 0) [ s e t t o t a l t o t a l + 1 ] ] 




724 ; ; i f there i s a car r ight ahead of you , match i t s speed then slow down 
725 ask t u r t l e s [ 
726 l e t car−ahead one−of t u r t l e s −on patch−ahead 1 
727 i f e l s e car−ahead != nobody 
728 [ s e t speed [ speed ] of car−ahead 
729 slow−down−car ] 
730 ; ; otherwise , speed up 
731 [ speed−up−car ] 
732 ; ; ; don ’t slow down below speed minimum or speed up beyond speed limi t 
733 i f speed < speed−min [ s e t speed speed−min ] 
734 i f speed > speed−l imi t [ set speed speed−l imi t ] 
735 fd speed ] 
736 t i ck 
737 end 
738 
739 to slow−down−car ; ; tur t l e procedure 
740 s e t speed speed − d e c e l e r a t i on 
741 end 
742 
743 to speed−up−car ; ; tur t l e procedure 
744 s e t speed speed + ac c e l e rat ion 
745 end 
746 
747 ; Copyright 1997 Uri Wilensky. 
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From 1991 to 1994, Mr. White held the title of Manager, ORNL Light Water Reactor 
Program.  In this position, Mr. White was responsible for all of the research and 
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